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INTRODUCTION
“Whose bureaucracy is this anyway?”1 This is the question
that political scientist Francis E. Rourke asked in a speech discussing the President’s and Congress’s shared sovereignty over
1. Francis E. Rourke, The 1993 John Gaus Lecture: Whose Bureaucracy Is
This, Anyway?, 26 POL. SCI. & POL. 687, 687 (1993).

2019]

CONGRESS’S AGENCY COORDINATION

1963

the administrative state.2 This Article expands the scope of this
fundamental inquiry by considering it within a framework that
governs the entire executive branch: interagency coordination.
More specifically, this Article establishes that Congress authorizes interagency coordination across the executive branch, by
producing and examining the largest compilation to date of coordination legislation and related legislative history.3
It is commonly understood that the President directs executive agencies. However, while the President may be likened to
the chief executive officer of executive agencies4 or even the “administrator-in-chief,”5 Congress designs the structure of every
2. See generally id. (discussing “the struggle for control over bureaucracy
between Congress and the president”). “This query has haunted the relationship
between the president and Congress from the very beginning of their history
together in the American political system. Which institution is to have real sovereignty over the activities and decisions of the agencies in the executive
branch?” Id.
3. See infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
4. See Rourke, supra note 1, at 687 (suggesting that under the Constitution, the President “reign[s] in solitary splendor as the bureaucracy’s chief executive officer,” and that a plain reading of Article II establishes “with luminous
clarity” that the President has control over the bureaucracy); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2015)
(suggesting that the Constitution requires that the “buck stops” with the President); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988) (noting that Congress
cannot interfere with the President’s constitutionally appointed duty to “take
care that laws be faithfully executed” under Article II); Steven G. Calabresi &
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165–68 (1992) (arguing that the Take Care
Clause contemplates more than a housekeeping role for the President); John
Yoo, Unitary, Executive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1935, 1947 (2009) (stating
that because the Constitution makes the President responsible for executing
laws, the President also has the ability to control inferior executive officers).
5. The term “administrator-in-chief ” recognizes the President as a central
figure directing agencies’ implementation of statutes. See Steven G. Calabresi
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541, 603–15 (1994) (discussing this concept of President as administratorin-chief ) ; Rourke, supra note 1, at 688 (noting the President’s constitutional
title as chief executive officer, and the President’s power in the bureaucratic
sphere); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90 (noting the power of the President
as administrator-in-chief ) ; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 761–63 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting) (suggesting the plausibility of the President as the administrator-in-chief ) ; United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (establishing the President as administrator-in-chief ) ; Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 347, 362 (2017) (noting that “executive action can be legally
binding presidential directives or sub-delegations to agencies”); Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority Over Agency Action,
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agency and administrative subcomponent6 (although its role in
this regard is not exclusive).7 Logically, the idea that Congress
might also direct federal agencies to coordinate with one another
flows from this general understanding.8 However, the relevant
literature has focused only on the ways in which interagency coordination has served as an executive tool for regulatory reform,
to improve administrative adjudication, or to reconcile shared
jurisdiction among agencies.9 Since the President and agencies
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2455–56 (2011) (outlining options for directive presidential authority); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1993) (discussing how Midwest Oil established the
President as administrator-in-chief ) ; Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2014) (arguing that
“the executive power includes directive authority over all federal agencies”). See
generally Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator:
The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991
(1993) (suggesting the constitutional foundations of the President’s authority to
act as administrator-in-chief ) .
6. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies As Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1375, 1416–32 (2017) (discussing design choices by
both political branches underlying instances of interagency conflict); Jacob
Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW 333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010);
Rourke, supra note 1, at 687 (noting that the Constitution “authorized Congress
to establish and empower all the agencies that might thereafter lie within the
domain of the White House”).
7. Brian D. Feinstein, Designing Executive Agencies for Congressional Influence, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 259, 271 n.48 (2017) (“Although most agencies are
established via statute, a nontrivial number are created via executive order,
reorganization plan, or departmental order.”); see also DAVID E. LEWIS, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INSULATION DATA SET CODE BOOK (2007) (analyzing the creation of administrative agencies by political actors between 1946 and 1947),
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/davidlewis/files/2011/12/Codebook.pdf.
8. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 717 (2007) (suggesting briefly
that Congress “has provided for coordination by the President or agencies reporting directly to him across a wide range of governmental activities,” including “budget proposals, property and acquisitions management, paperwork requirements, analyses of the environmental and economic impacts of government
actions [and] litigation”).
9. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1031, 1037 (2013) (arguing for additional and more systematic agency
coordination from the President on enforcement, and not just in rulemaking);
Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745
(2011) (arguing that interagency coordination is “a deliberately designed mechanism for presidential control of the administration”); Jody Freeman & Jim
Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1131, 1174 (2012) [hereinafter Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination] (arguing
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themselves are the paradigmatic initiators of agency coordination, widespread legislative implementation of agency coordination challenges the understanding that coordination is primarily
an executive tool for administrative management.
Analysis of an original legislative dataset indicates that
Congress uses statute-based coordination to influence agencies
to implement both its substantive and political priorities in a variety of regulatory areas,10 often in a manner that is neither directed nor overseen by (and perhaps not even apparent to) the
Executive. In this way, statute-based coordination serves as another potent organizational tool by which Congress supervises
the execution of the law. Indeed, legislation directing agencies to
coordinate may be conceived of as “congressional administration,”11 analogous to the well-known model of presidential administration12 within which most coordination scholars have operated.

that overlapping and fragmented delegations of responsibility provide an opportunity for the President to influence policy by imposing coordination on both
executive and independent agencies, primarily because shared agency delegations cumulatively add to the President’s total discretion); see also Gillian E.
Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1239, 1248 (2017) (“Nor is internal administrative law limited to measures
that exist within an agency. Transagency measures, in particular centralized
White House oversight and coordination mechanisms, also qualify.”); Bijal
Shah, Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 279
(2017) [hereinafter Shah, Interagency Transfers] (documenting agencies’ efforts
to endogenously transfer their final authority to adjudicate administrative
cases to one another); Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015) [hereinafter Shah, Uncovering] (examining
coordination initiated by agencies to manage shared jurisdiction over administrative adjudication).
10. See infra note 88 and accompanying text; infra Table 1 (illustrating that
coordination legislation has been enacted in regulatory areas, including law enforcement, national security, disaster management, military expansion, social
services, healthcare, education, land use, and others).
11. This term has been used to describe congressional oversight. See generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
61, 107–08 (2006) (noting in particular that Congress exercises control over the
execution of the law through the creation and abolition of agencies). This differs
from my use of this term to refer to congressionally-led administrative design,
including the legislative direction or supervision of agencies.
12. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245 (2001) (describing presidential administration, by which the President seeks to direct agencies).
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To put it another way, a principal function of interagency
coordination has been overlooked: its use as a directive instrument that both allows Congress to articulate, with precision, relationships among executive agencies. Perhaps unexpectedly,
this legislation enables agencies themselves to wield autonomous control over other agencies in order to further legislative
priorities. Consider the following examples, each of which is
based in a statutory directive:
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is part of
the Department of Justice, is empowered by Congress to
reach into any other agency to augment its own resources to
pursue fraud cases.13
 The Consumer Product Safety Commission may gather any
data from any agency it chooses, as long as it deems this information “necessary” to “protect public health and safety.”14
 The Department of Defense, a cabinet agency, is authorized
by the legislature to independently require the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, an independent agency,
to contribute expertise and resources to military initiatives.15
 The Coast Guard, a subcomponent of the Department of
Homeland Security, may enable the Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
several other agencies to either combine or subvert one another’s resources in pursuit of their own interests (for instance, national security, environmental protection, and others) in regard to the Arctic.16
Despite their diversity of subject matter and participating
agencies,17 these statutory schemes—and many others analyzed
for this project—share important characteristics indicating that
Congress authorizes coordination primarily to expand the reach
of agencies so that they may more effectively pursue Congress’s
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra notes 487–92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 556–62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 589–95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 496–500 and accompanying text.
See infra note 88 and accompanying text; infra Table 1.
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aims. Congress accomplishes this most often by delegating a single agency to control other agencies’ exercises of policymaking
and enforcement authority, without designating a supervisory
(or any) role for the President. This is the case even if the coordination involves cabinet agencies, as it often does. For this reason, the paradigm of coordination legislation is a prime illustration of J.R. DeShazo’s and Jody Freeman’s assertion that
Congress has an important “mechanism at its disposal in its
quest to control delegated power: other agencies.”18 By highlighting how the legislature enables agencies to interact on the basis
of their own discretion, this Article also challenges the assertion
that “Congress has shown little appetite or capacity for protecting spheres of agency autonomy.”19
As an initial matter, legislative history confirms that Congress delegates the authority to coordinate in order to empower
preferred agencies.20 In addition, the text of the vast majority of
coordination statutes delegates the power to structure the coordination process to one dominant agency, which then becomes
the de facto leader in a network of coordinating agencies. Further, these statutes usually authorize the head agency to determine the breadth of coordination, by allowing it to work with just
about any other federal agency (and in some cases, state and private entities as well). In this way, Congress accords favored

18. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2261 (2005) (suggesting that agency “policing” of other
agencies serves as a form of legislative oversight, in addition to more wellknown means for legislative control of the administrative state such as “structural and procedural requirements built into legislation,” “ex post oversight,”
and equipping “third parties to police agency action and to alert Congress so
that it can intervene to correct agency misbehavior”).
19. Metzger & Stack, supra note 9, at 1307 (“As Congress has shown little
appetite or capacity for protecting spheres of agency autonomy, the key actors
in creating a space for internal administrative law will be the president and the
courts, whose tendencies towards greater centralization or expansions of judicial review exact significant costs to administrative legality and accountability.”); see STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 41 (2007) (noting that public choice
theory assumes that legislatures are not interested in fostering agency autonomy); Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 438–39 (2011) (arguing that the executive
branch has become increasingly centralized).
20. See infra notes 65–74 and accompanying text.
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agencies significant discretion to structure interagency coordination as expansively as they wish.21 However, legislation authorizing coordination is also mostly mandatory,22 in that the
named agency is usually required to coordinate to further the
legislature’s aims.23 Therefore, this legislation maintains overarching congressional control over the initiation and general execution of administrative coordination.
These common characteristics of coordination statutes maximize the likelihood that agencies with competencies of particular importance to Congress will draw on other agencies to further both the legislature’s and their own goals, notwithstanding
the mitigating effects of interagency resistance and conflict.24
Potential motivations underlying the issuance of coordination
legislation may include many that are similar to the President’s
reasons for initiating coordination, such as the desire to use a
prominent agency to further certain substantive goals, combine
diverse agency competencies, bridge ideological divides, increase
the availability and application of expertise, and ensure accountability in policymaking.25 However, coordination legislation may
also be driven by aims that are unique to the legislature, including some that benefit from the incubation of agency autonomy
vis-à-vis the President. These include encouraging agencies to be
more responsive to Congress (particularly to the pressures and
crises it faces), replicating the benefits of shared jurisdiction
while avoiding its drawbacks, and enabling agencies to maintain
their core mandates in the face of disruptive political pressure
from the White House.26
Notably, these statutes serve the legislature’s goals by allowing agencies to coordinate without prescribed involvement
from the President. Therefore, they also have the potential to
unsettle the President’s ability to direct the executive branch.27
More specifically, coordination statutes infuse networks of executive agencies with independence both in the sense that they orient agencies collectively towards legislative concerns (as opposed

21. See infra Part I.A.
22. Cf. Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1158
(providing an example of “mandatory consultation”).
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See infra Part I.C.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See infra Part III.
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to executive priorities) and in that they mandate agency interactions that foster insulation from the President.
First, the independent, hierarchical relationships created
among agencies by coordination statutes may deteriorate the
function, ease, and transparency of presidential administration,
and could even interfere with the President’s exercise of power
under Article II of the Constitution.28 Second, networks of interagency coordination share some characteristics of independent
regulatory commissions, which contributes to these agencies’ insulation from the Executive.29 To resolve interagency conflicts,
as well as minimize confusion and increase executive accountability, the President may assert legislatively-delineated, ex ante
options for presidential involvement (to the extent they are
available),30 or endogenous, ex post mechanisms of executive
oversight.31 From the legislature’s perspective, designating a
clear role for presidential involvement in statute-based coordination may benefit the goals of congressional administration, as
this could reduce incentives for the President to exercise more
extensive oversight post hoc and help the government avoid potential constitutional pitfalls.32
Overall, by analyzing how the ubiquitous framework of statute-based coordination shapes agencies’ relationships with one
another and with Congress, this Article uses the lens of agency
design to expand the scholarship on administrative coordination,
which is focused on interagency relationships that originate in
the executive branch itself.33 And by considering the impact of
new interagency relationships and increased agency autonomy
on the President’s role as administrator-in-chief, this project
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. See infra Part III.B.
30. See infra Part III.C.1.
31. See infra Part III.C.2.
32. See infra Part III.C.1.
33. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. By interrogating the nature
and legitimacy of coordination statutes in this paper, I also investigate a critique of my own work on coordination originating in the executive branch, in
which I argue that coordination statutes provide a legitimate basis for many
interagency agreements. Shah, Interagency Transfers, supra note 9, at 331–33
(arguing in favor of sanction agencies’ efforts to transfer their authority to adjudicate administrative cases to one another, but only if these agreements are
based in legislative delegations of authority to coordinate). But see Farber &
O’Connell, supra note 6, at 1448–49 (suggesting, in disagreement with Shah,
that if “Congress delegates to one agency, then [an] agency cannot give that
authority to a different agency”).
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adds to work exploring interagency conflicts,34 accounts of the
variations in the “executive” and “independent” qualities of all
agencies,35 and the literature debating the unitary executive
paradigm.36 Finally, this Article also contributes to popular discourse on executive power, which includes accounts of fraught
relationships between the President and his cabinet37 as well as
34. See, e.g., Farber & O’Connell, supra note 6 (presenting a comprehensive
descriptive and normative account of interagency conflict); Jacob E. Gersen &
Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193, 2234–35
(2012) (arguing for the importance of delegating to regulatory “enemies,” or
agencies who do not share “principal preferences”); see also Farber & O’Connell,
supra note 6, at 1383 n.40 (citing the following additional examples: Jacob E.
Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2006); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314
(2006); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655
(2006)).
35. See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 773–74 (2013) (arguing that the logic of Humphrey’s Executor is under-inclusive, that the binary
conception of agencies as either “independent” or “executive” is incorrect, and
that many executive agencies display “indicia of independence”); Jennifer Nou,
Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755,
1763 (2013) (describing Nou’s project as examining “the ways in which [executive] agencies can resist institutionalized forms of presidential influence”);
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1163 (2013) (arguing that agencies that lack for-cause tenure may enjoy operative independence because they are protected by unwritten conventions that
constrain political actors from attempting to direct their exercise of discretion).
36. Unitary executive theory, which is grounded in the Vesting and the
Take Care clauses of the U.S. Constitution, holds that all federal officers exercising executive power must be subject to the control of the President—in other
words, that the President possesses the plenary power to control the entire executive branch. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in
a President”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed”); see also Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 4, at
1158–67 (discussing the scholarly debate over the scope of Congress’s power to
insulate executive officials from presidential control); Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1732 (1996) (“The dominant unitarian position conceives of the executive branch as a separate entity ordinarily
accountable to the President alone.”); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1242 (1994) (arguing that the
Vesting Clause “creates a unitary executive”); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1946–47
(stating that the constitutional argument for presidential control relies on the
Vesting and Take Care Clauses).
37. See Rourke, supra note 1, at 691 (noting the FBI’s reduced autonomy
from the President); Cyra Master, Comey in 2014: FBI Must ‘Maintain Independence From Political Forces’, THE HILL (May 14, 2017), https://thehill.com/
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judicial messaging about the constitutionality of insulated forms
of agency leadership.38
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by offering
political and legislative history establishing that Congress issues coordination statutes to empower favored agencies to further key legislative mandates. Then, the bulk of this Part describes newly-gathered legislative history and statutes to
establish the widespread existence of legislation authorizing interagency coordination. More specifically, this Part illustrates
the generally hierarchical, expansive, and mandatory nature of
coordination legislation. These factors suggest that the legislature authorizes agencies to influence the application of other
agencies’ resources and discretion, a phenomenon referred to in
this Article as “interagency control,” in order to further Congress’s aims. This Part also notes that interagency control may
be limited, however, by interagency conflict and resistance.
Part II presents a framework theorizing the legislature’s
motivations for structuring coordination legislation as it has.
First, this Part argues that Congress may authorize interagency
coordination for purposes that are similar to those that drive the
President to initiate coordination. In addition, this Part proposes
a number of incentives unique to the legislature that animate
coordination legislation. By noting that the latter is bolstered by

homenews/administration/333372-what-comey-said-about-fbi-independence-in
-2014 (noting Comey stated that “the Department of Justice answers to the
President, but [i]t has to maintain a sense of independence from the political
forces . . . in the executive branch”); Adam Serwer, The Tragedy of James Comey,
THE ATLANTIC (May 11, 2017), https://theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/
the-tragedy-of-james-comey/526356 (discussing the FBI director’s attempts to
maintain a level of independence from the President); Transcript: Jeff Sessions’s
Prepared Remarks at His Attorney General Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://nytimes.com/2017/01/10/us/politics/sessions-remarks-transcript.html
(quoting Jeff Sessions as saying “[t]he office of the attorney general of the
United States is not a political position, and . . . [the attorney general] must be
committed to following the law. He or she must be willing to tell the president
no if he overreaches. He or she cannot be a mere rubber stamp to any idea the
president has”).
38. See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding
that it is unconstitutional for Congress to vest executive authority in an independent agency headed by a “single, unaccountable, unchecked Director”);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (2017) (No.
15-1177) (highlighting concerns about the functioning of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the event that the current President were to gain more
power over the independent agency).
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administrative autonomy, this Part also offers an instrumental
explanation for the claims furthered in Part III.
Part III argues that coordination legislation encourages administrative independence, and thus unsettles the President’s
function as “administrator-in-chief.” First, this Part discusses
how legislative establishment of interagency networks may impact traditional structures of executive supervision and hierarchy. Then, this Part highlights characteristics of interagency coordination that are similar to the qualities that insulate
independent regulatory commissions from the President. Finally, this Part suggests that the President might reassert Article II authority by exercising involvement in reporting mechanisms established by a handful of coordination statutes,
implementing tools of administrative oversight that originate in
the executive branch and responding to interagency conflicts resulting from statute-based coordination. This Part ultimately
proposes that a well-defined, ex ante presidential participation
in statute-based coordination would balance the benefits of administrative autonomy and the President’s function as overseer
of the executive branch.
I. STATUTE-BASED COORDINATION
Scholars assume that administrative coordination is primarily an executive mechanism for governing the administrative
state.39 Accordingly, the handful of studies gathering inter-

39. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 9, at 1254–55 (stating “a distinctive
feature of [interagency coordination] agreements is that they do not involve action by Congress, the courts, or other parties external to the executive branch”);
see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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agency coordination data have focused on arrangements initiated by the President40 or agreements fostered by agencies themselves,41 and not on legislation establishing coordination. Furthermore, to the extent scholars have examined legislation
40. The President relies on both horizontal and vertical forms of interagency coordination to further her policymaking goals. See, e.g., Jason Marisam,
Interagency Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J., 183, 207 (2013) [hereinafter
Marisam, Interagency Administration] (discussing an example in which the
President relied “on a lead agency—a single agency put in charge of coordinating federal action and to which all other agencies should defer” in order to implement legislation on the basis of his own priorities); Jason Marisam, The President’s Agency Selection Powers, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 821, 835 (2013) [hereinafter
Marisam, Selection Powers] (noting that “interagency hierarchies” allow “a single agency or agency head to speak for the President and act as the President’s
chief adviser for a particular regulatory problem”); id. at 835 (suggesting that
fostering hierarchy allows the President more control over the interagency process and its outcomes); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
211, 213 (2015) (arguing that “the executive augments capacity by mixing and
matching resources dispersed across the bureaucracy . . . [which thus] enables
the executive to combine one agency’s expertise with legal authority allocated
to another”).
41. For instance, Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi declare that most interagency coordination is “negotiated by agencies voluntarily, in furtherance of
their statutory duties, though Congress could explicitly require them, and the
President presumably could request or direct that executive agencies sign such
agreements if he wished.” Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note
9, at 1161. See also id. (characterizing memoranda of understandings (MOUs)
created by agencies as “the most pervasive instrument of coordination in the
federal government”). Other work building on this assertion has detailed administrative networks and subdelegatory relationships created by interagency
agreements like memoranda of understanding. See Metzger & Stack, supra note
9, at 1254–55 (“[T]he scope of internal administrative law . . . includes the processes and policies governing interagency interactions, which similarly represent agency-generated efforts aimed at agency actors that seek to control how
the agencies at issue function. Sometimes these processes and policies are
jointly constructed, as when different agencies enter into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) that govern their interactions.”); Shah, Uncovering, supra
note 9, at 831, 840–50 (discussing and presenting MOUs created by agencies
themselves in order to enter into coordinated interagency adjudication). See generally Shah, Interagency Transfers, supra note 9, at 327 (discussing endogenously-generated interagency arrangements created by MOUs and regulations
by which agencies transfer their full jurisdiction to adjudicate administrative
claims to other agencies). These arrangements can also be horizontal or vertical.
See, e.g., Shah, Uncovering, supra note 9, at 846–50 (illustrating how agencies
choose to coordinate in a relatively horizontal, collaborative manner when they
have shared jurisdiction over an adjudication process); id. at 831–40 (illustrating how agencies engage in hierarchical coordination when they have jurisdiction over different parts of the same adjudicatory process—particularly when
one agency has jurisdiction over an appeals process in which it may reverse the
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engendering coordination in some way, they have considered
only coordination incidental to the statutory delegation of shared
or “overlapping” jurisdiction. Overlapping jurisdiction is the express legislative assignment of the same regulatory authority to
multiple agencies.42 However, while shared jurisdiction may
stimulate the need for coordination among agencies, it does not
itself mandate agencies to coordinate.43
This Part shows that Congress often directly and explicitly
legislates coordination, for purposes and with intention beyond
the reconciliation of overlapping jurisdiction. First, it offers a
snapshot of political history situating the origin of coordination
legislation in the tension between Congress and the President
concerning the proper management of the administrative state
in the wake of the New Deal. Then, the majority of this Part is
devoted to establishing that coordination legislation enhances
Congress’s ability to direct agencies’ implementation of the
law—and in particular, that it does so by fostering administrative autonomy and interagency control. This Part concludes by
considering how the effectiveness of interagency control may be
altered or frustrated by interagency conflict or resistance.
A. POLITICAL HISTORY & CURRENT LEGISLATIVE INTENT
This Section begins by theorizing that the tension between
Congress and the Executive for primary control over agencies instigated the advent of legislation authorizing administrative coordination. Throughout the twentieth century, there was a legislative backlash against sustained presidential efforts to gather

decision of another agency).
42. See, e.g., Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the
Future of Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 81 (2012)
(discussing agency overlap); Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note
9, at 1134 (describing overlapping delegation); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Improving Interagency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 38 ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS 11, 11 (2013) [hereinafter Freeman & Rossi, Improving Interagency Coordination] (“Congress bears primary responsibility for creating these
overlapping functions [across agencies].”); see also Gersen & Vermeule, supra
note 34, at 2234–35 (discussing the difficulty courts face in determining which
agency they ought to defer to “[w]hen multiple agencies must interpret a given
statute”).
43. See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181,
189 (2011) [hereinafter Marisam, Duplicative Delegations] (noting that “duplicative delegations are distinct from jurisdictional arrangements in which Congress directs one agency to consult with another agency before acting”).
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agencies more squarely within the Executive’s power.44 However, Congress seems to have sought targeted control of agency
interactions specifically in response to Presidents’ efforts to corral the extensive, rapid, and often uncoordinated growth of the
federal government resulting from the New Deal.45 Moreover,
this Section asserts, there is proof that Congress continues to
legislate interagency coordination to more precisely implement
its lawmaking agenda.
Governmental expansion stemming from the New Deal required the establishment of new departments and agencies, as
well as the broadening of existing agencies.46 This led to duplication, waste, and conflicts within and between bureaucratic entities that hindered the efficiency and efficacy of the federal government47—including when agencies tried to work together to
achieve shared goals. As noted in the Senate in 1934, “[v]oluntary coordination is inefficient, wasteful, and frequently fails
through lack of information and understanding.”48 Indeed, senators used this justification to issue one of the first statutes mandating interagency coordination for legislative purposes.49 This
44. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995) (“‘The history of the presidency in the
twentieth century has been the history of presidents’ attempts to gain control
of the sprawling federal bureaucracy’ [and t]ypically, these attempts have generated sharp congressional resistance.” (quoting FORREST MCDONALD, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 329 (1994))); Rourke, supra note 1, at 688 (“Throughout the twentieth century, therefore, administrative reform has sought to breathe new life into the president’s constitutional
title as the nation’s chief executive officer. There was continuing resistance in
Congress to this development, especially since the growing authority of presidents in the bureaucratic sphere went hand and glove with the increasingly
dominant position of the White House in American politics and policymaking.”).
45. See COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV’T, THE HOOVER
COMMISSION REPORT xiii–xvi (1949) [hereinafter HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT]; HERBERT EMMERICH, FEDERAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT 47–48 (1971); BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED
STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945, at 156–57 (1983).
46. See HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 45, at xiii–xvi; EMMERICH supra note 45, at 47–48; KARL, supra note 45, at 156–57.
47. HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 45, at xiv.
48. FREDERIC COLLIN WALCOTT, SPECIAL COMM. ON CONSERVATION OF
WILD LIFE RES., TO PROMOTE THE CONSERVATION OF WILD LIFE, FISH, AND
GAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S. REP. NO. 73-244, at 1 (1934).
49. “This bill will secure an efficient coordination of national effort and will
produce a more economical administration.” Id. (discussing mandating coordination for wildlife preservation). This mandated coordination was eventually
included as part of “An Act to Promote the Conservation of Wild Life, Fish, and
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statute was part of Congress’s efforts to foster agency independence50 in response to President Roosevelt’s calls for “the establishment of a responsible and effective chief executive as the center of energy, direction, and administrative management.”51
In 1949, the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government (headed by former President Hoover,
who was appointed to the post by President Truman), also identified weaknesses in agencies’ structures and operation and issued a report calling for more executive-initiated coordination at
all levels of government.52 In this way, it reiterated Roosevelt’s
contention that the President be accorded more concentrated
power to manage agencies.53 Although the Hoover Commission
Report was only partially adopted by Congress at the time, it
influenced the views of future administrations regarding the federal bureaucracy.54 Indeed, subsequent presidents continued to
seek greater control over the expansion and decentralization of
the federal government.55
Game, and for Other Purposes.” Pub. L. No. 73-121, 48 Stat. 401 (1934); 16
U.S.C. § 661 (2012) (“Declaration of purpose; cooperation of agencies; surveys
and investigations; donations.”); see also infra notes 569–73 and accompanying
text (discussing a similarly broad coordination statute issued around the same
time).
50. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of
Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 616 (2010) (discussing how Congress favored the use of independent agencies in Roosevelt’s time). Bressman
and Thompson further discuss that the Supreme Court “supported the broad
authority of the independent agencies,” which suggests that Congress may have
felt emboldened to seek continued administrative control and response. Id. at
617–18.
51. PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2 (1937) (often referred to as the “Brownlow Report”) (emphasis added).
“Roosevelt embraced the Brownlow Committee’s recommendations for executive
reorganization. But the legislation he proposed incorporating these recommendations faced a hostile response from Congress.” Metzger & Stack, supra note
9, at 1270–71.
52. See generally Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal Regions,
70 STAN. L. REV 1895, 1895–96 (2018) (arguing that regional offices of federal
agencies serve as coordinators between “central headquarters” and state and
local governments).
53. See HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 45, at 3; Metzger &
Stack, supra note 9, at 1271.
54. Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 52, at 1930.
55. See id. For instance, under President Eisenhower in the 1950s, the
countermovement against the autonomous expansion of the federal government
gained momentum. Id.
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Nonetheless, the legislature rebuffed presidents’ persistent
attempts to wrangle federal agencies by implementing its own
mechanisms to control agency interactions. First, Congress rejected56 Eisenhower’s efforts to consolidate and coordinate regulatory programs.57 President Kennedy also advocated for greater
presidential control of agencies, both independent and executive,
by drawing Congress’s awareness to problems associated with a
lack of administrative coordination.58 However, this effort was
discouraged by the legislature as well.
In 1961, Kennedy sent a message to Congress on “Regulatory Agencies,” lamenting “that too little attention has been
given to the overall operation of these agencies by the President.”59 This communication was sent after a report commissioned by the Kennedy Administration concluded that a lack of
interagency coordination was inhibiting the development of regulatory policy; greater executive control over agencies, the report
argued, would rectify the problem.60 Instead of sanctioning additional executive control of agency interactions, however, Congress had itself begun authorizing agencies to coordinate. For instance, around that time, the House gave the Small Business
Administration expansive power to coordinate61 to further the
goals of the Small Business Act.62 In addition, the legislature
passed this Act while explicitly disavowing the need for the presidential management of interagency activity.63
56. See JAMES M. STRINE, THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL: LEGAL PROFESSIONALS IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM 71 (1992); Devins, infra note 64, at 265.
57. See COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV’T, TASK FORCE
REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 1–3 (1955); see also EMMERICH,
supra note 45, at 101–28.
58. 107 CONG. REC. 5704, 5813–14 (1961).
59. Id.
60. See JAMES M. LANDIS, U.S. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, 86TH CONG., REP. ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENTELECT 24–31 (Comm. Print 1960).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 639(f) (2006) (“To the extent deemed necessary by the Administrator to protect and preserve small-business interests, the Administration shall consult and cooperate with other departments and agencies of the
Federal Government in the formulation by the Administration of policies affecting small-business concerns. When requested by the Administrator, each department and agency of the Federal Government shall consult and cooperate
with the Administration . . . [except in situations affecting] the national interest
in an emergency.”) (originally passed in 1958).
62. An Act to Amend the Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 85-536,
72 Stat. 384 (1958).
63. More specifically, the House Committee on Banking and Currency
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The confrontation between Kennedy and the legislature
marked the beginning of a legislative interest in nurturing administrative autonomy. This took the form of a budding reliance
on agency coordination legislation and a growing interest in creating independent agencies, which also bolsters congressional
influence and limit the president’s impact on administrative decisionmaking.64 Perhaps, then, it is no coincidence that this period is also part of the narrative of unitary executive theory.65
Congress began issuing coordination legislation in earnest
in the 1960s, and has continued to do so until the present day.

stated, in regards to coordination furthering the interests of the Small Business
Act, that “such consultation and cooperation should be a normal part of the operations of the Government; there is no reason to require a special direction
from the President.” H.R. REP. NO. 85-555, at 16 (1957).
64. See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY
DESIGN 30 (2003) (describing how congressional Democrats opted to delegate
broad consumer protection powers to a newly created independent agency, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, and how it created create seven-year
terms for members of this agency, in order to insulate these powers from President Nixon’s antiregulatory influence); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15,
20 (2010) (“The idea is that an agency could be created that would be insulated
from short-term political pressures so that it could adopt public policies based
on expertise that would yield better public policy over the long term.”); Bressman & Thompson, supra note 50, at 612 (“Independence was traditionally justified, particularly during the New Deal era, as promoting expertise.”); Neal
Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and
the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 463 (2008) (“Some combination of concerns about expertise, due process, and the likely administrative
actions of Presidents explains Congress’s decision to constrain the President
this way.”); Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 260 (1994) (“For
better or for worse, independent agencies are empowered to make policy at odds
with White House priorities.”); Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control,
Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1778 (2012) (“Thus,
independent agencies—which burgeoned during the New Deal—were designed
with the purpose of shielding expert decisionmakers from the shifting winds of
politics.”).
65. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 153–79 (1994) (detailing the demise of the
non-delegation doctrine during this time); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era,
1945–2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 645 (2005) (discussing Kennedy’s actions regarding independent agencies); see also STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER
S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO
BUSH 4 (2008) (arguing that “all of our nation’s presidents have believed in the
theory of the unitary executive”).
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In general, the legislative history underlying coordination statutes showcases congressional intent to manage administrative
activity in a manner consistent with legislative priorities. Like
its efforts to support legislative priorities through the creation of
independent agencies,66 Congress often does this by expanding
the reach of agencies with competency in areas that it prioritizes.
Generally speaking, the lead agencies in statutes authorizing coordination have substantive knowledge and the capacity to further policymaking in regulatory matters of interest to Congress,
as well as political stances that are sympathetic to the policies
Congress wishes to implement.67
Coordination statutes have expanded the autonomy and jurisdiction of several agencies in their core areas of regulatory expertise, including: the FBI;68 the Department of Veterans Affairs;69 the Department of Energy;70 the Consumer Product
Safety Commission;71 the Army and the Department of Defense
as a whole;72 the Department of Transportation;73 and the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, a subcomponent of
the Department of Health and Human Services.74 For instance,
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act allows the FBI to
66. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
67. These qualities are also found in lead agencies in interagency coordination initiated by the President. See infra notes 178–82 and accompanying text.
68. See infra note 489 (citing H.R. REP. 110-374(l) (2007), which indicates
that coordination was implemented to expand the reach of the FBI).
69. See infra notes 222, 509 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-123, at 17 (1997) and
H.R. REP. NO. 105-293, at 11 (1997), both of which discuss coordination intended
to expand the power of the Department of Veterans Affairs).
70. See infra notes 547–52 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-1006 (1980), which suggests that Congress intended coordination to increase the power of the Department of Energy).
71. See infra note 557 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 110-501 (2007), which suggests
that coordination was authorized to expand the power to the Consumer Product
Safety Commission).
72. See infra note 581 (citing S. REP. NO. 91-1422, at 108 (1970), which suggests that coordination was authorized to expand the “authority currently available to the Department of the Army”); infra note 590 (citing H.R. REP. NO.
85-1770, at 7 (1958), which noted that coordination was authorized to expand
the power of the Department of Defense over NASA).
73. See infra note 620 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-1048, at 19 (1976) (Conf. Rep.),
which suggests that coordination was intended to bolster the Department of
Transportation).
74. See infra note 508 (citing S. REP. NO. 106-82, at 5 (1999) and H.R. REP.
NO. 106-305 (1999), both of which discuss coordination as intended to expand
the role and influence of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, a
subcomponent of the Department of Health and Human Services).
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draw from just about any agency to amplify its resources and
reach—an interpretation of the statute that is supported by legislative history.75 This gives the FBI particular sway over the
coordinated implementation of anti-fraud policy enforcement.76
Similarly, the Attorney General appears to have significant influence in the furtherance of the Federal Witness Security Program,77 the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality in regards to health services research and quality assurance,78 and
the Department of Veteran’s Affairs as concerns assistance to
homeless veterans.79 Also, in environmental protection and related mandates, agencies with clear expertise in these areas tend
to be empowered to initiate coordination to further relevant
aims.80
B. COORDINATION LEGISLATION & INTERAGENCY CONTROL
This Section offers a holistic analysis of all statutes that authorize coordination, cooperation or collaboration between or
among federal agencies and agency subcomponents.81 By presenting the most extensive collection of statutes to date authorizing agencies to coordinate with one another,82 this Section establishes that Congress seeks to initiate interagency
coordination across a broad swath of the administrative state.
Due to time and resource limitations, this exploration does
not capture every instance in which legislation includes a seemingly throwaway reference to the word “coordinate,” “cooperate”
75. See supra note 68.
76. See infra notes 487–92 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 493–98 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 507–11 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 509 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 517–36 and accompanying text.
81. The raw data from Westlaw shows 141 results for U.S. Code sections as
of 2018 that contain both (collaborat! or coordinat! or cooperat!) and (agenc! or
department) within the section title. Further curation of these results led to the
identification of eighty-one statutes that authorize federal interagency coordination. While the conclusions drawn in this Part are based on an overarching
analysis of this dataset, most of these eighty-one statutes are referenced directly
throughout this Article and in the Appendix. For additional information about
the dataset, please contact the author.
82. I would like to thank Cary Coglianese for this observation; see also Bijal
Shah, Coordination as Resistance (to the President) (Nov. 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the implication that interagency coordination has for the constitutional and administrative separation
of powers).
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or “collaborate.”83 that appears to have been included without
much legislative deliberation. Instead, this dataset includes all
statutes that have standalone sections authorizing agencies to
engage in these ways. This analysis focuses on legislation with
section headings that reference these forms of agency interaction, because headings suggest that portion of legislation was
drafted with intention, and thus is relatively important to the
enabling statute.84
Certainly, Congress is not necessarily, or perhaps even often, intentional when it builds duplication and overlap into the
administrative state.85 However, the instances of coordination
presented here involve concise and explicit references to multiple-agency interactions within a single, relevantly-titled section
of legislation. Therefore, they are unlike statutory language that
leads to accidental agency fragmentation, such as the assignment of overlapping jurisdiction via duplicative legislation created by different congressional committees or at different points
in time.86 Moreover, legislative history associated with the statutes analyzed in this Article bears this out. By providing insight
into why Congress empowered agencies to coordinate in any
given instance, it indicates, at the very least, that Congress did
83. For instance, a Westlaw search for the term “in coordination with”
yields upwards of 700 statutes. The term “in consultation with” results in over
200 statutes. “In partnership with” captures 141 statutes as of 2018.
84. Many of the excluded results also pertain to interactions between federal agencies and state entities, tribes, or private entities, such as schools and
hospitals, etc.—dynamics worth studying, but that are not the focus of this project.
85. “One might be tempted to think that because lawmakers ultimately authorize these delegations by statute, they are intentional, but this assumption
places too much faith in lawmakers’ prescience in legislating.” Freeman &
Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1143 (citations omitted); see also
JONATHAN B. BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT 41
(1985) (“[T]he intentional creation of redundancy is quantitatively of small importance when compared with the less dramatic causes.”); LEWIS, supra note
64, at 7 (“[M]ost of the duplication, fragmentation, and overlap in the administrative state is not purposefully chosen to take auxiliary precautions or improve
effectiveness via competition.”). But see Cornelius P. Cotter & J. Malcolm Smith,
Administrative Responsibility: Congressional Prescription of Interagency Relationships, 10 W. POL. Q. 765 (1957) (discussing in depth various interagency
relationships that Congress created intentionally).
86. Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1143 (“In many
cases, the creation of shared regulatory space is not the result of a single Congress but develops over time, on a piecemeal basis, as enacting majorities engraft new powers and responsibilities onto existing assignments of authority.”)
(citations omitted).
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so on purpose.87
Coordination requirements are often framed in mandatory
language, which also suggests that they are important to the enabling statute. If a coordination scheme is presented as optional,
87. See, e.g., infra note 513 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-43 at 13 (1973), which
showed an intent to bolster the power of the Administration on Aging through
coordination); infra note 532 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-825, at 11 (1982), which
discusses the issuance of coordination to protect a national park); infra note 522
(referencing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 8 (1976), which shows that coordination
was implemented specifically to “achiev[e] the purposes of th[e Resource Conservation and Recovery Act]”); infra note 553 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1298
(1976) (Conf. Rep.), which discusses coordination authorized to further national
energy policy); infra note 561 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-311, at 107 (1973), which
notes that coordination furthers certain aims of the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964); infra note 576 (citing S. REP. NO. 81-2094, at 2, 6 (1950), which notes
that cooperation was intended to further the international coordination of tuna
research); infra note 578 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-413 (1982), which notes that
coordination was implemented to ensure that wildlife conservation did not interfere with military priorities); infra note 581 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 91-1665, at
66 (1970), which notes that coordination was authorized to further the development of water resources in the western United States); infra note 588 (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 97-388 at 48 (1982), which notes that coordination was authorized to improve medical services to civilians); infra note 590 (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 85-1770, at 7 (1958), which states that coordination was authorized to
achieve improved research and development by military and civilian organizations on war-time matters); infra note 615 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 108-397(l)
(2003) and S. REP. NO. 108-252 (2004), which note that coordination was authorized to “facilitate the transfer of interdisciplinary knowledge” for ecological
restoration and wildlife management purposes); infra note 594 (citing S. REP.
NO. 93-980, at 51 (1974), which notes that coordination was authorized to bolster research related to environmental protection); infra note 598 (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 91-1307, at 12 (1970), which deemed coordination provision “most important” and necessary to the success of the migratory waterfowl conservation
program established by the statute); infra notes 626–30 (citing H.R. REP. NO.
102-199, at 76–78 (1991), which notes that coordination was authorized to improve community services for the elderly); infra note 629 (citing S. REP. NO.
100-128, at 29–30 (1987), which discusses authorizing coordination to improve
employment-related services for veterans); infra note 632 (citing S. REP. NO.
105-332, at 5 (1998), which suggests that Congress provided for interagency coordination to better achieve the Public Works and Economic Development Act’s
purpose of providing economic assistance to less developed parts of the United
States); infra note 635 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 81-2514, at 5 (1950), which suggests
that coordination was authorized to improve whaling regulations); infra note
640 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-91 (1995), which suggests that coordination was issued to improve agency management of shared fishing regions); infra note 621
(citing S. REP. NO. 94-830, at 46 (1976), which suggests that Congress authorized coordination to support the Department of Energy’s electric car project);
infra note 592 (citing H.R. REP. NO 1770, at 16 (1958)), infra note 612 (citing
H.R. REP NO. 97-295 (1981)).
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on the other hand, this implies that Congress does not believe
coordination to be essential to the broader legislative directive.
In addition, Congress’s issuance of primarily mandatory coordination directives indicates the legislature’s desire not to leave it
to agencies to decide, at their own discretion, whether to initiate
coordination. Furthermore, mandatoriness indicates that the coordination provision was intentional even if the enacting legislature did not know how best to align agencies’ incentives or to
structure the coordination hierarchy or process. This is further
suggested by coordination statutes that are both mandatory and
expansive or open-ended, and that therefore require coordination, but leave the work of shaping it to the lead agency. And in
any case, once multiple congressional committees possess authority to oversee an administrative function as a result of coordination legislation, each can be expected to yield it only reluctantly. This, in turn, may allot the coordination provision a long
enough lifespan to impact administrative activity even if it was
not passed with clear intention.
As to substantive focus, these statutes often pertain to matters of environmental protection and energy management.88
However, coordination legislation has also been enacted within
and across several other public law areas, including law enforcement, national security, disaster management, military expansion, social services, education, small businesses, and federalism/land use. A researcher studying a particular regulatory area
might be interested in this representation of coordination statutes by subject matter and programmatic breadth:

88. This makes sense, given that a significant portion of the interagency
coordination literature focuses on this regulatory area. Shah, Uncovering, supra
note 9, at 807 n.2 (“In general, the agency coordination literature has focused
abundantly on agencies participating in environmental regulation.”) (citations
omitted).
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Table 1: Coordination by Issue & Importance

Law Enforcement / Disaster Relief

Environmental Protection

Energy Policy

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (law Endangered Species Act (protect endangered species),
enforcement), Market Reform Act (market
Marine Mammal Protection Act (marine mammal
risk regulation), Coast Guard and Maritime research and protection), Energy Reorganization Act
Transportation Act (security and other
(expansive environmental protection), Southwest
policies concerning in the Arctic), Coast
Forest Health and Wildfire Prevention Act (ecological
Guard Authorization Act (environmental
restoration and wildlife management), Water Bank
disasters), An Act to Regulate Commerce with Act (wetlands program), Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Foreign Countries (furtherance of general
Act (protect wildlife), Act to Amend the Commercial
statute), National Flood Insurance Act
Fisheries Research and Development Act (management
(preventing flooding), National Drug Control of commercial fishing regulations), National Fishing
Policy (drug abuse prevention), Anti-Drug
Enhancement Act (sustain research of Antarctic
Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act
and Controlled Substances Act (drug policing
marine ecosystem), Energy Policy Act (protect
(coastal zone management and national energy
in national forests), Omnibus Diplomatic
ecosystems of the North Slope of Alaska),
policy), Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research,
Security and Antiterrorism Act (security of Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora (furtherance Development, and Demonstration Act (Electric and
diplomatic missions), Joint Resolution Making of general statute), Whaling Convention (furtherance Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and
Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year
of general statute), Resource Conservation and
Demonstration Project), Methane Transportation
1985, and for Other Purposes (Federal Witness Recovery Act (waste management), Tuna Conventions
Research, Development, and Demonstration Act
Protection Program)
Act (furtherance of general statute)
(methane vehicle development)
Military

National Aeronautics and Space Act (military
technology), Coordination of Wildlife, Fish, and
Game Conservation and Rehabilitation in Military
Reservations (sustain natural resources for
military benefit), An Act Authorizing the
Construction, Repair, and Preservation of Certain
Public Works on Rivers and Harbors for
Navigation, Flood Control, and for Other
Purposes (military development of water
resources of Western U.S. under Colorado
River Basin Project)

Social Services / Education / Small Business

Land Use

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (avoid
duplication of functions), Consumer Product Safety
Act (furtherance of general statute), Veterans'
Benefits Act (housing for veterans), Older Americans
Act Amendments (support services for health,
education and training of the elderly), Indian
Financing Act (improve conditions of reservations),
Healthcare Research and Quality Act (health services
research and quality), Higher Education Act (STEM
education programs), Vietnam Era Veterans'
Readjustment Assistance Act (employment for
veterans), Small Business Act (furtherance of general
statute)

Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development
Act (areawide development), Reforestation Act
(support preservation of public and private land),
An Act to Provide for the Protection of Land Resources
Against Soil Erosion (soil erosion), An Act to Revise,
Codify, and Enact into Law, Title 23 of the United States
Code, Entitled "Highways" (maintain federal, state
and foreign highways), Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (waste management), An Act to Stop
Injury to the Public Grazing Lands (range
administration), Housing and Community
Development Act (manufactured housing
development), Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally
Assisted Programs (mobile homes safety), Housing
and Community Development Act (control lead paint),
Establishing the Sawtooth National Recreation Area
(furtherance of general statutes), Wolf Trap Park
Act (furtherance of general statute)

The majority of statutes authorizing coordination with intention can be described by a handful of qualities. Moreover,
these characteristics square with legislative history indicating
that Congress often authorizes coordination legislation to empower a dominant agency to shape administrative implementation of the law according to legislative interests. Almost all statute-based interagency coordination tends to be vertical and
hierarchical, with one preferred, named agency in control of implementation. This structure privileges the interests of the lead
agency and by extension, emphasize the legislature’s own goals.
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In most of this subset of statutes, the lead agency is authorized
to initiate coordination expansively—that is, with several other
agencies or an unspecified set of agencies—and as shaped by its
own discretion. In this way, the favored agency’s reach is not
cabined. Finally, almost the entirety of coordination legislation
uses language that specifies or suggests that coordination is
mandatory, thus preserving Congress’s overarching control over
the process.89 The rest of this Section discusses the parameters
of coordination legislation in detail, and suggests, ultimately,
that the combination of these factors spurs favored agencies to
exercise control over other agencies, or “interagency control,” in
order to better implement the legislature’s lawmaking priorities.90
As noted, coordination statutes issued intentionally are
more likely than not to authorize coordination that is unilaterally-initiated—in other words, initiated by one, leading, named
agency.91 All but one92 of the statutes mandating unilaterallyinitiated coordination authorize just one particular agency or
agency head to initiate and lead the coordination. Further, only
eleven of all the statutes analyzed for this project limit the authorized lead agency to coordinate with only one or two named
agencies. The rest allow the lead agency to coordinate with several or an uncapped number of other agencies. Put another way,
interagency coordination established by legislation is primarily
hierarchical and expansive.
In many instances, the head of the lead agency is directly
designated in charge of the coordination. For example, under the
Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act,93 the Secretary of Commerce is assigned to coordinate to improve coastal

89. “When Congress legislates with precision, the President and other administrative officials may have little discretion in the execution of the law, especially if there are effective tools for enforcing Congress’s expressed intent . . . .
If Congress is less than precise, or if enforcement is not very strong, Congress
may be unable to exert much direct control over the administration of the law.”
Beermann, supra note 11, at 71–72.
90. For in-depth discussion and substantiation of the coordination legislation on which the following analysis is based, including citations to and excerpts
from relevant legislative history and statutory language, please consult the Appendix.
91. See App., Part A.
92. In one example, the statute empowers a Commission of two agencies to
lead the coordination effort. See infra notes 541–42.
93. See infra note 551 and accompanying text.
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zone management and national energy policy.94 And per the Methane Transportation Research, Development, and Demonstration Act,95 the Secretary of Energy is tasked with leading the coordination.96 The Secretary of Energy is also named to lead
coordination in other instances.97 And perhaps unsurprisingly,
the Secretary of State is often empowered to coordinate
broadly.98
In many cases, statutes delegate to agency heads the authority to coordinate with an unspecified set of other agencies.
Examples include delegations of open-ended coordination authority to the Secretary of Commerce99 and the Secretary of Labor.100 Other statutes grant broad coordination authority to several department heads. This legislation includes the Veterans
Benefits Act, which grants joint authority to the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs101 and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,102 and the Small Business Act, which names all cabinet heads, the Administrators of the Small Business Administration,103 and the EPA as parties with authority to
coordinate.104 By contrast, few statutes mandate the heads of
agencies to coordinate with a particular other agency head or
agency. Examples include the Secretary of Agriculture’s mandate to coordinate with the Secretary of the Interior,105 and the

94. See infra note 552–56 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 547–52 and accompanying text.
96. See infra note 550 and accompanying text.
97. See also infra notes 547–53 (allowing the Secretary of Energy to coordinate with “any other federal department or agency”); infra notes 618–24 and
accompanying text (allowing the Secretary of Energy to coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation).
98. See, e.g., infra notes 155, 545–49, 609–13, 633–40 and accompanying
text (authorizing the Secretary of State to work with “agencies of the United
States,” among others).
99. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text; infra notes 514–19 (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior “to cooperate with the Small Business
Administration and the Corporation for National and Community Service and
other Federal agencies”); infra notes 597–602.
100. See infra notes 263, 510, 629 and accompanying text.
101. See infra note 509 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 258–61 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 263, 520–25, 593–99 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 614–19 and accompanying text.
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Secretary of Interior’s authority to coordinate with the Federal
Aviation Administration.106
Sometimes, several heads of agencies may be tasked with a
meeting of the minds to further a legislative initiative, such as
in coordination led by the Commandant of the Coast Guard107 or
the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),108 or conducted together by the Secretary
of Homeland Security, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget.109 Fewer statutes still allow heads of
agencies to coordinate jointly with other entities, like the authority of the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce to initiate
coordination with other federal agencies.110 And occasionally,
the head of an agency will be explicitly authorized to work with
its own subcomponent to coordinate with other federal agencies—like the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the
Director of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality111 or
the Commissioner on Aging,112 the Secretary of Agriculture and
the Forest Service,113 or the Secretary of the Army and her Chief
of Engineers.114 This shows that Congress may (re)direct not
only inter-, but also intra-agency relationships via legislation.
Overall, hierarchy and expansiveness in interagency coordination encourages lead agencies to structure coordination autonomously.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See infra notes 530–33 and accompanying text.
See infra notes, 352, 366, 461–67, 496–500 and accompanying text.
See infra note 562 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 638–42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 517–22 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 506–11 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 624–31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 535–43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 579–85 and accompanying text.
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Table 2: Hierarchy & Expansiveness in Interagency Coordination

Most

Hierarchy &
Expansiveness
in Authority to
Coordinate

Least

Unilaterally
-initiated coordination with unspecified (or unnamed) federal
agencies
Unilaterally-initiated coordination with specified (or named)
agenc[ies]
Jointly-initiated
coordination
(with two
named agencies)

In addition, the majority of coordination statutes in this dataset require the lead agency to initiate coordination, even if the
agency has some freedom to shape the coordination process. Put
another way, this data suggests that statute-based coordination
is often mandatory, either for the lead agency, other agencies in
the statute—named or unnamed—or both. Most of the statutes
in this dataset mandate coordination by use of terms such as
“shall” and “must.”115 Some others require coordination to the
“maximum extent possible” or the “maximum extent practicable,” which falls short of establishing a strict requirement but
renders the coordination semi-obligatory.116 And relatively few
others offer agencies the option to coordinate solely, and transparently, on the basis of their own discretion.117
In addition, once the named agency has initiated coordination, other agencies are generally directed by Congress to respond (although, as the next subsection discusses, conflict and
resistance may complicate or erode responsiveness). Nonetheless, because coordination is authorized explicitly in service of an
enabling statute, the policymaking goals furthered by interagency coordination are always determined, albeit broadly, by
Congress. As a result, mandating agency coordination intensifies
the legislature’s ability to direct agencies.
115. See App., Part A.1, Part B.1, Part C.1.
116. See App., Part A.2, Part B.2, Part C.2.
117. See App., Part A.3, Part B.3, Part C.3.
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Table 3: Congressional Control in Interagency Coordination

Mandatory

Semi-Obligatory

Discretionary

Most

Congressional
Control over
Authority to Coordinate

Least

Because coordination legislation is generally hierarchical,
expansive and mandatory, it is a potent mechanism of agency
control over other agencies. In general, agencies “seek to influence other agencies’ actions to advance and protect their own interests,”118 either to positive or negative effects.119 As Eric Biber
and others have suggested, processes by which agencies direct
other agencies to specific policymaking outcomes include “lobbying,” for instance, via the submission of comments on other agencies’ proposals; a plea to a political leader, like the elevation of
decisionmaking to an upper-level official; and the exercise of express authority, like the use of coercive statutory powers to veto
another agency’s proposals.120 In addition, there is a burgeoning

118. Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions
of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2009) [hereinafter
Biber, Too Many Things to Do] (suggesting that agencies can cope with the challenge of achieving success in the multiple goals laid out for them by Congress
and the President by interacting with other agencies); see also Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 40, at 186 (“Interagency administration reorients the conception of power in the administrative state by turning agencies
from competitors for power into secondary sources of power for each other (after
the primary sources of Congress and the White House).”); id. at 191 (“By contributing resources and expertise to another agency’s regulatory problem, an
agency can shape an executive action over which it otherwise would have no
influence.”).
119. See Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 40, at 188–200
(suggesting that agencies can act rationally by manipulating other agencies in
order to augment their own expertise or may fail to fulfill their responsibilities
as a result).
120. See generally Biber, Too Many Things to Do, supra note 118 (exploring
two main models of agency interactions: the monitoring agency as a “lobbyist,”
and the monitoring agency as a “regulator”); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note
18, at 2221 (arguing that Congress can control delegated power by using agencies as “lobbyists” against other agencies on its own behalf ) ; see also Bradley,
supra note 9, at 754–56; Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 40,
at 200.
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literature that focuses on the allocation of power among agencies,121 although this work has not amply considered the ways in
which agencies might encroach on one another’s turf.122
Coordination statutes that are unilaterally-initiated and expansive also allow their lead agencies opportunities to influence
other agencies’ actions to advance and protect their own interests—more specifically, by giving them the authority to draw on
the resources and discretion of other agencies to further certain
policymaking goals. Furthermore, since lead agencies are often
required to initiate coordination dictated by legislation—and
non-lead agencies are obligated to respond—it is more likely that
these vertical interagency relationships will, in fact, come to fruition.123 This Article refers to this dynamic as “interagency control.”

121. See, e.g., Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within
Agencies, 120 YALE L. J. 1032 (2011); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving
Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (2015); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New
Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016).
122. Bijal Shah, Toward an Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 227 (2016) (critiquing Jon D. Michaels’s work on this basis).
123. Notably, the many non-mandatory coordination also occur within
frameworks that are otherwise hierarchical and expansive, which gives lead
agencies maximum discretion in the initiate and implement coordination. See
infra notes 545–91 and accompanying text. And in at least one instance, coordination legislation also offers a dispute resolution mechanism by which an
agency might feasibly influence another. See infra notes 557–59 and accompanying text.
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Table 4: Factors Engendering Interagency Control

There are many coordination regimes in this dataset that
create strong conditions of interagency control. These offer evidence that Congress often issues coordination legislation to give
favored agencies the opportunity to shape the use of other agencies’ resources, policymaking priorities and discretion in order to
implement legislative priorities.
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Table 5: Overall Categorization of Coordination Legislation
Mandatory

Most

Unilaterally
initiated by
lead agency
with
unspecified
(or
unnamed)
federal
agencies

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(DOJ/FBI), Market Reform Act
(Securities and Exchange
Commission), National Drug Control
Policy (White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy), Joint
Resolution Making Continuing
Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985,
and for Other Purposes (AG), Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation Act (Coast
Guard), An Act to Regulate Commerce
with Foreign Countries (International
Trade Commission), Small Business Act
(Small Business Administration),
Higher Education Act (Dept. of
Education), Healthcare Research and
Quality Act (HHS/Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality), Veterans' Benefits
Act (VA), Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (Dept. of Labor),
Older Americans Act
(HHS/Administration on Aging),
Indian Financing Act (Dept. of
Interior), Endangered Species Act
(Depts. of Interior and Commerce
with other unnamed agencies),
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(EPA), Marine Mammal Protection Act
(Marine Mammal Commission),
Energy Policy Act (Dept. of Interior),
Coast Guard Authorization Act (Coast
Guard), Coordination of Wildlife, Fish, and
Game Conservation and Rehabilitation in
Military Reservations (DOD), An Act
Authorizing the Construction, Repair, and
Preservation of Certain Public Works on
Rivers and Harbors for Navigation, Flood
Control, and for Other Purposes (Army),
Anti-Drug and Controlled Substances Act
(Forest Service), Wolf Trap Park Act
(Dept. of Interior)

Hierarchical
&
Expansive*
Authority to
Coordinate
National Aeronautics and Space Act
(DOD [with NASA]), Energy
Reorganization
Act (EPA [with Energy
Unilaterally
Research and Development
initiated by
Administration]), Water Bank Act
lead agency
(Depts. of Agricuture [with Dept. of
with specified Interior]), Rural Water Act (Dept. of
(or named)
the Interior [with Dept. of
agenc[ies]
Agriculture]), Housing and Community
Development Act (Dept. of Labor [with
EPA]),

Least

*meaning breadth of
topic and
number/flexibility of
agencies involved.

Semi-Obligatory

Discretionary

Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act (State
Dept.), Methane
Transportation Research,
Development, and
Demonstration Act (Dept. of
Energy), Marine Resources
and Engineering Development
Act (Dept. Commerce),
Conservation of Antarctic
Fauna and Flora (National
Science Foundation),
Consumer Product Safety Act
(Consumer Product Safety
Commission)

Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development
Act (Dept. of Housing
and Urban
Development), Housing
and Community
Development Act (Dept. of
Housing and Urban
Development), Reforestation
Act (Dept. of
Agriculture), An Act to
Provide for the Protection of
Land Resources Against Soil
Erosion (Dept. of
Agriculture), An Act to
Stop Injury to the Public
Grazing Lands (Dept. of
the Interior), An Act to
Promote Effectual Planning,
Development, Maintenance,
and Coordination of
Wildlife, Fish, and Game
Conservation and
Rehabilitation in Military
Reservations (DOD),
Colorado River Basin Project
(Army), Establishing the
Sawtooth National
Recreation Area (Dept. of
Interior/Forest Service),
An Act to Revise, Codify, and
Enact into Law, Title 23 of
the United States Code,
Entitled "Highways" (Dept.
of Transportation), Tuna
Conventions Act (Secretary
of State)

Southwest Forest Health and
Wildfire Prevention Act
(Depts. Of Agriculture [with
Dept. of Interior]), National
Fishing Enhancement Act
(National Science
Foundation [with Dept.
of State; Dept. of
Commerce, NSF, and
Dept. of State]), Act to
Amend the Commercial
Fisheries Research and
Development Act (Depts. of
Commerce [with Dept. of
Interior and other federal
agencies]), Electric and
Hybrid Vehicle Research,
Development, and
Demonstration Act (Dept. of
Energy [with Dept. of
Transportation])

Older Americans Act Amendments
(HHS/Administration on Aging and
Dept. of Labor); Vietnam Era Veterans'
Jointly
Readjustment Assistance Act (VA and
initiated** (by Dept. of Labor); National Flood
two named Insurance Act (Dept. of Homeland
agencies) Security/FEMA and White House
Office of Management and Budget),
Whaling Convention (Depts. of State
and Commerce)

**rarely is there
jointly initiated with
unnamed federal
agencies.

Most

Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act (Depts.
of Agriculture and
Commerce)

Congressional Control

Least

2019]

CONGRESS’S AGENCY COORDINATION

1993

For in-depth discussion and substantiation of all the coordination regimes listed in the preceding table (in the order they are listed), please
consult the Appendix. In the following table, the relevant enabling statute for which coordination has been authorized is listed first. The agencies specified in the coordination legislation are bolded. The lead or
“named” agency—in other words, the agency at the head of hierarchical
coordination—is listed next to the statute in (parenthesis). If the lead
agency has control over an unspecified or “unnamed” set of agencies,
no other agency is listed in the parenthesis. If the lead agency has control over a named set of agencies, the latter are listed in [brackets]. If
the coordination is jointly-initiated, all the initiating agencies are
listed in the parenthesis.

C. IMPACT & MITIGATION OF INTERAGENCY CONFLICT
The potential for interagency control is eroded when coordinating agencies engage in conflict. As Anne Joseph O’Connell
and Dan Farber have noted, control is never complete in the administrative context,124 an observation that bears on statutebased coordination as well. While most coordination legislation
authorizes a lead agency to structure coordination on the basis
of its own discretion, other agencies may also seek to assert their
autonomy over the coordination process. This may reduce the
lead agency’s actual ability to shape the coordination process in
keeping with its own interests and those it shares with Congress.
Certainly, the presence of interagency dissent may lead to
stronger outcomes that take into account different sets of information or political viewpoints.125 However, it may lead to inefficiency or other costs that undercut the goals of coordination.126
124. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 6, at 1418 (“By their nature, control
is never complete in principal-agent models and may be even less so in the administrative context.”).
125. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 18, at 2233 (suggesting that “interagency conflict can be productive”); Farber & O’Connell, supra note 6 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of interagency conflict).
126. Barkow, supra note 64, at 52–53 (noting that “shared authority may
undercut the goals of both agencies. Because these agencies may be charged
with serving somewhat different politically vulnerable populations, they may
undermine each other by engaging in costly and time-consuming turf battles”);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. L. 447,
460–66 (1995) (chronicling costs associated with the interagency conflict over
jurisdiction between two independent agencies, the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission); Farber &
O’Connell, supra note 6 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of interagency
conflict); cf. Candeub & Hunnicut, infra note 368, at 13 (“[D]issents may simply
constitute efforts by members of the executive branch, responding to the power
of the party opposite to the Executive, to undermine its administration of the
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For instance, if agencies have different views regarding the normative value of the policy to be furthered, unique budgets, or
distinct differences in their programmatic priorities, they may
seek to alter one another’s priorities, clip each other’s wings,127
or chip away at each other’s discretionary powers in order to assert their own interests.
The likelihood of conflict between agencies depends on factors such as whether the shared agency activity is focused only
on the lead agency’s needs or includes the interests of the other
agencies involved, whether the coordinating agencies differ as to
the goals of the legislation to be implemented, and whether the
coordinating agencies have similar views or values in general.128
Joshua Clinton and David Lewis suggest that political ideology
is another quality that may strongly predict whether agencies
engage in conflict.129 In general, if agencies share a common culture, they are more likely to collaborate.130 And if a fewer number of agencies are involved in coordination, or the authority to
coordinate is limited in subject matter or scope, both the opportunity to exercise interagency control and the locus of interagency conflict are likely to be narrowed or more focused.
The impact of interagency conflict on agencies’ ability to assert their own values may vary depending on the structure of the
coordination network. More specifically, interagency conflict
may erode adherence to coordination by non-lead agencies, particularly within the more uncommon nonhierarchical and/or
law.”).
127. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS
158–60 (1999) (suggesting that conflicting agencies have fewer units of “delegated authority” than do agencies with a united mission).
128. See Barkow, supra note 64, at 51 (“Even if a single agency does not have
competing internal goals, conflict can emerge from the agency’s relationship
with a separate agency that is looking out for a different interest.”).
129. See Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 4 (2008) (ranking several agencies on a scale from liberal to conservative on the basis of expert opinions).
130. See THOMAS H. STANTON, IMPROVING COLLABORATION BY FEDERAL
AGENCIES: AN ESSENTIAL PRIORITY FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 1, 15
(2008), http://thomas-stanton.com/pubs/gom/GOM-Improvising_Collaboration
.pdf (“For administrative officials who share a common culture . . . collaboration
can come naturally.”); HAROLD SEIDMAN, Foreword to MAKING GOVERNMENT
MANAGEABLE (Thomas H. Stanton & Benjamin Ginsburg eds., 2004) (“Agencies
are more likely to collaborate and network when they are in agreement on common objectives, operate under the same laws and regulations, and do not compete for scarce resources.”).
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more discretionary coordination structures. For instance, even if
Congress delegated expansive and mandatory coordination to
privilege a particular legislative mandate, it may reduce opportunities for interagency control if the coordination authorized is
not clearly hierarchical. Or, hierarchical coordination that otherwise encourages interagency control may never gain enough
fuel to be properly implemented by the lead agency in the first
place if it is not mandatory. These variations in coordination authorized by legislation are less conducive to strong interagency
control because they obligate agencies to submit to the will of the
lead only to some extent, and/or give them some leeway to modify
the obligation. As a result, agencies may resist coordination either explicitly, bolstered by the flexibility offered by coordination
legislation, or by acting with reluctance or inefficiency even if
they have apparently acquiesced to requests to coordinate.
Conversely, a strongly hierarchical structure could minimize the effects of conflict. Rachel Barkow has suggested that
hierarchy between agencies sharing an enforcement task allows
the leading agency to assert its preferences, particularly if the
hierarchy is mandatory.131 Similarly, if interagency coordination
is hierarchical and mandatory, the impact of conflict on the lead
agency’s ability to further its own interests may be reduced.
Indeed, a lead agency might seek to minimize pushback
from other agencies with political ideologies or goals that are at
odds with its own.132 For example, the strong law enforcement

131. See also Candeub & Hunnicutt, infra note 368 (suggesting as leader of
the board, the Chair controls which orders pass in independent agencies, regardless of commissioner dissent); cf. Barkow, supra note 64, at 55 (suggesting
that if two agencies share an enforcement responsibility, but are nonetheless in
a clear hierarchy in which the latter cannot veto the former, this will not undercut the former’s authority and will, in fact, “put[ ] more cops on the beat”).
132. See DANIEL E. HO, CONGRESSIONAL AGENCY CONTROL: THE IMPACT OF
STATUTORY PARTISAN REQUIREMENTS ON REGULATION 35 (2007), http://dho
.stanford.edu/research/partisan.pdf (showing empirical evidence that partisan
requirements constrain); Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Partisans & Partisan Commissions, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 789, 790 (2010) (arguing that “‘nonpartisan interests’ or ‘idiosyncrasies’ drive a commissioner’s voting”); cf. Candeub & Hunnicutt, infra note 368 (stating that congressional concerns dominate
independent agencies); Datla & Revesz, supra note 35, at 797–99 (reporting that
the chairs of boards heading independent agencies engage in similar dynamics);
Paul R. Verkuil, Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J.
257, 258 (1988).
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priorities of entities such as the FBI133 and Department of Justice134 may lead to more autocratic treatment of those agencies
whose resources these agencies wish to utilize, regardless of underlying resistance from those agencies. Still, even in hierarchical arrangements, disagreement could pose an obstacle to policy implementation.135 In the case of the Department of
Defense’s control over NASA, authorized by Congress to favor
the Department of Defense’s interests,136 the potential problems
associated with pushback from NASA137 led Congress to include
an interagency dispute resolution mechanism.138
Resistance may also find greater purchase in semi-obligatory arrangements.139 For instance, the Secretary of Commerce
may encounter obstacles when seeking the assistance of other
agencies governed by the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act140 in order to “coordinate . . . to the maximum extent practicable”141 to further energy policy,142 particularly considering that what is “practicable” is constrained by fact that the
Department of Commerce’s goals may be in conflict with the
preservation of marine resources. The Consumer Product Safety
Commission may also meet resistance to its mission to engage
agencies143 and gain access to their data144 “to the maximum extent practicable”145 in order to better implement its enabling

133. Infra notes 487–92 and accompanying text.
134. Infra notes 493–98, 535–43 and accompanying text.
135. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and
Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 59, 71 (2010) (“The transaction costs of strong coordination, the
differing internal incentives of each agency, the loss of autonomy, and other
collective action challenges often overwhelm ambitions toward coordination.”).
136. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 589–93 and accompanying text (discussing the Department of Defense’s power to require coordination from NASA).
138. See infra notes 591–95 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 549, 552, 555, 558, 560 and accompanying text.
140. See infra note 551 and accompanying text.
141. Coastal Zone Management, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a) (2012); see also infra
notes 552–58 and accompanying text.
142. See infra note 553 and accompanying text.
143. See infra note 558 and accompanying text.
144. See infra note 559 and accompanying text.
145. H.R. REP. NO. 110-501 (2007); see also infra note 557 and accompanying
text.
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statute,146 given that agencies may wish to guard sensitive information in a manner that makes sharing it “impracticable.”
In addition to asserting its status as the lead, an agency authorized to initiate coordination might minimize conflict by encouraging cooperation, including by forming coalitions in order
to seek consensus,147 particularly when relying on agencies with
useful policymaking expertise that might be less responsive to a
wholly authoritarian approach. For example, despite their authority to spearhead coordination in their areas of interest, the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s extension of
healthcare initiatives,148 the Administration on Aging’s work on
elder initiatives,149 and the Department of the Interior’s efforts
to implement the Indian Financing Act150 might include consensus-building with agencies that have expertise likely to benefit
their objectives; in these examples, the expert non-lead agencies
include the Department of Commerce, Department of Labor and
Small Business Administration, respectively. In these regulatory areas, as opposed to in law enforcement, the lead agencies
should incorporate the preferences of the other coordinating
agencies, instead of forcing adherence to their own preferences.
This is due in part to the longer timeline for accomplishing nonlaw enforcement initiatives and the potential benefits—such as
buy-in and higher-quality participation in the coordination—of
coaxing non-lead, but nonetheless expert, agencies to contribute
their resources and expertise willingly.
Alternatively, agencies expected to be responsive to a lead
agency may be eager to coordinate. For example, legislative history underlying congressional efforts to conserve Antarctic fauna
and flora151 shows that the several agencies drafted the bill,152
which may indicate that they are motivated to implement this
legislation. In addition, agencies other than the lead agency may
sometimes initiate coordination, or be able to expand their own
jurisdiction in response to it. For instance, under the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Authorization Act,153
non-lead agencies are also affirmatively authorized to engage
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See infra note 556 and accompanying text.
See Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1182–87.
See infra notes 506–11 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 511–16 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 514–19 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 554–58 and accompanying text.
H. R. REP. NO. 95-1031, pt. 2 (1978).
See infra note 542.
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with the lead Commission tasked with coordinating154 should
they wish to do so, notwithstanding any jurisdictional barriers.
And when the Secretary of State “delegates” authority to other
agency heads to operate their own overseas security,155 these
agency heads gain control of a function that is otherwise technically within the State Department’s purview. A concrete stake
in coordination may motivate non-lead agencies to work more
cooperatively with the lead than if they had no clear incentive to
do so.
Despite the potential for cheerful participation by non-lead
agencies, the lack of actual overlapping jurisdiction means that
the only agency ultimately responsible for the process is the lead
agency. This gives the other coordinating agencies leverage to
create conflict without being held accountable for the consequences of doing so.156 Particularly where the named agency
must balance several interests, the other agencies required to
coordinate may resist with greater impunity. For instance, the
Coast Guard may have some difficulty forcing the varied agencies157 governed by the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act158 to act in concert with one another,159 even though it
holds primary responsibility for implementing this Act, precisely
because its role as lead agency limits the accountability of the
other agencies tasked with coordination. Relatedly, the Coast
Guard might be too overwhelmed by the need to balance several
equities to hold any agency stakeholders accountable for conflict.
To take another example, the Energy Research and Development Administration is less likely to be responsive to the EPA’s
concerns, given the former’s lack of responsibility for the latter’s
goals.160

154. See infra note 541.
155. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-399, Tit. I, § 106, 100 Stat. 853, 858 (1986) (“Specifically, the Secretary
may agree to delegate operational control of overseas security functions of other
Federal agencies to the heads of such agencies . . . .”); see also infra notes
545–49 and accompanying text.
156. See Barkow, supra note 64, at 55 (noting that when a single agency is
responsible for enforcement, it is held accountable for it); O’Connell, supra note
6, at 1680 (arguing that redundancy may decrease reliability).
157. See infra note 498 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 496–500 and accompanying text.
159. See infra note 499 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 593–99 and accompanying text.
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Finally, executive agencies that are incentivized or bound to
coordinate on relatively equal footing, as opposed to within a hierarchical structure, may jointly increase their influence over
the implementation of legislation.161 However, this is more likely
if they are like-minded. Coordination to further employment and
support programs for the elderly is apt to involve friendly exchanges between the Administration on Aging and the Department of Labor, given their shared interest in furthering these
programs.162 Similarly, coordination to provide career counseling and job placement services to veterans furthered jointly by
the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Labor may be of comparable interest to both agencies.163 In these
cases, agencies may seek to amplify one another’s efforts to further their shared goals, instead of sublimating them as might
happen in a more hierarchical relationship.
However, if two or more specific agencies are empowered to
coordinate on relatively equal footing, but do not see eye-to-eye
as to the best way to pool their resources—due to substantive,
ideological, or other disparities in their perspectives or aims—
they are less likely to compromise.164 Even if coordination legislation nonetheless requires agencies to pursue compromise,
agencies may attempt to actively constrain one another to tip
policymaking outcomes in their favor—a dynamic Eric Biber refers to as “agency as regulator of another agency.”165 More specifically, jointly-initiated coordination provides leeway for adversarial agencies to exercise their preferences to reduce one
another’s impact on policymaking. For example, although Con-

161. See EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER 8
(1998) (suggesting that collaboration is “any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public value by their working together rather
than separately”). Here, the value produced is likely to be “public”, in that it
furthers an administrative program benefitting the polity, but also of value to
the agency itself to the extent it privileges that agency’s own priorities and accumulation of resources.
162. See infra notes 624–31 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 629–35 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., STANTON, supra note 130, at 14–15 (mentioning briefly the
difficulty of the Department of Homeland Security in integrating its immigration functions to suggest that “[s]ome agencies have operated as rivals for so
long that it may be difficult to bring them to collaborate”).
165. Biber, Too Many Things to Do, supra note 118, at 6 (referring to a similar model as “‘agency as regulator’ of another agency”).
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gress intended the EPA to exercise significant control over environmental protection initiatives involving other agencies,166 it
may encounter resistance while coordinating with the Energy
Research and Development Administration,167 particularly because the former will seek to intensify protection efforts while
the latter has opposing policy interests. It is worth noting that
this Article revisits this theory in Part III.C.3, which suggests
that interagency conflict—and the resulting deterioration of the
potential for interagency control—may offer the President more
purchase over statute-based coordination than if the coordinating agencies are generally in agreement.
II. IMPACT ON ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION
This Part shifts from a descriptive account of coordination
legislation in Part I to potential reasons Congress has legislated
interagency relationships. Coordination is generally a tool for executive management, whereby the President, in her capacity as
administrator-in-chief, directs agencies to act in a manner that
emphasizes executive priorities while fulfilling their legislative
mandates.168 However, Congress’s extensive implementation of
agency coordination indicates that it is not only an executive tool
for administrative management.169
The literature on administrative coordination initiated by
the President and agencies suggests that its effects on agency
functions are beneficial to policymaking170 and “substantial,
across a range of regulatory problems.”171 Congress’s use of
166. See infra notes 593–99 and accompanying text (noting that coordination
was authorized to enhance the Environmental Protection Agency’s capacity).
167. See id.
168. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
170. See Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1210 (noting in their work on executive-initiated coordination, that “coordination can improve efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability . . . [and further] the purported benefits of functional fragmentation”); Marisam, Selection Powers, supra
note 40, at 835 (observing that the President’s power to designate an agency
head is “helpful for coordinating executive responses to regulatory problems
that involve fragmented jurisdiction”); cf. Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 478 (2015) [hereinafter Nou, Intra-Agency] (suggesting that intra-agency coordination stands to promote efficiency and effectiveness across the executive hierarchy if embraced on the appropriate scale).
171. Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1210; cf. Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 477 (2017) [hereinafter Nou, Subdelegating] (“[Intra-a]gency subdelegation . . . is a more pervasive
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agency coordination likely benefits administrative functioning
as well, because it allows Congress to more precisely direct agencies’ implementation of the law.
First, this Part argues, Congress may establish coordination
among agencies—and in particular, coordination that is hierarchical and mandatory, and thus similar to coordination initiated
by the President—for reasons like those that motivate the executive formation of interagency coordination. These include harnessing like-minded agencies to further particular substantive
goals, implementing a system of accountability (in particular, by
creating vertical coordination structures), exploiting the competencies of diverse administrative stakeholders, and bringing to
bear greater administrative expertise.
In addition, this Part notes, there are a number of objectives
driving the passage of coordination legislation that are unique to
the legislature, some of which, like other public interest efforts,172 may benefit from the administrative autonomy cultivated by hierarchical and expansive forms of statute-based coordination. These objectives include increased administrative
sensitivity to congressional priorities, responsiveness to special
pressures faced by the legislature and to national crises, replication of the benefits of overlapping authority and, of particular
relevance to current times, offsetting problematic political influence on the early stages of administrative policymaking. Overall,
this Part suggests that coordination legislation supports more
effective administrative implementation of the legislature’s
goals by allowing agencies with expertise in areas of interest to
Congress to engage with one another in a manner shaped by
their own discretion. Given the potential for statute-based coordination to minimize some negative elements of presidential administration,173 it may, in some cases, be an improvement over
coordination implemented by the President.

phenomenon than commonly recognized, sometimes even by agency heads
themselves.”).
172. See CROLEY, supra note 19, at 157–236 (illustrating beneficial forms of
agency autonomy and public interest-oriented agency action); Spaulding, supra
note 19, at 438–39 (noting briefly that “nothing prevents Congress from restoring decentralization where it might aid the exercise of independent judgment”);
Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Beyond Agency Core Mission, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 599
(2016) (arguing that administrative autonomy can help Congress “ensure that
an agency will make a good-faith effort to balance conflicting objectives”).
173. See infra Part II.B.V.
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A. REPLICATING THE BENEFITS OF EXECUTIVE-INITIATED
COORDINATION
Congress designates lead agencies in interagency coordination for reasons that are similar to presidential initiation of administrative coordination.174 This Section theorizes that interagency relationships created by legislation replicate some of the
benefits of executive-initiated coordination. Both vertical and
horizontal statute-based coordination helps the legislature to effect dynamics similar to those produced by executive-led coordination. These include amplifying administrative leadership, improving accountability mechanisms, harnessing diverse
administrative competencies, intensifying administrative expertise, reducing decisionmaking costs, and maintaining efficient
information-sharing and adaptivity in agency decisionmaking.
1. Lead Agency as Mouthpiece
Fostering agency hierarchies also allows the President more
control over the administrative process and its outcomes.175 Like
the President, Congress legislates hierarchical coordination in
order to utilize lead agencies to help further its aims.176 According to one theory, “interagency hierarchies” created by the President allow “a single agency or agency head to speak for the President and act as the President’s chief adviser for a particular
regulatory problem.”177 For instance, the President relied “on a
lead agency—a single agency put in charge of coordinating federal action and to which all other agencies should defer” in order
to implement the National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA).178
NEPA requires that all federal agencies prepare environmental assessments of any actions that significantly affect the
environment. To “avoid . . . inefficiencies, the Executive has determined that a single lead agency shall supervise the review
174. See Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, supra note 43, at 206–07 (discussing some advantages to designating a lead agency when agency action
needs to be coordinated).
175. Marisam, Selection Powers, supra note 40, at 836 (arguing that the
President can take advantage of a hierarchical administrative structure “by selecting an agency—one with knowledge of the regulatory problem at hand and
preferences that closely align with the President’s—that will speak for the President and organize the agencies’ actions in his stead”).
176. See supra notes 68–80.
177. Marisam, Selection Powers, supra note 40, at 835.
178. Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, supra note 43, at 207.
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process”179 and codified this in regulation.180 The factors determining the lead agency were as follows: “(1) Magnitude of
agency’s involvement. (2) Project approval/disapproval authority. (3) Expertise concerning the action’s environmental effects.
(4) Duration of agency’s involvement. (5) Sequence of agency’s
involvement.”181 Overall, this description reflects the expectation that the President will choose a lead agency based on its
expertise and enduring ability to further the President’s goals
for NEPA.
Similarly, Congress uses favored agencies as a bullhorn to
direct policymaking by choosing lead agencies based on their expertise in areas of legislative interest and the likelihood of their
continued involvement in the statute-based coordination process.182 This approach limits costs to the legislature of making
specific policy decisions, because it farms this responsibility out
to agencies.183 Further, by empowering an agency with expertise
in an area of particular importance to the legislature, Congress
is able to align administrative interests with its own, thus increasing the likelihood that the agency pursues outcomes that
Congress also prefers.184 This general description matches just
about every coordination structure discussed in this Article and
the Appendix. Empowering an expert and allied agency to lead
also means that, despite some authority to subdelegate tasks,
this agency is more likely to remain consistently involved in the
implementation of coordination, thus enhancing administrative
accountability as well.185
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2018) (“A lead agency shall supervise
the preparation of an environmental impact statement if more than one
agency . . . is involved in the same action.”).
181. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(c) (2017).
182. See supra notes 68–80 and accompanying text.
183. Cf. Nou, Subdelegating, supra note 171, at 509 (suggesting that intraagency subdelegation provides a way for political appointees to limit their own
costs associated with decisionmaking, by “farm[ing] out the decisionmaking,”
particularly when the transaction costs of retaining decisionmaking authority
are high); Shah, Interagency Transfers, supra note 9, at 284 (arguing that an
interagency transfer of adjudication authority “represents an agency’s desire to
reduce its delegated power and attendant responsibility by shifting them to another agency”).
184. Cf. Nou, Subdelegating, supra note 171, at 525–26 (arguing that “subdelegations [within agencies] are best understood as credible commitment devices through which commissioners motivate better-informed but potentially biased subordinates”).
185. See Shah, Interagency Transfers, supra note 9, at 311–14 (discussing
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2. Replicating the System of Executive Accountability
By designating a lead agency in statute-based coordination,
Congress enables executive management of an administrative
process that might otherwise suffer from reduced presidential
oversight. Executive-initiated interagency hierarchies “enable
presidents to better supervise the multi-agency process.”186 In
contrast, statute-based interagency coordination and their potential to stimulate agency autonomy could weaken administrative accountability.187 Theoretically, autonomous interagency coordination is also less efficient than initiatives led by the
President, because consensus requirements may create networks that are “slow moving and fail to produce bold actions,”188
in contrast to actions furthered unilaterally by the relatively unencumbered Executive.189 Nonetheless, the efficiency and orderliness born of executive hierarchy may be preserved to some extent by the creation of discrete, agency-led hierarchies among
agencies tasked by legislation to coordinate.
Scholars have noted the benefits of hierarchical administrative management. For instance, Gillian Metzger and Kevin
Stack discuss intra-agency “managerial accountability,” defining
it as “the extent to which subordinate officials within an agency

that the consistent involvement of a lead agency in coordination enhances administrative accountability).
186. Marisam, Selection Powers, supra note 40, at 836. Marisam explains
that “interagency hierarchies” allow “a single agency or agency head to speak
for the President and act as the President’s chief adviser for a particular regulatory problem.” Id. at 835.
187. Cf. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1994) (suggesting that values of accountability and organization in the execution of the laws are promoted by presidential
hierarchy).
188. Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, supra note 43, at 207; see also HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION & POWER 70 (2d ed. 1975) (asserting that
Congress can only achieve “piecemeal” solutions to problems).
189. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 9, at 783–85 (identifying the “rule-based
interface” as a design tool through which the President “preserve[s] the division
of authority” between agencies so “[e]ach agency . . . is discouraged from considering interest-dimensions outside of its part of the problem”); Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1717–18 (2009) (arguing that in a unitary system,
information flows to the President from the cabinet in an efficient manner because the President acts as a central point in the network of information).
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are responsible and answerable to their organizational superiors.”190 In more successful systems of accountability, “the manager is present and part of the organization, not an external evaluator, and . . . has power and license not merely to nullify or
sanction, but to teach, to inspire, to check, to cajole, to encourage,
and to remedy any wayward action.”191 Edward Rubin also suggests that internal agency monitoring improves accountability.192 Similarly, lead agencies in statute-based coordination
could help maintain accountability across agency boundaries.
Finally, perhaps counterintuitively,193 lead agencies might
also seek to delegate authority to other agencies in order to reduce their policymaking costs, especially if they retain ultimate
control over the coordination process. The delegation of authority might also stimulate responsibility among non-lead agencies.
For instance, we may not expect that the FBI, Coast Guard, or
EPA would willingly distribute their stakes in law enforcement,
water management, or environmental protection, but they might
if convinced that doing so would allow for the preservation of
their own resources;194 agencies delegated this authority, in
turn, might perceive an obligation to use it to foster a successful
outcome in coordination.
3. Harnessing Diverse Competencies
Like the President, Congress might initiate coordination to
combine and better utilize the capabilities of varied agencies. For

190. Metzger & Stack, supra note 9, at 1265.
191. Id.
192. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2075 (2005) (asserting that “true accountability” involves features common in the administrative state, such as hierarchy, reporting, and monitoring).
193. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 916 (2005) (“[An] enduring and pervasive assumption in constitutional law and theory is that much government behavior is
driven by empire-building, the self-aggrandizing pursuit of power . . . .”); see
also Shah, Interagency Transfers, supra note 9, at 283 (noting that one common
assumption in administrative law is “the foundational theory that agencies are
constantly attempting to maintain, grow, and compete for power, or ‘empire
build’”).
194. See infra notes 487–92 (suggesting benefits to the FBI in farming out
certain law enforcement tasks); infra notes 527–31 (noting that the Coast Guard
can enlist other agencies to fix oil spills); infra notes 520–25 (allowing the Environmental Protection Agency to enlist the help of “all federal agencies” to further the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) and accompanying text.
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instance, Daphna Renan explores a phenomenon she calls “pooling,” by which the President “augments capacity by mixing and
matching resources dispersed across the bureaucracy.”195 According to Renan, pooling “concentrates administrative resources . . . through joint efforts that bridge sometimes
longstanding structural divides” in order to bolster the Executive’s agenda.196
Congress also creates horizontal relationships between
agencies that facilitate the “pooling” of administrative resources
in regulatory matters that it has chosen to emphasize. For instance, the legislature has authorized coordination that combines resources across agencies to further the Endangered Species Act,197 the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism
Act,198 the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development
Act,199 and to increase employment opportunities for the elderly.200 Also, there may be limits to Congress’s desire to broaden
a favored agency’s scope, which Congress may therefore choose
to dilute by reinforcing another agency’s claims to jurisdiction.
For instance, in a coordination scheme broadening the Department of Health and Human Services’ role in ensuring quality
health care,201 Congress explicitly limited the expansion of the
agency’s purview by naming the areas in which the Social Security Administration is to remain a key figure.202
In addition, Congress might implement vertical relationships to bridge administrative divides,203 particularly where the
non-lead agencies might otherwise not have incentives to do so.
Examples that fit this description include the Department of De-

195. Renan, supra note 40, at 213.
196. Id. at 291.
197. See infra notes 517–21 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 545–49 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 563–67 and accompanying text.
200. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-199, at 76–78 (1991) (suggesting that the Secretary of Labor and the Commissioner on Aging should be on equal footing while
coordinating for this purpose); see also infra notes 626–30 and accompanying
text.
201. See infra notes 506–11 and accompanying text.
202. H.R. REP. NO. 106-305, at 29 (1999) (noting that while the coordination
authority is broad in the context of federal healthcare quality initiatives, the
Committee on Commerce “does not intend for the Agency to have an administrative role in the operation of programs under titles XVIII, XIX, and XXI of the
Social Security Act”).
203. See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text.
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fense wielding control over NASA to support the former’s military goals,204 the Environmental Protection Agency exercising
control over the Energy Research and Development Administration to further environmental protection initiatives,205 and the
Department of Agriculture leading the Department of the Interior to maintain the wetlands program.206
4. Enhancing the Use of Information
Finally, executive agencies coordinating under a statutory
directive, just like those tasked to coordinate by the President,
may exhibit greater adaptability and a better use of information
in decisionmaking than agencies acting alone. For instance, Jody
Freeman and Daniel Farber argue that interagency coordination
offers more adaptive tools for policymaking than do more traditional forms of executive delegation.207 In addition, they suggest
it leads to “modularity,”208 which makes the network “capable of
generating and incorporating new information,”209 particularly
if one component of the network maintains and organizes the
flow of information within the network.210 In addition, Jennifer
Nou argues that in the intra-agency context, “coordination mechanisms decrease the net information-processing costs for
knowledge the agency head values.”211 This, in turn, is “likely to
increase efficiency by lowering the costs necessary [for the
agency head] to make a decision.”212 Similarly, hierarchical interagency coordination—especially if mandated by legislation,
thus decreasing the President’s potentially substantial start-up
costs for the implementation of coordination213—may both galvanize agency responsiveness and have a mitigating influence
204. See infra notes 589–95 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 593–99 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 597–602 and accompanying text.
207. See generally Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L. J. 795 (2005) (proposing a “modular,” or flexible, approach to regulation involving coordination across agencies).
208. Id. at 795–96.
209. Id. at 876–77.
210. See id. at 888–90 (describing how interagency modularity, or coordination, supports information flow).
211. Nou, Intra-Agency, supra note 170, at 482.
212. Id. at 482–83. “While initial implementation costs may be substantial,
these mechanisms, once implemented, decrease the resources necessary for the
agency head to acquire the information required to reach a rational conclusion.”
Id. at 482.
213. See id. (noting that the “initial implementation costs [of coordination]
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on the costs of gathering and disseminating information across
agency borders for decisionmaking purposes. In this way, vertical networks of agencies generated by coordination legislation
may lend themselves to relatively flexible and effective ways of
using information.
B. GOALS UNIQUE TO THE LEGISLATURE
This Section argues that, in addition to motivations that are
similar to the President’s, statute-based coordination may support unique legislative goals. These include garnering administrative responsiveness both to special pressures faced by the legislature and to national crises. Congress also sometimes seeks to
replicate the benefits of overlapping authority, including those
associated with redundancy and interagency competition, while
maintaining actual jurisdictional separation. This allows the
legislature to avoid some of the negative effects of actual shared
authority on administrative accountability. Finally, one of the
purposes of statute-based coordination, of particular importance
to critics of centralized executive governance,214 may be to limit
political interference in administrative policymaking. Overall,
each of these goals is enhanced, to varying degrees, by the administrative autonomy fostered by coordination statutes.
1. Improving Agency Responsiveness to Congress
Congress uses interagency coordination to strengthen the
feedback and accountability loops that motivate agencies to
shape their interactions in response to legislative signals. For
one, legislative systems of oversight and required legislative reporting may reinforce agencies’ use of discretion to act in accordance with legislative expectations. For example, Congress
established an oversight committee215 with sweeping
authority216 to ensure proper implementation of agency
may be substantial”).
214. See, e.g., Metzger & Stack, supra note 9, at 1249 (suggesting that “the
significant expansion of White House control over the executive branch has
made internal administrative law much more centralized and less agency specific”).
215. Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-365, 120
Stat. 2522 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3013) (providing for the
establishment of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Aging, which was
established to oversee the interagency coordination authorized under § 3013).
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 3013(c)(1) (2012) (suggesting that if a matter relates to
aging, including in regards to Public Works and Economic Development, 42
U.S.C. § 3132 (“Cooperation of Federal agencies”); infra note 511, the relevant
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coordination benefitting programs for the elderly.217 Because
this committee was created after a determination that agencies
were not coordinating enough on their own,218 the committee is
required to report to Congress on the progress of interagency
coordination.219
Under the Higher Education Act, agencies report back to
Congress regarding which programs they have developed and
how they have coordinated in order to improve science, mathematics, engineering, and technology (STEM) education.220 The
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act mandates that
agencies submit to the legislature a five-year plan for indicating
how coordination will help them fulfill their goals,221 which allows Congress to respond to agency initiatives both prospectively
as well as in response to the agencies’ ultimate success in adhering to legislative expectations. Similarly, the Veterans Benefits
Act provides for an “[a]nnual report on assistance to homeless
veterans,” which Congress amended in 2008 to require the inclusion of “[i]nformation on the efforts of the Secretary [of Veterans
Affairs] to coordinate the delivery of housing and services with
other Federal departments and agencies.”222
Required reporting on the implementation of “greater coordination of the research, operations, and activities relating to civilian Earth observation”223 encourages direct agency communication with legislators on this issue, bolstered by the

interagency cooperation would be overseen by the Interagency Coordinating
Committee on Aging).
217. See infra notes 511–16, 624–31 and accompanying text.
218. S. REP. NO. 109-366, at 11 (2006) (noting that Congress wanted to establish the Coordinating Committee because a “committee [on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions] review to determine whether congressional intent
was carried out in [regard to interagency coordination] determined that there
was little coordination activity among various Federal departments and agencies on matters relating to older individuals”).
219. Id. (indicating that Congress intended for the Coordinating Committee
to address this problem by compiling an annual report which “monitor[s], evaluate[s], and recommend[s] improvements” in interagency coordination).
220. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1067a, 3486 (2012); see also infra notes 504–08 and accompanying text.
221. Howard Coble Coast Guard and Transportation Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-281, Tit. V, § 502(a) (2014).
222. 38 U.S.C. § 2065(b)(5) (2017); see also infra note 509 and accompanying
text.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 18731 (2017) (noting, in regards to establishing “a mechanism to ensure greater coordination of the research, operations, and activities
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legislature’s public commitment to maintaining coordination in
this arena.224 Furthermore, while reducing the country’s “vulnerability to flooding hazards”225 is only one priority among
many others shared by the Department of Homeland Security,
the Office of Management and Budget, and other agencies,226 reporting requirements focused on the quality of coordination to
further anti-flood efforts227 may influence these entities to focus
their efforts on this responsibility—as opposed to coordinating in
regards to, say, the study of earthquake insurance,228 for which
there are no legislative reporting requirements.229 (Reporting requirements may also encourage agencies to be more responsive
to recent crises, another potential reason for coordination legislation discussed in the next Subsection.)
The legislature may also require hearings to account for an
agency’s proper implementation of coordination. In an example
involving an independent agency, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission230 is not tasked with simply filing a report, but must
in fact present information directly to the legislature regarding
its coordination to further the goals of the Consumer Product

relating to civilian Earth observation,” that the “Director [of the Office of Science and Technology Policy] shall provide a report to Congress . . . on the implementation plan for this mechanism”); see also infra notes 401–03.
224. See, e.g, Keeping the Space Environment Safe for Civil and Commercial
Users: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space & Aeronautics of the Comm. on
Sci. & Tech., 111th Cong. 81 (2009) (statement of Professor Scott Pace) (responding to a post-hearing question by stating that “strong interagency coordination for a national position and active agency support” would be needed to
develop “a common international framework” of operating procedures in space);
Enhancing the Relevance of Space to Address National Needs: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Space & Aeronautics of the Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th
Cong. 26 (2009) (statement of General Lester L. Lyles) (calling for coordination
in space through “some [ ] leadership forum where all of the agencies involved
in space can do a better job of integrating and coordinating their space activities”).
225. Nat’l Flood Ins. ch. 50, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4101c(a)(1) (“Coordination”) (West
2018); see also infra notes 638–42 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012) (listing a range of federal priorities related to
transportation and safety).
227. See infra notes 638–42 and accompanying text.
228. See infra note 638 and accompanying text.
229. Cf. id. (noting the requirements for coordination and reporting for
floods).
230. See 15 U.S.C. § 2078 (2017) (explaining the Commission’s duties to cooperate and share information with other agencies).
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Safety Act.231 This is the case even if this coordination involves
executive agencies as well, perhaps because of the legislature’s
special interest in the Commission,232 which strengthens those
agencies’ connection to Congress in this context. Overall, legislative reporting requirements could be analogized to hard look review in the judicial context, which also encourages agencies to
act of their own accord to “intensify [] their ‘exercise of . . . authority within [their] substantive field[s].’”233
In addition to reporting mechanisms, coordination legislation incentivizes the formation of new interagency initiatives
and programs bolstering those regulatory areas in which Congress has granted agencies the power to coordinate. This also has
the effect of focusing administrative activity on Congress’s priorities, thus serving as another way for Congress to direct agencies. For instance, agency coordination authorized by the Higher
Education Act to improve the quality of STEM education234 may
act as a carrot for a lead agency seeking autonomy or others
seeking resources to prioritize coordination in this arena, perhaps in spite of competing White House directives. In addition,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission may choose to create
initiatives to access other agencies’ information in order to emphasize its data collection mandate.235 Similarly, legislation authorizing widespread data collection by the Office of National
Drug Control Policy236 may encourage agencies participating in
the National Drug Control Program237 to develop stronger research facilities.
Finally, as with independent agencies, Congress may seek
to “stovepipe” executive agencies via statute-based coordination.
“Stovepiping” refers to a dynamic in network theory in which a
principal can access an independent source of unfiltered, ground-

231. See infra notes 556–62 and accompanying text.
232. Cf. Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG.
159, 159–61 (1984) (discussing Congress’s ongoing attention to Consumer Protection since the 1960s and analyzing the effectiveness of regulations and public
awareness campaigns in that area).
233. Shah, Interagency Transfers, supra note 9, at 348 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013)).
234. See infra notes 504–08 and accompanying text.
235. See infra notes 556–62 and accompanying text.
236. See infra note 492 and accompanying text.
237. See infra note 491 and accompanying text.
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level information besides that provided by the agent.238 Here, the
principal is Congress and the agent tasked with implementing
the principal’s goals more generally is the President or political
leadership in the executive branch. In the case of coordination
statutes, however, Congress might be able to bypass the President and seek direction as to how to shape future initiatives from
an independent source: an agency that has implemented coordination in a particularly innovative manner.
2. Encouraging Sensitivity to Pressure, Crisis & Legislative
Compromise
Congress might authorize coordination to encourage agencies to be sensitive to political239 and economic pressures, or it
might engage agencies in coordination in order to restructure the
government in response to crisis.240 Each of these contexts requires agencies to act with flexibility and expertise, both of
which are served by the administrative autonomy that may be
enhanced by coordination authority.241 By authorizing interagency coordination in order to direct agencies towards their
own or their constituents’ goals, Congress may serve democratic
and substantive ends as well. For example, the Forest Service is
required by statute to work with the Attorney General (AG) to
further implementation of the Anti-Drug and Controlled Substances Act,242 and in particular, to give the AG the flexibility to
do so quickly and effectively. In this case, legislative history indicates that a focus of the enacting Congress was policing the
growth of marijuana on federal land for both political and policyoriented reasons.243 To take another example, the broad authority to coordinate delegated to the EPA was likely based on both
238. See generally Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Stovepiping, 25 J. THEPOL. 388 (2013) (presenting the “stovepipe” model of information
transmission between decision-makers and outside analysts).
239. Cf. Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, supra note 43, at 195–99 (discussing how legislators have acted on the basis of political motivation while designing several agencies).
240. See FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41803, INTERAGENCY COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES: TYPES, RATIONALES,
CONSIDERATIONS 1, 14–15 (2011) (identifying crisis response as a core rationale
for increased agency coordination).
241. See infra Part III.
242. See infra notes 535–43 and accompanying text.
243. See Initiatives in Drug Interdiction (Part 1): Hearing Before a Subcomm.
of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 99th Cong. 554–56 (1985) (discussing the
reasons for, and goals of, domestic marijuana production eradication efforts).
ORETICAL
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congressional and stakeholder interest in environmental protection goals.244
However, the legislature could also implement coordination
to hinder, as opposed to improve, agencies’ expression of legislative mandates. Put another way, legislators might mandate interagency coordination to erode an agency’s ability to exercise
control over a regulatory area or to prevent effective implementation of policies that those legislators, in fact, oppose.245 The
text of the coordination statutes and associated legislative history examined in this Article does not suggest that this is generally Congress’s purpose. Of course, this intention may not be as
transparently communicated by legislators during hearings and
other forms of explicit communication about the bill, since this
may undercut a legislator’s reputation for consensus-building
and would appear inconsistent with the apparent policy-building
purpose of coordination.
3. Mimicking the Benefits of Overlapping Jurisdiction
Congress may be motivated to authorize interagency coordination for reasons similar246 to those underlying delegations of
shared jurisdiction.247 Interagency coordination may allow Congress to reap the benefits of redundancy in the furtherance of its
goals—in particular, to provide what Matthew Stephenson and
244. See infra notes 593–99 and accompanying text.
245. See generally Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in
CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1989) (examining how Congressionally created bureaucratic structures can undermine the effectiveness of agency regulation).
246. See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields,
and Statutory Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 240 (2011) (using EPA
and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) case studies to
demonstrate that jurisdictional overlap can “create regulatory synergy rather
than dysfunction”); Michael Doran, Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1815, 1817–20 (2011) (examining how Congress employs redundancy in agency direction to promote and emphasize favored activities); Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1139
(discussing Congress’s “redundant or duplicative delegations”); Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, supra note 43, at 189, 210 (explaining the use of “duplicative delegations” by all three branches of government, and arguing how these
institutions can screen out duplication and shape agency behavior by providing
strong incentives for agencies to coordinate well). See generally Michael M. Ting,
A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 274 (2003)
(modeling how congressional delegations create overlapping programs to further their own interests vis-à-vis agencies).
247. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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others have called “a form of insurance against a single agency’s
failure.”248 While none of the statutes brought to light in this Article delegate actual overlapping jurisdiction, they do employ
more than one agency in furtherance of a particular legislative
goal, which allows agencies to amplify one another’s efforts in
important regulatory areas. Furthermore, legislating coordination in lieu of overlapping jurisdiction may allow Congress to
stem the wastefulness and the potential abdication of agencies’
responsibilities that occurs when agencies share statutory authority.249 More specifically, the fact that statutes mandating coordination ultimately hold one, lead agency responsible for implementing both the coordination and the statute at large250 may
induce that agency to offset any reductions in other agencies’ investment of resources or exercise of accountability that result
248. Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1138; see Farber & O’Connell, supra note 6, at 1426 (suggesting that a symmetrical, adversarial relationship may motivate agencies to correct one another’s mistakes);
Katyal, supra note 34, at 2324 (arguing that “reliance on just one agency is
risky” since “[i]t is ‘a form of administrative brinkmanship’”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1422, 1463 (2011) (“Redundant systems are thought to act as a form of insurance: if one agent fails in her task, another agent’s contributions may compensate. Furthermore, if agents’ contributions are partial rather than perfect substitutes (that is, if the agents’ functions overlap but are not fully redundant),
then the contributions from multiple agents may add value to the final outcome
even if none of them shirk.”); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 274 (1989) (stating that there
are both “good and bad redundancies”); Katyal, supra note 34, at 2324–27 (arguing bureaucratic overlap can serve as an important internal check on the
President).
249. See Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1138 (arguing “overlapping and fragmented delegations are . . . pervasive”); Teresa M.
Schwartz, Protecting Consumer Health and Safety: The Need for Coordinated
Regulation Among Federal Agencies, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1975)
(shedding light on the consequences of newly created jurisdictional overlaps);
Ting, supra note 246, at 275–76 (discussing the traditional redundancy theory
and connecting this classic theory with “a simple-game theoretic model”).
250. There is only one example where the agency head with responsibility to
oversee the coordination is not part of the agency authorized to implement the
parent statute. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996 empowers the Coast
Guard to interact expansively with “any Federal agency, State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia,” to literally
“perform any activity” it is qualified to perform. 14 U.S.C. § 141(a) (1996). However, the Secretary of Commerce (acting through the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) is charged with ensuring the
quality of information rationalizing Coast Guard’s actions. See id. § 141(b) (“The
Coast Guard, with consent of the head of the agency concerned [may act].”).
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from multiple agencies’ involvement in the coordination process.251 For instance, the Coast Guard is likely to expend resources while leading coordination among several dissimilar
agencies to improve the maritime domain of the Arctic under the
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act.252
Like coordination initiated by the executive branch,253 the
legislature also authorizes coordination for the express purpose
of eliminating duplication254 or improving coordination incidental to overlapping jurisdiction.255 For example, legislative
history notes that Congress authorized cooperation under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)256 “with a
view toward avoiding unnecessary expenses and duplication of
functions and to utilize the facilities or services . . . of any department [or] agency.”257 Under the Housing and Community
Development Act,258 coordination was authorized259 “to avoid duplication” in planning and development efforts.260 Legislation
concerning land management261 also provides for “cooperation
and coordination of range administration which [was] under different departments of the Government,” when it is preferable for

251. See Stephenson, supra note 248, at 1465 (“[I]ncreasing the number of
agents involved in researching a public decision problem tends to reduce each
individual agent’s incentive to invest heavily in doing that research.”).
252. See infra notes 496–500 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
254. For reference to two instances in which coordination has been authorized to avoid duplication, see infra note 510 and accompanying text. See also
Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, supra note 43, at 184 (suggesting that legislation authorizing coordination constitutes an “antiduplication institution”).
255. See Freeman & Rossi, Improving Interagency Coordination, supra note
42, at 11 (suggesting that Congress may create interagency coordination to
“help agencies and the executive branch capitalize on the benefits of shared authority, while minimizing potential losses of efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability”).
256. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
66 Stat. 829 (1974); see also infra note 513.
257. S. REP. NO. 86-187, at 53 (1959); see also id. (“Every Government department, agency, or establishment is directed to cooperate with the Secretary.”).
258. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
88 Stat. 633 (1974).
259. See infra note 566 and accompanying text.
260. S. REP. NO. 93-693, at 73 (1974).
261. See infra notes 570–74 and accompanying text.
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those efforts to be furthered by the same agency.262 Other examples include coordination enacted to improve the efforts of the
Department of Labor and the EPA on the control of lead paint263
and efforts of the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture to
issue more uniform standards under the Rural Water Act.264
4. Capitalizing on Interagency Conflict
By authorizing coordination—particularly hierarchical coordination—rather than shared jurisdiction, Congress could also
reduce interagency competition or even reap benefits from perhaps inevitable interagency conflict. Overlapping jurisdiction often results from legislative compromise in response to battles
over turf.265 As a result, multiple agencies may believe they have
262. To Provide for the Orderly Use Improvement, and Development of the
Public Range Hearing on H.R. 6462 Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Lands & Surveys, 73rd Cong. 107 (1934) (statement of Rufus G. Poole, Assistance Solicitor,
Dep’t of the Interior).
263. See infra notes 602–06 and accompanying text. A report on an earlier
iteration of this bill (H.R. 5730), which was also aimed at addressing lead paint
issues, noted that the EPA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development were already working together to develop “a national lead-based paint
program,” with the EPA providing the technical expertise. H.R. REP. NO.
102-852, pt. 1, at 53 (1992); see also id. at 50, 53 (stating that an interagency
task force already existed, co-chaired by the EPA and HUD, to deal with lead
paint issues).
264. See infra notes 600–04 and accompanying text. Coordination was authorized here to standardize eligibility criteria for the federal government’s rural water programs. See S. REP. NO. 109-148, at 13–14 (2005). This section was
changed by a committee amendment “which addresse[d] concerns raised during
the committee hearing and in written submissions.” Id. at 13. The need for coordination between the Department of Interior and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) was touched upon at several points during the
hearing on rural water programs. See, e.g., The Rural Water Supply Act of 2005:
Hearing on S. 895 Before the Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., 109th Cong. 2 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Gordon Smith, Member, Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res.) (“We
must [ ] examine other federal programs, particularly the USDA’s Rural Utilities Service, to determine whether changes to the eligibility criteria would be of
more benefit to rural communities.”); id. at 15 (statement of Sen. Ken Salazar,
Member, Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res.) (“I am wondering whether there would
be a way of bringing in the efforts that we currently have . . . under the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, so . . . that there be a coherent program that . . . we
can go to and that we can figure out to access those resources.”).
265. See DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
CLAIM JURISDICTION 144 (1997) (discussing the benefits that occur from committees handling complex issues); KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK,
ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 325 (1997)
(“Turf battles between committees . . . are notorious . . . [and] often extend[ ]
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been delegated the same authority and compete to invest their
energy and bring about their desired outcomes.266 Likewise, provisions granting agencies power to coordinate may result in part
from friction between various factions of Congress that seek control over a process or policy for their pet agencies. Nonetheless,
compromise that leads to a clear agency hierarchy in coordination reduces the likelihood that coordinating agencies believe
themselves to have equal claim to jurisdiction.267
Alternatively, coordination legislation could create situational interdependence among agencies that have different and
potentially incompatible primary missions.268 Interdependence
could, in turn, mitigate agency conflict (since the agencies need
one another to proceed as mandated) while securing some of the
benefits of agency diversity. The work of Jacob Gersen and
Adrian Vermeule implies that the legislature might delegate
power to a lead agency to coordinate with dissimilar agencies
with the hope that the lead will take advantage of or transform
the resources of those agencies in ways that improve the implementation of legislation.269 An example of this involves efforts by
the Secretary of State under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act to draw on the resources of a variety of
federal agencies to maintain the security of all U.S. diplomatic
missions.270 Alternatively, Congress could choose to fragment
administrative authority specifically to promote administrative
over many years.”); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 1006–10 (2013) (stating findings on the amount of interagency coordination which results in joint
regulations). See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po,
Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789
(2015) (discussing the complex modern lawmaking process).
266. Cf. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 34, at 2234–35 (discussing the tension courts must resolve when two competing agencies interpret the same statute); Stephenson, supra note 248, at 1463–64 (explaining the pros and cons of
“institutional redundancy” on policy outcomes).
267. Cf. id. (stating when multiple agencies interpret the same statute, the
court will “seek to identify the agency to which it is most likely Congress would
have delegated . . . authority”).
268. Cf. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 187, at 98 (stating the consequences
of insulating agencies from presidential influence and control).
269. See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 34, at 2195–96 (suggesting that
principals “delegate to enemies or potential enemies” for several reasons: “to
reveal the agent’s type,” “to exploit the agent’s type,” and “to transform the
agent’s type”).
270. See infra notes 545–49 and accompanying text.
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independence where it is deemed critical to the legislative mission, or where the mission is so uncertain that its articulation
would benefit from agency competition, as in the legislation
charging the Army with coordinating the amorphous task of
“preparing the general plan for the development of the water resources of the western United States.”271
5. Offsetting Political Influence
Finally, statute-based coordination could mitigate the negative influence of politics on the quality of policymaking.272 On the
one hand, coordination legislation may lead to a reduction in
democratic control.273 For instance, DeShazo and Freeman suggest that “deputizing lateral agencies [as leaders] allows Congress . . . to influence the interagency process during implementation, thereby enabling members down the road to intervene on
behalf of local constituents in particular instances.”274 On the
other hand, as Peter Shane notes, “the executive branch is most
likely to respect democratic norms when there is some protection
of senior policymakers from direct presidential command.”275
Like the legislative designation of independent agencies,276
statute-based coordination could reduce the problematic influ-

271. 43 U.S.C. § 1511a (1970); see infra notes 579–85 and accompanying text.
272. See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATIONS IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 30–33 (2001) (discussing techniques bureaucracies use to foment relative political independence).
273. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 187, at 98 (stating the consequences
of shielding policymaking decisions from presidential control are less accountability and control, and “subject[ing] . . . institutions to the perverse incentives of
factions”).
274. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 18, at 2290; see id. (noting also that
“[l]ateral agencies are attractive instruments of control because they have
unique expertise that both Congress and the lead agency may lack”).
275. Peter M. Shane, Legislative Delegation, the Unitary Executive, and the
Legitimacy of the Administrative State, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 108
(2010); see also Rourke, supra note 1, at 690 (“[T]he White House often plays its
action-forcing role for purely self-serving reasons.”).
276. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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ence of political involvement on the quality of pluralistic policymaking,277 which includes presidential displacement of executive agencies in policy implementation.278 More specifically, legislative mandates allowing agencies to implement coordination
autonomously could reduce White House interference in crucial
interagency coordination at the early stages of policymaking.279
In addition, agencies could draw on authority to coordinate
to engage in collective action to constrain the Executive. The idea
of agencies checking the President is not novel,280 although
scholars have not yet considered how agencies might interact in

277. See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S.
Public Law: An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2007) ( “[T]he presumption of presidential power over the agencies
and the presidential mystique informing it diminish the vigor of pluralistic debate that is vital for informing governmental decisionmaking.”).
278. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 9, at 1245 (noting that “pressures for
centralized White House control have led to the displacement of agencies’ own
internal law into versions of internal law that stem from central offices within
the executive branch”); Alan Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1986)
(discussing a presidential Executive Order, which enabled the President to curtail agency action).
279. “This process of early interagency coordination can be extremely important and valuable in compiling relevant information and in ensuring that
from the very beginning, multiple and potentially diverse perspectives are
taken into account.” Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1850 (2013); see also Barkow, supra note 64, at 51 (suggesting that statutes imposing consultation requirements often require agencies to contact one another early in their decisionmaking processes); Bradley, supra note 9, at 752–53 (stating that agencies
may influence other agencies’ policymaking and choice of priorities early in the
regulatory process).
280. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, A Fourth Way?: Bringing Politics Back into Recess Appointments (and the Rest of the Separation of Powers, Too), 64 DUKE L.J.
ONLINE 161, 162–63 (2015) (arguing that the level of control agency actors exercise depends on political climate); Katyal, supra note 34, at 2314 (proposing
“a set of mechanisms that can create checks and balances within the executive
branch in the foreign affairs area”); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J.
423, 429 (2009) (“[I]nternal separation of powers is most often equated with
measures that check or constrain the Executive Branch, particularly presidential power.”); Shah, Intra-Agency Separation, supra note 122, at 113 (suggesting
“that agency fragmentation is a tool for mitigating executive control”).
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order to do so. Given that politics can erode legitimacy in rulemaking,281 and that increasingly authoritarian political norms282
provide motivation to agencies to resist executive leadership in
order to preserve their functions, agencies might use coordination statutes to insulate themselves from the President283 in order to remain more accountable to their missions.284
281. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 64, at 15–16 (considering the problems of
capture in financial regulation); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1599–1600 (2012) (suggesting
that a unitary executive may undermine the constitutionality of cooperative federalism); Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1671 (2012) (arguing that
“high-stakes rulemaking has become a ‘blood sport’ in which regulated industries, and occasionally beneficiary groups, are willing to spend millions of dollars to shape public opinion and influence powerful political actors to exert political pressure on agencies”).
282. See Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving
Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 43, 47–49
(2017) (describing actions taken by President Obama as part of “the modern
trend toward an ‘administrative presidency,’” and suggesting that “early actions
by President Donald Trump signal that exertions of presidential authority over
administrative agencies will continue—if not even be taken to new extremes”);
Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683,
692–720 (2016) (illustrating how Presidents Bush and Obama exerted “significant control over the regulatory state”); Jennifer Nou, Taming the Shallow
State, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 28, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/
nc/taming-the-shallow-state-by-jennifer-nou (highlighting President Trump’s
hostility towards and weakening of the administrative state); Lisa Rein & Juliet
Eilperin, White House Installs Political Aides at Cabinet Agencies to be Trump’s
Eyes and Ears, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2017), https://washingtonpost.com/
powerpost/white-house-installs-political-aides-at-cabinet-agencies-to-be
-trumps-eyes-and-ears/2017/03/19/68419f0e-08da-11e7-93dc-00f9bdd74ed1_
story.html (discussing President Trump’s actions to gain control and influence
within agencies); Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, As Leaks Multiply, Fears of a
‘Deep State’ in America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://nytimes.com/2017/
02/16/world/americas/deep-state-leaks-trump.html (discussing the similarities
between the Trump administration and authoritarian regimes like Egypt).
283. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 35, at 824–25 (arguing that an agency
may gain the ability to resist presidential influence from its enabling statute,
rather than from classification as independent).
284. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 461 (2003) (contending “that the ‘presidential control’ model cannot legitimate agencies because the model rests on a mistaken assumption about the sufficiency of political accountability for that purpose”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 51 (2006) (“We conclude, somewhat

2019]

CONGRESS’S AGENCY COORDINATION

2021

Relatedly, coordination statutes could empower executive
agencies to jointly resist those presidential actions that increase
bureaucratic drift.285 For instance, where a significant number
of agencies are authorized to coordinate on environmental matters,286 like-minded agencies with an interest in conservation
could find mooring in coordination statutes despite a president’s
anti-conservation agenda,287 or even if an anti-conservationist is
installed as the head of one of the coordinating agencies.288 This
paradoxically, that agencies, though not comprising elected officials, may better
promote political accountability than the White House.”); Cynthia R. Farina,
The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987–88 (1997) (speaking to “the legitimacy problem”
faced by federal agencies from trends “strengthening the hand of the President”); Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741,
1765–71 (2009) (discussing, in part, the problems that a unitary conception of
the executive branch poses for accountability); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of
Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1397, 1397, 1416–25 (2013) (identifying the presidential control model as
“the most prevalent model of political influence on agencies” and nonetheless
recognizing flaws with the model that undermine the legitimacy and accountability of agencies and the administrative state as a whole).
285. Katyal, supra note 34, at 2318 (suggesting that unitary executive theorists have not answered the question of how institutions should be structured
to encourage not only executive oversight, but to check “presidential adventurism”).
286. For examples of this legislation, see supra Table 1 & Table 5 and infra
App.
287. See, e.g., Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How President
Trump Is Changing Environmental Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-science
-environment; Oliver Milman, Trump’s Alarming Environmental Rollback:
What’s Been Scrapped so Far, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2017), https://theguardian
.com/environment/2017/jul/04/trump-emvironmental-rollback-epa-scrap
-regulations (listing President Trump’s agenda rolling back environmental regulations); Nadja Popovich & Tatiana Schlossberg, 23 Environmental Rules
Rolled Back in Trump’s First 100 Days, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2017), https://
nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/02/climate/environmental-rules-reversed
-trump-100-days.html (outlining President Trump’s extensive rollback of environmental rules).
288. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Counseled by Industry, Not Staff, E.P.A.
Chief Is Off to a Blazing Start, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2017), https://nytimes.com/
2017/07/01/us/politics/trump-epa-chief-pruitt-regulations-climate-change.html
(“In the four months since he took office as the Environmental Protection
Agency’s administrator, Scott Pruitt has moved to undo, delay or otherwise
block more than 30 environmental rules, a regulatory rollback larger in scope
than any other.”); Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, How Scott Pruitt Turned the
EPA into One of Trump’s Most Powerful Tools, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2017),
https://washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/under-scott-pruitt-a-year
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dynamic could bolster any of the number of agencies with core
missions that are currently incompatible with the views of political leadership.289 Indeed, Congress might protect its interests
proactively by authorizing coordination to create a safety net or
pressure valve allowing an agency to draw on the assistance of
other agencies for reinforcement if faced with executive
pushback against its legislative mandate. This desire to inoculate an agency could drive the initial passage of coordination legislation or might be realized through progressive expansion of
the authority to coordinate, as Congress sought to do by passing
iterations of the Endangered Species Act.290
III. EFFECT ON EXECUTIVE CONTROL
The previous Parts established the paradigm of statutebased coordination and argued that it is motivated, for the most
part, by Congress’s desire to direct agencies to more effectively
implement their legislative and related mandates. This Part theorizes that this tool of agency design alters how Congress and
the President share governance of the administrative state. Put
another way, this Part suggests that coordination statutes displace, in the words of Nelson Polsby, “a presidential branch of
government separate and apart from the executive branch” “that

-of-tumult-and-transformation-at-epa/2017/12/26/f93d1262-e017-11e7-8679
-a9728984779c_story.html (stating Scott Pruitt, President Trump’s EPA Administrator, has “single-handedly reversed the agency’s position”); Alex Guillén
& Emily Holden, What EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Promised—and What He’s Done,
POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2017), https://politico.com/interactives/2017/scott-pruitt
-promises (discussing how Scott Pruitt, the EPA’s administrator, plans to rollback Agency’s focus on climate change); Justin Worland, Inside Scott Pruitt’s
Mission to Remake the EPA, TIME (Oct. 26, 2017), http://time.com/4998279/
company-man-in-washington/ (“Pruitt has pioneered a radically different approach to environmental protection.”).
289. Cf. Massimo Calabresi, While Trump Is Tweeting, These 3 People Are
Undoing American Government as We Know It, TIME (Oct. 26, 2017), http://
time.com/magazine/us/4998244/november-6th-2017-vol-190-no-19-u-s (discussing President Trump’s efforts to dismantle the administrative state by appointing heads that are opposed to their respective agencies’ mandates); Meg Jacobs,
Trump Is Appointing People Who Hate the Agencies They Will Lead, CNN (Dec.
12, 2016), http://cnn.com/2016/12/10/opinions/government-is-the-problem
-jacobs/index.html (stating President Trump is picking agency leadership that
is “downright hostile to the mission of the agency they are appointed to run”).
290. See H.R. REP. 100-517 (1988) for an example of one of these iterations.
See also supra notes 517–22 and accompanying text.
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sits across the table from the executive branch . . . [and] imperfectly attempts to coordinate both the executive and legislative
branches in its own behalf.”291
Scholars have long sought to clarify how Congress and the
President divide the power to shape agencies’ implementation of
statute.292 As the chief executive officer (CEO) of the executive
branch, the President directs administrative activity to come extent.293 Some argue that constitutionally,294 to ensure agency
conformity with both executive and legislative norms295 and for
purposes of effective governance,296 the President is the administrator-in-chief.297 Others caution that presidential over-involvement in administrative activity can displace expertise298 or
291. Nelson W. Polsby, Some Landmarks in Modern Presidential–Congressional Relations, in BOTH ENDS OF THE AVENUE: THE PRESIDENCY, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND CONGRESS IN THE 1980S 1, 20 (Anthony King ed., 1983).
292. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of how the dynamics of administrative control are relevant to historical accounts of the allocation of power between
Congress and the President.
293. See Rourke, supra note 1, at 687 (likening political control over the administrative to “joint custody,” in which the President “reign[s] in solitary splendor as the bureaucracy’s chief executive officer,” to whom all civil servants must
defer, while Congress controls “both the extent of their power and the scope of
their resources”).
294. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82
VA. L. REV. 647, 652 (1996) (suggesting that the Opinion Clause and Article II
“place[s] the President at the apex of three awesome pyramids of power,” including “as Chief Administrator of the Executive Bureaucracy”); Steven G. Calabresi, Concluding Thoughts, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 651, 653 (2010) (stating
that “[i]t would be impossible for the President to” ensure “that the laws be
faithfully executed,” “or for that matter [it is] his oath to preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution of the United States unless the Vesting Clause of Article II gave him the executive power and made him, in effect, our Administratorin-Chief ” ); Rao, supra note 5, at 1275 (“Article II requires the President serve
as the Administrator in Chief, in control of execution of the laws and with directive authority over his subordinates.”). See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The
Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015) (suggesting that
the constitutional principles direct the President to supervise agencies).
295. “It is the internal structures that order collective action with the
agency—whether in a hierarchical or decentralized fashion . . . that provide the
systems through which agencies incorporate and heed, or neglect, external administrative law [which includes legislative and judicial mandates].” Metzger &
Stack, supra note 9, at 1264.
296. Rourke, supra note 1, at 689–90 (suggesting that the President spurs
administrative agencies to action).
297. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
298. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1, 24 (1994) (suggesting that “[i]f political
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even steer an agency away from its legislative mandate.299 Likewise, some scholars suggest that the President is not able to supervise broad swathes of regulatory activity300 and that Congress does not intend for the President to do so in any case.301 In
contrast, others critique the “legislative micro-management of
the decisions and actions of executive agencies.”302 A general
oversight is a good thing, then it is possible to have too much of a good thing,”
and that presidential oversight has led to “micromanagement techniques that
have reduced the collective gains available from relying on agency expertise and
experience”).
299. See Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 454 (1987) (“The President . . . may not
always be enthusiastic about his constitutional duty, and he may use whatever
influence he has over the regulatory process to steer an agency away from its
congressional mandate.”); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 965, 984–86 (1997) (cautioning that the legitimacy of agencies is
preserved when the President is restrained in exerting his executive power over
administrative agencies); id. at 986 (“[The President may wields power only]
within the constraints of law that Congress has established. No more than he
could assign to the Secretary of the Interior responsibilities Congress had placed
in the hands of the Secretary of Agriculture but he thought could be more capably met on F Street, can he depart from Congress’s other assignments of responsibility.”).
300. See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2250 (arguing a broad system of presidential “administrative control raises serious legal questions”); see also STEPHEN
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 110 (2010) (“[T]he president may not
have the time or willingness to review [bureaucratic] decisions.”); RICHARD P.
NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 1–2 (1983) (discussing the historical limits of the President’s executive authority); Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 412 (2010) (“It is costly for Presidents
and their advisers to monitor the mass of agencies’ policymaking activities, to
develop positions on the often complex underlying substantive issues, to communicate those positions to the people formally empowered to decide, and to
actually get a decision implementing the President’s policy.”).
301. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law:
Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1301 (2006) [hereinafter Mashaw, Recovering] (noting that Congress presumes the President’s subdelegation authority because it cannot expect the President to carry out personally every grant of authority); see also Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard,
Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 787 (2016)
(“[R]equiring complete presidential control over the bureaucracy would make
Congress less enthusiastic about delegating power, which in turn would slow
the growth of the administrative state.”); Jerry L. Mashaw & Avi Perry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the Antebellum Republic, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 7, 28 (2009) (discussing how Congress did not expect the President to “oversee the various and sundry details of the growing administrative state”).
302. Rourke, supra note 1, at 689 (emphasis added) (referencing this general
critique).
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takeaway from these disputes is that while Congress is in charge
of administrative design on an agency-by-agency and component-by-component basis,303 the President’s purview is less precise and concerned with orienting her branch more generally towards her priorities.
This Part suggests that coordination legislation has the potential to impact the salience of executive authority and branch
unification, because it empowers agencies to effectuate transboundary relationships without transparent and consistent input from the President. As this Article has noted throughout, interagency coordination is often initiated by the Executive to
direct agencies to make policy consistent with her broader
agenda. This Part argues that by incentivizing agencies to interact autonomously, in ways that privilege legislative concerns
over executive interests, coordination that is initiated by legislation may alter the supervisory relationship between the Executive and executive agencies.
This Part begins by suggesting that administrative networks created by Congress impact our expectations of a hierarchical and unilateral relationship between the President and
each executive agency. The piecemeal, vertical interagency relationships mandated by coordination statutes allow executive
agencies to control one another outside of the usual executive
hierarchy, which would otherwise place the President on top.
This, in turn, challenges the assumption of a unique chain of
command from the White House to bureaucrats and could interfere with the President’s capacity to properly manage the outcomes of interagency coordination. Under a more unitarian conception of presidential power,304 statute-based coordination
networks have the potential to infringe on the President’s power
under Article II of the Constitution. Ultimately, this Part does
not take the stance that this legislation necessarily violates the
separation of powers, although unitary executive theorists might
disagree. Rather, this Part asserts that coordination legislation
infuses agencies with additional autonomy and increases the insulation of executive agencies, which may have a functional impact on the President’s ability to lead her branch.
This Part then theorizes that executive agencies that coordinate on the basis of statute, be it vertically or horizontally,
share some qualities with independent regulatory commissions
303. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 36.
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that insulate them from the President. Just as Lisa Bressman
and Robert Thompson have identified the existence of mechanisms that make independent agencies increasingly responsive
to presidential preferences,305 the authority to coordinate may
render executive agencies decreasingly responsive to executive
influence. This Part concludes by offering suggestions for proactive steps the President could take to establish greater control
over statute-based coordination, including via mechanisms in a
handful of statutes that offer avenues for presidential involvement in coordination and, perhaps more consistently, through ex
post implementation of the Executive’s own tools of administrative oversight. Ultimately, this Part suggests, if Congress allots
a clear role for the Executive in statute-based coordination, this
will reduce her incentives to overstep and thus reduce the benefits of agency autonomy in statute-based coordination, while improving the exercise of Article II.
A. UNSETTLING PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
Congress has a wide degree of authority to structure government as it sees fit and may choose to do so on the basis of several
competing values.306 However, the President’s mandate to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed creates a hierarchical
executive structure and an oversight function that Congress may
not wholly excise.307 As noted by the judiciary regarding coordination under the Endangered Species Act308 “the President has
the constitutional authority to ‘supervise and guide’ Executive
Branch officials in ‘their construction of the statutes under
which they act.’”309

305. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 50, at 600.
306. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 187, at 8–9; Yoo, supra note 4, at
1953; see also Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1168–71; Mashaw, Recovering, supra note 301, at 1271; Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal
Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1830, 116
YALE L.J. 1636, 1657 (2007) [hereinafter Mashaw, Reluctant]; Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583–648 (1984).
307. See supra notes 293–98 and accompanying text (describing theories of
executive structure and congressional oversight).
308. See infra notes 517–21 and accompanying text.
309. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534,
1546 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926)).
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There are many political leaders and scholars who recognize310 or even favor311 a strong executive hierarchy. But even
those less enthusiastic about centralized executive power note
that the Constitution “recognizes the President’s right to consult
with those who exercise the legal authority Congress delegates
in establishing government agencies.”312 It may be safely said
that there are some, albeit disputed, limits to Congress’s power
to obstruct the President’s supervision of her subordinates.313
On the one hand, if coordination statutes increase the reach
and jurisdiction of agencies whose priorities are aligned with the
legislature’s, this may encourage policymaking that is more
mindful of and responsive to Congress.314 On the other hand, the
legislative empowerment of agencies in this manner could interfere with the President’s power to direct administrative activity
on a larger scale. Coordination statutes even have the potential
to serve as a Trojan horse for Congress to actively reduce the
President’s capacity to oversee interagency relationships in particularly contentious regulatory areas, although additional evidence would be required to determine whether Congress in fact
uses them in this way.
Statutes authorizing coordination are similar to other enabling legislation in that the delegated responsibility is assigned
310. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 6, at 1417–19 (suggesting that “the
president and agency leaders often embrace [hierarchical] designs” and that
“[m]any hierarchical relationships give power to the president”).
311. Kagan, supra note 12, at 2251 (defending the practice of presidential
directives to agencies); Mashaw, Reluctant, supra note 306, at 1657 (implying
that “any system of administrative implementation under the American Constitution [is] subject . . . to three forms of control: political control by elected
officials; administrative control through hierarchal supervision; and legal control through judicial review”).
312. Strauss, supra note 8, at 717; see id. at 704–05 (arguing that Presidents
lawfully exercise supervision, but not decisional authority over agencies); Yoo,
supra note 4, at 1953; see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 187, at 8 (comparing “executive” functions to “administrative” functions and suggesting that the
President has power over the former but not the latter); Mashaw, Recovering,
supra note 301, at 1271 (“The Constitution’s silence on most matters administrative provides extremely modest textual support for the notion that all administration was to be firmly and exclusively in the control of the President.”).
313. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1165–71; Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 187, at 10; see also Kagan, supra note 12, at 2251 (arguing that when
Congress has not acted expressly to restrict the President’s ability to direct an
agency decision, regulatory statutes should be interpreted to permit the President to do so).
314. See supra Part II (describing benefits of coordination).
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to an agency without mention of the President. The difference
here is that agency leadership is given the authority to interact
with and in many cases to lead or influence other agencies without the President’s permission, as opposed to the more commonly
recognized opportunity simply to delegate within her own
agency.315 As an initial matter, the President may not be aware
of the implementation of statute-based coordination. In addition,
the assignment of coordination authority to a lead agency beholden to Congress may limit the President’s capacity both to
manage coordination efficiently, thus hindering her ability to direct cross-cutting administration, and to draw on the mechanism
of interagency coordination for her own purposes.
In general, the legislative delineation of a hierarchical relationship among previously horizontally-situated agencies may
create opacity in lines of executive accountability. Where previously, an agency may have reported directly to the President on
matters of broader executive policy, that agency may now be directed to report instead to another agency designated by Congress, and this too, in response to legislative (as opposed to executive) priorities. The President might sustain a connection to the
dominant agency in the coordination network,316 but awareness
of and control over interagency interactions between or among
agencies within the network may be reduced. Alternatively, the
President could maintain separate lines of accountability to each
coordinating agency in a statute-based network, but once again
have a limited understanding of the coordination between or
among these agencies, and reduced control over the outcomes of
those interactions.317 Possible exceptions to this include the relatively uncommon occurrence of a legislatively-designated role
for the President in the coordination effort,318 or instances when

315. See generally Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, supra note 170 (discussing the role of agency heads within an agency); Nou, Subdelegating, supra note
171 (discussing delegation of authority with an agency).
316. Cf. Verkuil, supra note 132, at 265–66 (arguing that “centralizing power
in the office of the Chair” is a way to make independent agencies into “singleheaded agencies” that answer more to the President).
317. Cf. infra note 363 and accompanying text (discussing the typical independent agency structure and the buffer it creates between the president and
the agency).
318. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing coordination legislation).
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the President’s attention is commanded by interagency conflict.319 Furthermore, to the extent some delegations of coordination authority are, in fact, dysfunctional, interagency conflicts
may also pose a challenge to presidential administration by destabilizing the President’s highly visible role as the government’s CEO.320
Finally, coordination legislation could violate the Constitution. Its potential to do so rests on whether Article II empowers
the Executive to co-opt the authority of agency heads in order to
direct the implementation of legislation. On the one hand, scholars such as Justice Kagan, Henry Monaghan, and Saikrishna
Prakash suggest that presidents have clear directive power over
executive agency leaders even in those instances where it is the
agency heads themselves, and not the Executive, that have been
assigned by Congress to administer the statute.321 On the other
hand, Richard Pildes, Cass Sunstein, Kevin Stack, and Peter
Strauss argue that the president may direct the implementation
of legislation in lieu of an agency head only when Congress expressly confers the opportunity.322
319. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing presidential oversight and agency coordination).
320. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the settled role of
the president as analogous to a chief executive officer).
321. See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2326–28 (arguing that delegations
to agency heads who are removable by the President at will should be interpreted as reflecting an intent to give the President directive authority because
“when Congress delegates to an executive official, it in some necessary and obvious sense also delegates to the President”); Monaghan, supra note 5, at 57
(arguing that the president has broad “managerial” power to fill in the details
of statutes when those details are an incident of normal public administration,
even absent supporting statutory authority); Prakash, supra note 5, at 991–92
(suggesting that the Framers established that “even if a statute grants discretion to the Secretary of State and explicitly prohibits presidential intervention
in the decisionmaking process, the President retains the constitutional authority to substitute his own judgment for the Secretary’s determination”); see also
Robert Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The NotSo-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 1011 (2001) (suggesting that every regulatory review program established by Presidents since Nixon has been rooted
in the president’s advisory and consultative role in supervising rulemaking by
agencies).
322. See, e.g., Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 25 (“[T]he President has
no authority to make the decision himself, at least if Congress has conferred the
relevant authority on an agency head.”); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Administrative Process in Crisis: The Example of Presidential Oversight of Agency Rulemaking, 6 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 710, 716 (1993) (“[T]he power to regulate remains
where the statute places it: the agency head ultimately is to decide what to do.”);
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Under a more unitary model of the executive branch, a substantial reduction in the President’s ability to direct interagency
relationships as a result of coordination legislation could inhibit
the President’s full expression of Article II and may even violate
this constitutional provision. To the extent the President does
not have the power to displace agency heads’ authority to form
statute-based interagency relationships, however, coordination
statutes simply allow Congress to wield more nuanced powers of
administrative management than are generally associated with
its other, more attenuated tools of design and oversight323 without running afoul of the Constitution. Nonetheless, regardless of
the limited possibility of constitutional violation, coordination
legislation alters intra-executive branch dynamics—not only
among agencies themselves,324 but also between the President
and the rest of her branch. In other words, even if coordination
statutes do not reach the bar of interference with the constitutional separation of powers, they may nonetheless undermine
the President’s role as a functional matter.

Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267, 284 (2006) (arguing that the president has directive
authority only when Congress expressly confers that power, in part because the
legislature would not delegate directly to the President if it was assumed she
had power otherwise); Strauss, supra note 306, at 649–50 (explaining that “the
agencies to which rulemaking is assigned,” rather than the President, possess
“ultimate decisional authority”); Strauss, supra note 8, at 697–759 (arguing that
statutes generally imply less, rather than more, presidential involvement in legislative implementation—in other words, “if [statutory] text chooses between
President as overseer of the resulting assemblage, and President as necessarily
entitled ‘decider,’ the implicit message is that of oversight, not decision”);
Strauss, supra note 299, at 984 (“[T]he President is simply in error and disserves the democracy he leads when he behaves as if rulemakings were his rulemakings. The delegations of authority that permit rulemaking are ordinarily
made to others, not him—to agency heads whose limited field of action and embeddedness in a multi-voiced framework of legislature, President, and court are
the very tokens of their acceptability in a culture of law.”); see also Monaghan,
supra note 5, at 59 (suggesting a limiting principle to broad presidential power
by noting that executive initiatives must be based in statute).
323. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 9, at 1263 (noting that Congress’s “important levers of agency control” consist of the ability to “subject[ ] agencies to
procedural and substantive requirements, like the APA, that courts enforce,”
and to “conduct[ ] investigations and oversight, and further constrain[ ] agencies
through exercise of the appropriations power”); supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
324. Supra Part I.B (discussing coordination legislation and interagency
control).
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B. INSULATING AGENCY INTERACTIONS
The previous Section suggested that the statutory creation
of autonomous interagency coordination disadvantages presidential administration. The instant Section theorizes that statute-based interagency coordination infuses executive agencies
with independence in another way. More specifically, dynamics
associated with the characteristics of independent agencies that
promote insulation from the President—such as for-cause removal restrictions, leadership by multi-member commissions
and others—are also associated with networks of agencies created by coordination legislation. For this reason, coordination
statutes offer executive agencies an additional degree of independence from the Executive.
Indeed, only seven statutes, total, authorize specific independent agencies to coordinate;325 the rest are aimed at particular executive agencies. Since a significant majority of the interagency coordination regimes analyzed for this project designate
executive (rather than independent) agencies as the lead, this
Section’s assertion that interagency coordination renders agencies more independent and offers them insulation from the President is that much more challenging to general assumptions
about executive hierarchy.
More specifically, this Section adds to the list of “indicia of
independence” among executive agencies326 by arguing that vertical networks of coordinating agencies are like independent regulatory commissions (IRCs) in ways that increase executive
agencies’ insulation from the President.327 This hypothesis de-

325. An Act to Provide Revenue to Regulate Commerce with Foreign Countries, to Encourage the Industries of the United States, to Protect American
Labor, and for Other Purposes, infra notes 393–95, 501–604 (authorizing the
International Trade Commission to coordinate); Consumer Product Safety Act,
infra note 556 (authorizing the Consumer Product Safety Commission to coordinate); Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, infra note 561 (authorizing the
Corporation for National and Community Service to coordinate); Marine Mammal Protection Act, infra note 523 (authorizing the Marine Mammal Commission to coordinate); Market Reform Act of 1990, infra note 490 (authorizing the
Securities and Exchange Commission to coordinate); National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, infra note 589 (authorizing NASA to coordinate); America
COMPETES Act, infra note 562 (also authorizing NASA to coordinate).
326. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
327. KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 2.5, at 46 (3d ed. 1994) (defining independent agencies as those that
are “insulated from presidential control in one or more ways”); Kagan, supra
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stabilizes the assumption of a strong presidential hierarchy particularly because the overwhelming majority of coordination legislation directs relationships among executive agencies, rather
than IRCs.328
Executive agencies are fundamentally part of the executive
hierarchy, even though they are animated by Congress. More
specifically, they are tied to their branch’s structure and priorities, and generally hew to White House priorities in their enforcement of the law. In contrast, independent agencies may
more easily avoid presidential supervision or direction,329 are
more clearly beholden “to the Congress rather than solely to the
Executive,”330 and tend to be more closely aligned with the legislature331 or driven by a set of unique motivations that can be

note 12, at 2274 (suggesting that agency independence poses “a particularly
stark challenge to the aspiration of Presidents to control administration”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of
Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 218–19 (1988) (concluding that independent agencies are independent of presidential power).
328. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (discussing the few examples of coordination legislation for independent agencies).
329. See PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussing how
the heads of independent agencies are “neither supervised nor directed by the
President”).
330. See LANDIS, supra note 60, at 34 (“The policies that [independent agencies] are supposed to pursue are those that have been delineated by the Congress not by the Executive. Departure from these policies or the failure to make
them effective or their subordination of legislative goals to the directions of the
Executive is thus a matter of necessary legislative concern.”).
331. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (“The
independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President,
and it has often been observed that their freedom from Presidential oversight
(and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction.”); Barkow, supra note 64, at 37–38 (noting that a single head
may be more susceptible to presidential influence, especially when the President has the power to demote the chair and appoint a new one); see also Brown
& Candeub, supra note 132, at 809 (stating that congressional concerns dominate independent agencies); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 5, at 582–83 (arguing that without presidential control, independent agencies are subject only
to congressional oversight).
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distinguished from those of the President.332 For this reason, independent agencies may “protect[] against bureaucratic
drift.”333
However, executive agencies may also exhibit characteristics of independence,334 including by reducing the potential for
drift.335 On the one hand, as Peter Strauss notes, “[a]ll agencies,
whether denominated executive or independent, have relationships with the President.”336 On the other hand, Congress has
long given all agencies the power to act on the basis of expertise,
rather than in response to political interests.337 Generallyspeaking, independent agencies are structured for precisely this
purpose.338 However, cabinet agencies may have a measure of

332. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 886 (3d Cir.
1986) (“[The] headless ‘fourth branch’ of government consist[s] of independent
agencies having significant duties in both the legislative and executive branches
but residing not entirely within either.”); U.S. ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v.
Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 99 (D.D.C. 1964)) (“[M]any regulatory commissions
fulfill in part a legislative function and in part carry out executive duties.” (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)).
333. Meazell, supra note 64, at 1779; see also Barkow, supra note 64, at 24
(“A related goal of agency independence is to insulate the agency from future
political changes in either Congress or the presidency. This can be done either
to cement in place current congressional policy preferences or to allow the
agency to make an initial policy decision that is not subject to wide fluctuations
over time.”); Bressman & Thompson, supra note 50, at 613–14 (discussing how
independent agencies prevent short-term political interests from dominating);
Gersen, supra note 6, at 347–48 (describing the risk of drift as a justification for
insulation).
334. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (“Although the Constitution empowers the President to keep federal
officers accountable, administrative agencies enjoy in practice a significant degree of independence.”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 35, at 828 (suggesting that
“indicia of independence” in executive agencies “can have weighty implications
for the relationship between an agency and the President,” and serve to constrain presidential authority); Strauss, supra note 306, at 585 (“Despite the attention often given asserted differences between single, politically responsible
administrators and multimember independent commissions, these organizations are more similar than different below the highest levels.”).
335. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
336. Strauss, supra note 306, at 583 (suggesting that all agencies are “subject to presidential direction in significant aspects of their functioning” and all
can “resist presidential direction in others”); see also Datla & Revesz, supra note
35, at 825.
337. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 50, at 613–14.
338. Strauss, supra note 306, at 583.
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insulation from the President as well.339 For instance, the legislature allows administrative law judges in both independent340
and executive341 agencies to adjudicate cases related to their core
mandates in lieu of Article III courts, and protects these judges
from executive influence, to some extent. And while news accounts decry the President’s overly-political influence on the
heads of certain executive agencies,342 Adrian Vermeule has
339. Datla & Revesz, supra note 35, at 796 (“It is not clear how much more
insulation from presidential control results from a multimember agency as opposed to a single-headed agency.”); see A. Michael Froomkin, In Defense of Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 789 (1987) (“[T]he Constitution permits Congress to create executive agencies with substantial autonomy,
regardless of whether they are called independent.”).
340. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (defining
independent agencies as those which performed quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions because unfettered executive control over these agencies would
violate the separation of powers); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961); Frederick R. Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 278 (1987)
(“Legislative and judicial functions—dubbed ‘quasi’ perhaps to assuage our lingering constitutional guilt—have been steadily transferred to administrative
agencies for a century . . . . Delegation is the broad channel through which increasing power has flowed to what many feel is a de facto fourth branch. How
delegation is exercised determines the ability of Congress or the executive to
wield power in the constitutional scheme.”); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes,
Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward A Constitutional
Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (recognizing the judicial role of agencies generally).
341. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (concretizing the transition of judicial functions to the executive branch); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV.
915, 923 (1988) (discussing the entrenchment of the judicial role of administrative agencies); Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
939, 943 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court decision that is most often credited with the rise of the current scheme of administrative adjudication, then
appellative review, is Crowell v. Benson [285 U.S. 22 (1932)]); Caleb Nelson,
Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 602–03 (2007)
(discussing the expansion of non-judicial adjudication).
342. See Rourke, supra note 1, at 691 (discussing the FBI’s reduced autonomy from the President); Master, supra note 37 (“[T]he Department of Justice
answers to the president, but . . . ‘[i]t has to maintain a sense of independence
from the political forces . . . in the executive branch.’”); Serwer, supra note 37
(discussing the FBI director’s attempts to maintain a level of independence from
the President); Transcript: Jeff Sessions’s Prepared Remarks at His Attorney
General Hearing, supra note 37 (“The office of the attorney general of the United
States is not a political position, and [the attorney general] . . . must be committed to following the law. He or she must be willing to tell the president no if he
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noted that executive agencies’ relative independence may be preserved by conventions that limit the impact of politics on administrative judgment.343
Interagency interactions also afford agencies some measure
of autonomy, particularly when initiated by an entity other than
the President. Even within the context of presidential efforts to
influence agencies by fostering coordination,344 shared responsibilities intensify “the goals of insulation.”345 For instance, while
Keith Bradley argues that interagency interactions constitute a
mechanism for presidential control of agencies,346 he does so in
order to challenge the prevalent idea that shared administrative
responsibilities “dissipate presidential authority.”347 Agency-initiated coordination more easily allows for some independence
from presidential interference348 and for increases in joint administrative capacity outside the President’s sightline.349 Coordination may even be used by agencies to alter their own jurisdiction, although this is arguably constitutional only when
supported by legislation.350 For these reasons, “Congress may

overreaches. He or she cannot be a mere rubber stamp to any idea the president
has.”).
343. Vermeule, supra note 35, at 1166–67 (noting that “[a]gencies that lack
for-cause tenure yet enjoy operative independence are protected by unwritten
conventions that constrain political actors” from attempting to remove their
members or to direct their exercise of discretion).
344. See supra Part I.A (discussing presidential efforts to influence agencies).
345. Barkow, supra note 64, at 49–55.
346. Bradley, supra note 9, at 745.
347. Id. at 794.
348. Cf. Nou, supra note 35, at 1765–66 (describing how agency insulation
can thwart the President’s efforts to exercise control).
349. Renan, supra note 40, at 211 (discussing how agencies can pool their
resources to create “joint structures capable of ends that no single agency could
otherwise achieve”); see Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 40,
at 186 (discussing agency-initiated coordination). See generally Biber, supra
note 42 (proposing further research into the benefits of coordination); Freeman
& Farber, supra note 207 (discussing benefits of agency coordination in the environmental regulation context); Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra
note 9 (describing modes of agency-initiated coordination and its effects on the
role of the President).
350. See generally Shah, Interagency Transfers, supra note 9 (discussing how
agencies autonomously alter their own jurisdiction by transferring authority to
adjudicate administrative cases, and arguing this is constitutional only if based
in legislation authorizing interagency coordination).
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prefer to inject multiple agencies into the decision-making process to limit presidential control.”351 It is noteworthy that Congress has not specified a role for Executive oversight in most coordination legislation involving multiple, diverse agencies. One
such example includes several agencies with drastically different goals for their shared control over Artic initiatives.352 Perhaps, Congress excluded a role for the President in this case to
retain more direct control over that area’s immense land mass
and resources.
Agency interactions, particularly those resulting from coordination statutes, also share independence-enhancing qualities
typically associated with IRCs. One such characteristic is structure. Independent agencies are headed predominantly by commissions, whereas executive agencies are led by individual, political appointees. Coordination legislation, however, creates
“commissions” of individual executive agencies, thus compelling
the heads of those agencies to negotiate shared activity like a
multi-member board. Indeed, every single example analyzed in
this Article abides by this structure. And as it does for IRCs,353
structural separation effected by coordination legislation may offer the resulting networks of agencies a form of independence.
It is commonly recognized that independent agencies’ insulation from the White House stems from the protection of principal officers from removal by the President at will.354 In part as a
351. Barkow, supra note 64, at 52 (suggesting that Congress does this in
particular to dilute the President’s power over executive agencies).
352. See infra notes 496–500 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges with coordination between the Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency, as interests such as national security, scientific
research and environmental protection must be balanced).
353. The structural separation of an agency from the President helps to define it as independent. Datla & Revesz, supra note 35, at 824 (arguing that an
agency’s relative level of independence is based on both structural insulating
features as well as functional realities and that such placement need not be
static); Vermeule, supra note 35, at 1165–66 (arguing that that for-cause removal protection is not an indispensable element of independent agencies or of
operational independence in any agency); see also Wiener v. United States, 357
U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958) (finding implied for-cause removal protection for members of the War Claims commission because of the nature of the Commission
and its structural separation from executive agencies).
354. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988) (determining that independent agencies no longer require a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative function,
but are agencies to which Congress may grant for-cause removal protection
without interfering with the Take Care clause); see also Gersen, supra note 6,
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result of this protection,355 independent agencies are able to engage in autonomous or agnostic decisionmaking.356 Also as a result of removal protection, independent agencies may be more
likely to further policymaking that takes legislative interests
into account.357 For these reasons, the appointment of a chair,
particularly one from the President’s own political party, provides the Executive with her primary mechanism of control over
an independent agency.358 This understanding implies that if a
chair is appointed by a previous administration, or is appointed
by the sitting president under significant pressure from Senate
or congressional lobbyists, or for any other reason is appointed
outside of the President’s purview (for example, if the chair could
at 347 (“Independence is a legal term of art in public law, referring to agencies
headed by officials that the President may not remove without cause. Such
agencies are, by definition, independent agencies; all other agencies are not.”);
Kagan, supra note 12, at 2376 (defining the President’s removal power as “the
core legal difference” between independent and executive agencies); John O.
McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901,
953–54 (2001) (defining independent agencies as “agencies whose heads do not
serve at the pleasure of the president”).
355. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.10, at 20 (3d ed.
1991) (noting that “[t]he key to independence is security of tenure”); see also
Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 44, at 28–33 (discussing how to interpret forcause removal provisions to allow inclusion of independent agencies within regulatory review).
356. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory
and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111,
1135–36 (2000) (noting that as a result of insulation from presidential control
agencies may make decisions that are bi-partisan, non-partisan, ruled by experts, or free from executive influence).
357. See id. at 1136 n.126.
358. Daniel A. Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s Executor, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1835, 1848–50 (2015) (“The formal power to fire may be structurally less
important to controlling an agency or department than other mechanisms, such
as the power to appoint members or the chair, budgetary control, or even less
formal mechanisms like ex parte contacts.”); Devins & Lewis, supra note 64, at
469–77 (showing empirically that the President exercises weak control over independent agencies through appointment of members, at least until a majority
of commissioners are appointed from the President’s own party); Strauss, supra
note 306, at 587–91 (suggesting that the President influences agencies through
appointment of members and chairs and through assistance with budgetary negotiations); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 943–44 (1980) (describing President’s power to influence administrative agencies through informal
contacts); see Barkow, supra note 64, at 17 (discussing ways other than removal
limitations to achieve agency insulation from “interest groups and partisan pressure”). See generally Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (discussing presidential appointment power).
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feasibly, albeit unconstitutionally, be appointed by another
branch of the government), the board’s decisionmaking or policymaking processes would be more insulated from presidential
influence.
In the case of statute-based coordination, there is often one,
named agency designated to initiate coordination and lead the
resulting network of agencies. However, that agency has not
been chosen by the President to spearhead the coordination process. Rather, the agency draws its power to lead from the congressional designation of its post. Moreover, the lead agency cannot be “removed” easily by the President from its post as the
head of a network of coordinating agencies, since it was “appointed” to this post by statute.359 By analogy to the chair of an
independent agency, the lead agency and those of its actions
compelled by coordination legislation are similarly distanced
from the President.
In addition, while the conventional distinction between executive and independent agencies lies in for-cause removal protection for principal officers of the latter,360 other criteria also
help constitute an independent agency.361 According to Justice
Kagan, multi-member leadership shared by those with diverse
viewpoints is also part of what serves to insulate independent
agencies from the Executive.362 More specifically, if the board of
an independent agency includes members with differing political
and ideological perspectives, the President does not have a clear
point of entry to influence their decisionmaking.363 The diverse
multi-member structure enacted by some coordination statutes
may similarly serve to insulate networks of coordinating agencies from upper-level executive oversight.

359. Cf. Vermeule, supra note 35, at 1194–1203 (arguing that agencies with
semi-independent leadership have norms that diffuse the power political actors
have to remove their leaders).
360. See supra note 354 and accompanying text (discussing for-cause removal as the distinguishing feature of independent agencies).
361. Breger & Edles, supra note 356, at 1135; see Datla & Revesz, supra note
35, at 826–27 (arguing that several structural features of independent agencies
are often present in executive agencies as well).
362. See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2376–77 (arguing that independent agencies’ “organizational structure featuring multiple agency heads of diverse parties serving staggered terms” increases “the gap between the agency and the
President”).
363. See id.
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For instance, legislation requiring the Departments of
Homeland Security, Defense, Transportation, State, and the Interior, as well as NASA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, EPA, National Science Foundation, and Arctic Research Commission to all work together to coordinate control of
the Artic is a paradigmatic example of a coordination structure
that is likely to insulate agency decisionmaking from upper-level
influence364 without proactive presidential efforts to regain control.365 In another example, under the Indian Financing Act,
combined efforts by diverse agencies including the Department
of the Interior, the Small Business Administration, and the Corporation for National and Community Service to improve the
condition of reservations may similarly limit presidential influence and instead offer Congress greater purchase over implementation of this Act,366 in keeping with its longstanding interest in Indian affairs.
Coordinating agencies also engage in a dynamic that is,
loosely-speaking, similar to relationships between the chairperson and other board members of an IRC. While substantive authority is generally assigned to any commission as a whole and
not only to the chairperson,367 the chairperson may have, or is at
least be perceived to have, more influence over the decisionmaking process than other members of the board.368 For example,
while the statute governing the Federal Communications Commission “unambiguously assigns key administrative responsibilities to the agency as a whole,”369 many statutes, like those governing the Federal Reserve Board370 and the National Labor

364. See infra notes 496–500 and accompanying text.
365. See infra notes 462–67 and accompanying text (describing President
Obama’s efforts to do just that).
366. See infra notes 514–19 and accompanying text.
367. Breger & Edles, supra note 356, at 1166–67.
368. See DAVID M. WELBORN, GOVERNANCE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY
AGENCIES 34, 90–96 (1977); Adam Candeub & Eric Hunnicutt, Political Control
of Independent Agencies: Evidence from the FCC 9–10 (July 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640285 (presenting empirical
work that suggests the ideology of the Chair controls which orders pass in independent agencies, regardless of the frequency and partisanship of commissioner
dissent); Strauss, supra note 306, at 591.
369. Breger & Edles, supra note 356, at 1170–71; see also 47 U.S.C. § 154
(g)–(f) (1994); 47 U.S.C. § 155(b) (2012).
370. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
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Relations Board,371 give the chairperson undefined administrative and executive powers.372 And if a hierarchical relationship
between a chairperson and her colleagues is established by statute but remains unspecified, decisionmaking may be ambiguous
and cause contention even if responsibility for the process is ultimately shared by the board373—for instance, as a result of the
agency’s governing statute and institutional guidance.374
Similarly, as noted throughout this Article, coordination
statutes often designate an agency to, like a chair, head a network of coordinating agencies. Further, this lead agency has influence over the process and the application of discretion by all
agencies involved, both because of its core statutory responsibility for and its political interest in a successful outcome. The interplay between the agency empowered to initiate coordination
and the other agencies tasked with coordinating at the request
of the named agency may also be subject to administrative discretion, particularly of the lead agency, because non-lead agencies perceive their decisionmaking role as both shared by and
subjugated to that of the named agency. In a number of examples
involving the mandatory initiation of coordination by a lead
agency with an expansive group of agencies, the statute establishes this type of dynamic.375 Each of these qualities contributes
to the complication of interagency relationships that, like the
complex interactions among board members of a commission, insulate these relationships from the President.
Finally, like the members of an independent board, the congressional assignment of a role in coordination is related to an
agency’s interest and expertise in the broader policy initiative.
Like IRCs,376 coordinating executive agencies often deal with
limited subject matter and are granted significant discretion to
exercise joint authority within their areas of focus. And also like
those comprising the boards of independent agencies, coordinating agencies may gather in a variety of sometimes self-chosen

371. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 154 (2012).
372. Breger & Edles, supra note 356, at 1172.
373. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 6, at 1461 (“[I]n independent agencies with multiple leaders, the ‘decision-maker’ is the majority of members, often creating visible conflict.”).
374. Breger & Edles, supra note 356, at 1165–67.
375. See App., Part A.
376. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 50, at 613; Verkuil, supra note 132,
at 260–63.
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sub-groups to focus more deeply on the substantive and procedural issues of particular interest to them. In general, just as an
independent agency consists of a body of experts that is “free to
exercise its judgment” without any obligation or obstacles imposed by the rest of the executive branch,377 coordination regimes that duplicate these dynamics among networks of executive agencies may tend towards similar, expertise-privileging
independence from the President.
C. PRESIDENTIAL FOOTHOLDS FOR OVERSIGHT
Thus far, this Part has argued that statute-based coordination foregrounds the legislature’s role in structuring interagency
relationships. More specifically, it has theorized that by enabling
administrative autonomy, coordination legislation undermines
the President’s supervisory role. Indeed, as Jennifer Nou suggests, “[i]ndependence is a matter of degree that cannot be determined by removal restrictions alone, but rather requires a
careful assessment of the likely presidential calculations within
particular contexts.”378 This calculation might include an added
responsiveness to conflict between agencies.379
This Section discusses several routes by which the President
might reclaim the position of administrator-in-chief in regard to
statute-based interagency coordination. Due to necessary limits
on the scope of this Article, this Section will not go into great
depth evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of these options.
Rather, its goal is simply to highlight statutory footholds and
endogenous oversight mechanisms that, along with greater executive responsiveness to interagency conflict, could increase
presidential control over administrative coordination initiated
by the legislature.
Statute-based coordination is fundamentally pervious to the
executive assertion of a role in administrative management. For
one, some coordination statutes designate explicit executive responsibilities. However, even if these statutes omit mention of
the President, they provide leeway for her to pursue control over
377. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1934); see also
Katyal, supra note 34, at 2320; Strauss, supra note 306, at 591–95 (describing
the entrenched position of the headless fourth branch in the years since Humphrey’s Executor).
378. Nou, supra note 35, at 1762 (introducing her work examining the ways
in which executive agencies may “self-insulate” from the President).
379. See Part III.C.3 (discussing the textured impact of interagency conflict
on the Executive’s ability to influence administrative coordination).
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agency interactions at the back end. This is because while Congress is able to create interagency relationships, its ability to
oversee them is limited, at best, in that this is more often accomplished by reporting requirements than by direct and consistent
supervision.380 Put another way, coordination statutes offer Congress a better tool for initiating interagency coordination than
for guaranteeing it conforms to legislative or other standards of
success once implemented, which leaves room for the President
to assert an oversight role. Furthermore, interagency conflict
may garner political attention that limits agency insulation from
the Executive.
This Section highlights, first, the provisions for executive involvement built into a handful of coordination statutes; these
routes include direct participation, the mediation of interagency
conflicts that stem from coordination, and influencing agencies’
reports on coordination to Congress. In addition, it offers several
options for supervision of agency coordination that the White
House itself could initiate, as well as an explanation of how interagency conflict leaves coordinating agencies more vulnerable
to executive oversight. Each of these mechanisms for presidential participation in statute-based coordination could benefit the
functioning of the executive branch, as well as reduce any obstacles to the proper exercise of Article II.
1. In Coordination Legislation
Some coordination statutes already contain explicit provisions for presidential involvement in or management of interagency coordination. In a few instances, Congress has included
the White House as a party to coordination.381 In a handful of
others, it delineates an explicit role for executive oversight of the
resulting interagency relationships. And in some others, the
President has a hand in shaping the way agencies report their
successes in coordination to Congress, which may allow her to
influence the coordination itself. Although they are unusual,
these statutes serve as models for future legislative preservation
of the President’s role in shaping administrative coordination.

380. See supra Part II.B.1.
381. See infra notes 403–08 (tasking the White House Office of Management
and Budget with directing data collection); infra notes 491–95 (tasking the
White House Office of National Drug Control Policy with coordination); infra
notes 638–42 (tasking the White House Office of Management and Budget with
coordination).
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In one notable example concerning services for the elderly,382 the President has been accorded direct oversight383 of a
committee established by Congress384 to ensure ample coordination, although Congress also retains a measure of control over
the committee.385 In another instance, coordination authorized386 under the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,387 which allows the State Department “to bring improved coordination and rationalization to U.S.
overseas economic and development assistance programs,”388
falls under a general provision stating that the Secretary of
State’s activities are to be carried out “[u]nder the direction of
the President.”389 In another example, while coordination under
the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act390
does not include an explicit presidential oversight provision, it
nonetheless specifies that “the Secretary [of Housing and Urban
Development] is authorized . . . to assist the President in coordinating the areawide development efforts of all Federal agencies”
under the Act,391 which positions the President in a leadership
role.392
Under An Act to Regulate Commerce with Foreign Countries,393 the U.S. International Trade Commission may receive
records and information as well as “officials and employees” from
other agencies in order to pursue investigations under the statute, but only if the President directs other agencies to assist the
382. See infra notes 511–16 and accompanying text.
383. 42 U.S.C. § 3013(c)(2) (2012) (giving the President significant authority
to direct the interagency coordination effected by the Interagency Coordinating
Committee on Aging).
384. See supra notes 215–20 and accompanying text.
385. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 3013(c)(7) (providing for a degree of congressional
oversight by requiring the Committee to prepare a report for a number of congressional committees every two years). In the report, the Committee must describe its activities and accomplishments in “enhancing the overall coordination
of federally funded programs and services.” 42 U.S.C. § 3013(c)(7)(A)(i).
386. 22 U.S.C. § 6593 (2012) (“Assistance programs coordination and oversight”).
387. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); S. 903, 105th Cong. (1997).
388. S. REP. NO. 105-28, at 20 (1997).
389. 22 U.S.C. § 6593(a)(1).
390. See infra note 563 and accompanying text.
391. 42 U.S.C. § 3332(1) (2012); see infra note 564 and accompanying text.
392. See infra note 564 and accompanying text.
393. See infra note 501 and accompanying text.
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Commission in this way.394 This legislation therefore allows the
President to shape the Commission’s coordination activities to
some extent, even though it is an independent agency. Indeed,
while coordination between independent and executive agencies
might otherwise be initiated by Congress as a way to bring executive agencies under the legislature’s influence, a coordination
provision stipulating a role for the President may allow her to
influence independent agencies to a greater extent than usual,
particularly if the statute involves cabinet agencies in the coordination as well.395
In another statute, Congress has established a unique dispute resolution mechanism that requires two independent agencies—NASA and the Department of Defense—to appeal to the
President in the event of a conflict regarding the legislature’s
mandate to NASA that it cooperate with the Department of Defense on any military initiatives.396 Furthermore, NASA and the
Department of Defense must both communicate through and acquiesce to the final decision of the President concerning any disagreements.397 Here, the President has the opportunity to influence coordination by resolving interagency disputes, as well as

394. 19 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012) (“The commission shall in appropriate matters
act in conjunction and cooperation . . . and, when directed by the President,
shall furnish to the commission, on its request, all records, papers, and information in their possession relating to any of the subjects of investigation by the
commission and shall detail, from time to time, such officials and employees to
said commission as he may direct.”); see infra note 502 and accompanying text.
395. See Barkow, supra note 64, at 52 (“[W]hether multiple agencies limit or
buttress the power of the President depends on what the single agency alternative looks like. If power would otherwise reside in an insulated agency alone,
the President gains power when an executive agency takes on a partnership
role.”); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 18, at 2300–01 (observing that congressional schemes that empower executive agencies to influence independent agencies may diminish the independent agency’s insulation from presidential influence).
396. See infra notes 591–95 and accompanying text.
397. 51 U.S.C. § 20114 (2012) (“The Administration and the Department of
Defense, through the President, shall advise and consult with each other on all
matters within their respective jurisdictions related to aeronautical and space
activities and shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect
to such activities . . . . If the Secretary of Defense concludes that any request,
action, proposed action, or failure to act on the part of the Administrator [of
NASA] is adverse to the responsibilities of the Department of Defense, or the
Administrator concludes that any request, action, proposed action, or failure to
act on the part of the Department of Defense is adverse to the responsibilities
of the Administration, and the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense are
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by guiding the submission of an annual report to Congress detailing the “activities and accomplishments of all” aeronautics
and space agencies.398 This scheme highlights how coordination
legislation can offer agencies and the President combined leverage to shape interagency activity.
While some statutes require the lead agency to report directly on the resulting coordination to Congress,399 some others
offer the President a role in the management of reporting requirements. For example, the Higher Education Act mandates
that agencies submit reports to the President that are ultimately
for transmission to Congress.400 Under the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration Authorization Act,401 the Office of Science and Technology Policy must submit a report to Congress
regarding its coordination “of the research, operations, and activities relating to civilian Earth observation of those Agencies,
including NASA, that have active programs that either contribute directly or indirectly to these areas [of science and technology].”402

unable to reach an agreement with respect to the matter, either the Administrator or the Secretary of Defense may refer the matter to the President for a
decision (which shall be final).”); see infra notes 591–95 and accompanying text.
398. See National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568,
§ 206, 72 Stat. 426, 432 (1958).
399. For instance, under the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act, the Secretary of Commerce is charged with leading the coordination
and reporting directly to Congress on the progress of this coordination of policymaking. See infra notes 551–56 and accompanying text. And under the Methane
Transportation Research, Development, and Demonstration Act, the Department of Energy, as the “lead agency,” must submit annual reports regarding
progress on related initiatives to a Senate committee. See infra notes 547–53
and accompanying text.
400. See 20 U.S.C. § 3486 (2012); infra notes 504–08 and accompanying text.
401. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-267, 124 Stat. 2805 (2010).
402. 42 U.S.C. § 18371 (2012) (“Interagency collaboration implementation
approach”).
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Under the Paperwork Reduction Act,403 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is not only authorized to coordinate404 and ensure the quality405 of large scale data sharing and
management, but also required to inform Congress about its
data-sharing efforts.406 Since both the Office of Science and Technology and OMB are part of the White House, the President
could involve herself in these coordination efforts, should she
want to, as a result of proximity—and in any case, her staff is
directly involved. Explicit executive oversight is also stipulated
in regard to OMB’s collaborative data-collection work.407 And finally, the President is also plainly invoked as part of the chain
of command for agencies reporting to Congress on their success
coordinating the development of aeronautics programs408 and
403. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163
(1995).
404. 44 U.S.C. § 3510 (2012) (“Cooperation of agencies in making information available”) (“The Director may direct an agency to make available to
another agency, or an agency may make available to another agency, information obtained by a collection of information if the disclosure is not inconsistent with applicable law.”). The purpose of this section is to “encourage[ ]
agencies to cooperate in data sharing to facilitate more efficient and effective,
and less burdensome information collection and use.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-37, at
53 (1995); S. REP. NO. 104-8, at 54 (1995).
405. 44 U.S.C. § 3513 (“Director review of agency activities; reporting;
agency response”) (“In consultation with the Administrator of General Services,
the Archivist of the United States, the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, the Director shall periodically review selected agency information resources management activities to ascertain the efficiency and effectiveness of
such activities to improve agency performance and the accomplishment of
agency missions.”). The purpose of this section is to provide for “more effective
executive branch review of agency implementation of the Act and related IRM
[information resource management] laws.” S. REP. NO. 104-8, at 55 (expecting
OMB to cooperate fully with the GSA, NARA, NIST, and OPM); H.R. REP. NO.
104-37, at 54. The OMB Director does, in consultation with the other agencies,
have broad discretion to review information resource management activities of
other agencies. The section “focuses OMB review of agency IRM activities on
determining their efficiency and effectiveness in [order to] help[ ] . . . improve
agency performance and achieve program missions and goals.” S. REP. NO.
104-8, at 55.
406. Section 3514 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 requires the OMB
“to inform the Congress on the major activities under the Act, including through
an annual report.” S. REP. NO. 104-8, at 56. However, section 3514 does not
contain an explicit requirement that the OMB report on interagency coordination under the Paperwork Reduction Act. See § 3514, 109 Stat. 163, at 181–82.
407. 44 U.S.C. § 3513.
408. See National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 § 206, 72 Stat. 426, 432
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safety standards for mobile homes.409 Through her involvement
in these reporting requirements, the President can shape agencies’ justification of their approach to coordination, thus creating
a more united executive representation of agencies’ coordination
efforts to Congress and the public. And in the process of seeking
guidance on how to fulfill reporting requirements, agencies may
in fact allow the President entrée to influencing the coordination
itself.
In no other statute examined for this project, however, has
Congress either specified a statutory role for presidential management of or mentioned in related legislative history a desire
for or expectation of executive involvement in the legislated coordination. Nonetheless, Congress might choose to incorporate
the President into interagency coordination more often moving
forward, in order to acknowledge the integrity of and draw on
the benefits of presidential administration. In addition, it might
improve the quality and outcomes of agency coordination by
specifying a mechanism for dispute resolution by the Executive
in those cases where it anticipates interagency conflict.
At the very least, Congress should ensure that the exclusion
of an allocated role for the President in interagency coordination
is not due solely to a conflicted or disorganized legislative process. Moreover, if a particular delegation of authority to coordinate restructures agencies in ways that disrupt the President’s
ability to direct agency activity, or if it renders executive agencies more akin to an autonomous “fourth branch of government,”410 explicit legislative specification of executive oversight
(1958) (requiring a report from the President detailing the “activities and accomplishments of all” aeronautics and space agencies).
409. See 42 U.S.C. § 5425 (1994) (repealed 2000) (requiring the Secretary of
HUD to submit an annual report to the President for transmittal to Congress
“on the administration of [Federal mobile home safety standards] for the preceding calendar year”; this provision does not discuss interagency cooperation
standards specifically); Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-383, § 626, 88 Stat. 633, 714 (1974) (providing for an annual report on
the administration of the chapters of Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 and Pub.
L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 dealing with mobile homes, but without explicit
mention of oversight of agency coordination); infra notes 543–47 and accompanying text.
410. The “fourth branch” literature identifies the contours and impact of
agencies on the proper balance of government. See, e.g., Datla & Revesz, supra
note 35, at 829 (suggesting that “indicia of independence” beyond for-cause removal can create a separate constitutional status for certain executive agencies,
constrain presidential authority, and create a branch of government not contemplated by the Constitution); Katyal, supra note 34, at 2320; Strauss, supra
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in interagency coordination schemes might mitigate interference
with the Take Care Clause or the proper separation of powers.411
Therefore, legislative grants to agencies of the power to coordinate should encourage the most effective combined administrative efforts while also carving out explicit opportunities for the
president to fulfill her role as “administrator-in-chief.”
2. Endogenous to the Executive
The President also has many options for overseeing interagency coordination beyond those delineated by coordination
statutes themselves. More specifically, there are several centralized methods by which the President might oversee statutebased interagency coordination,412 either explicitly or by use of
the powers of persuasion associated with her position.413 There
are, of course, drawbacks to centralized review, such as the possibility of delay in coordination.414 But the benefits of clear presidential supervision include, in brief, the implementation of
more holistic coordination frameworks, a reduction in factionalism, and increased transparency.415
The President could harness entities such as the Office of
the Chief of Staff to shape high-profile coordination;416 the Office
of White House Policy, the President’s primary vehicle for policy
note 306.
411. Cf. Peter P. Swire, Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the
Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766, 1785 (1985) (“The decline of expertise and
impartiality, and the rise in importance of presidential coordination of and accountability for agencies, today combine to justify incorporation on functionalist
grounds.”); id. (arguing for a shift towards a more formalist structure that values a return to tripartism through incorporation of the independent agencies
into the executive branch).
412. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 9, at 1255–56 (suggesting that
“measures that emanate from central executive branch actors” and that “take
familiar forms like executive orders, memoranda, bulletins, and circulars” can
“force agencies to generate new internal processes, organization, and policy”).
See generally Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986).
413. See Percival, supra note 321, at 1011–12 (“[The President] can have
substantial influence over [agency decisions] . . . . [A] president who wishes to
play an active role in management of the administrative state must be prepared
to use the formidable powers of persuasion the presidency provides.”).
414. Shah, Uncovering, supra note 9, at 873.
415. Id. at 871–72.
416. See Sunstein, supra note 279, at 1874 (noting that OIRA “has an important role insofar as it works to advise on and help coordinate executive
branch activity with close reference to the President’s own commitments”).
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coordination that also contains the Domestic Policy Council and
the National Economic Council, which has “an especially important role . . . in helping to coordinate different parts of the
federal government”;417 OMB, which plays an important role in
coordinating agency action;418 OMB’s Office of Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which oversees a regulatory review process to ensure that agency regulations are consistent with the President’s
priorities and economically justified, and whose “day-to-day operations . . . largely involve interagency coordination”;419 the Office of Legal Counsel, which is involved in resolving interagency
conflict;420 or perhaps a new office created expressly for overseeing and managing the exercise of agency discretion in coordination.421 In order to reduce the arguably overwhelming coordination responsibilities that OIRA faces, lead agencies in
coordination networks could instead be required by the President to serve unofficially as “mini-OIRAs” for their own coordination regimes.422 Holding lead agencies accountable also has

417. Id. at 1849.
418. “The President has used . . . OMB directives (the OMB being the principal although hardly the only instrument of his coordinating activities) to create supplementary coordinating regimes of a generally uncontroversial character.” Strauss, supra note 8, at 718 (noting that “OMB oversees coordination of
legislative testimony, legislative proposals, agency regulatory agendas, and a
variety of analytic regimes having some, but incomplete support in legislative
requirements”); see also Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9,
at 1178 (noting that OMB, “with a staff of hundreds, in the largest office in the
[Executive Office of the President], . . . contains several ‘resource management
offices’ with responsibility for evaluating the performance of agency programs
and reviewing agency budget requests”); Shah, Uncovering, supra note 9, at
860–64 (discussing several entities, including the Office of Management and
Budget and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, as possibilities for
the oversight of interagency coordination); STANTON, supra note 130, at 4 (suggesting that OMB “is the only agency with current capacity and clout to foster
improved collaboration”).
419. Sunstein, supra note 279, at 1840.
420. See Strauss, supra note 8, at 718 (“Conflicts between executive agencies
about their delegated authority are resolved in processes involving OMB or the
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel . . . .”).
421. For instance, Landis suggested to President Kennedy that he install
offices within the Executive Office of the President to coordinate and develop
transportation, communications, and energy policy, and also that he create an
Office for the Oversight of Regulatory Agencies. LANDIS, supra note 60, at
85–87.
422. Cf. Marisam, Interagency Administration, supra note 40, at 205 (suggesting that OIRA improves interagency coordination).
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the potential to improve policy in those agencies’ areas of interest, including to the extent this localized oversight mitigates the
drawbacks of interagency conflict.423
In order to reiterate and strengthen her involvement in the
communication between agencies and Congress beyond participation in agency reporting, the President could involve the
White House Office of Legislative Affairs or the OMB Office of
Legislative Affairs in oversight of agency coordination. Both of
these entities have key roles “in coordinating discussions between the Administration and Congress.”424 At very least, the
Executive could increase upper-level awareness of statute-based
interagency coordination by working with the Government Accountability Office.425 Nina Mendelson also notes that “budget
requests, legislative positions, and testimony before Congress”
are tools the president has to “systematically [coordinate and
‘clear’ policies] through White House offices so that a unified executive branch position can be presented.”426
In addition, the White House might take more conspicuous
steps, like issuing explicit directives to agencies427 in response to
or anticipation of statute-based coordination. The President also

423. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 18, at 2263 (describing how the statutory requirement that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission implement
its own dispute resolution mechanism to further coordination under the Electric
Consumers Protection Act “raised the transaction costs of making anti-environment decisions and, implicitly, the cost of ignoring the other agencies”).
424. Sunstein, supra note 279, at 1873.
425. See Shah, Uncovering, supra note 9, at 864 (noting that the Government
Accountability Office is mandated by statute to identify and reduce duplicative
agency activity).
426. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 2459.
427. Such directives may take “the form of written memoranda posted to
WhiteHouse.gov and published in the Federal Register.” Watts, supra note 282,
at 700–03 (discussing Obama’s overt control of agency decisionmaking via “extensive reliance on directives” and how “Obama—taking a cue from Clinton—
relied extensively on positive command to turn the administrative state into an
extension of the White House”); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1148 (2010)
(uncovering “literally hundreds of presidential statements directing agencies to
take action of one sort or another” from the Clinton through the second Bush
administration).
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could implement executive orders that improve statute-based coordination,428 monitor the likelihood of conflict,429 or even reduce
the baseline regulatory power of coordinating agencies,430
thereby weakening the potentially insulating effect of coordination networks, for better or for worse. The President might also
create executive task forces and working groups to oversee coordination or appoint “czars” that establish a hierarchy over coordinating agencies and govern agencies’ influence on one another.431 Presidential appointment of “czars,” or cabinet officials

428. In many cases, executive orders establishing regulatory review programs have expressly disclaimed that the President has the authority to dictate
regulatory decisions entrusted to agency heads. Watts, supra note 282, at
690–91. Nonetheless, they could feasibly be used to establish a stronger executive hierarchy as well. For example, Executive Order 13,563 furthers principles
of “integration and coordination.” Sunstein, supra note 279, at 1846; supra note
417 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Domestic Policy Council and
the National Economic Council were created by executive order); see also
Strauss, supra note 8, at 718 (“The President has used executive orders . . . to
create supplementary coordinating regimes of a generally uncontroversial character.”).
429. For instance, Executive Order 12,866 authorizes OIRA to review agency
regulatory actions for consistency with presidential priorities, statutory mandates, and, notably, other agencies’ rules. See Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1178–79 (noting that Executive Order 12,866 requires
both executive and independent agencies to submit annual plans of their anticipated regulatory actions prior to proposing them in the Federal Register and
encourages agencies to plan their regulatory activities “to maximize consultation and the resolution of potential conflicts at an early stage”).
430. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017)
(“[I]t is important that for every one new regulation issued, at least two prior
regulations be identified for elimination, and that the cost of planned regulations be prudently managed and controlled through a budgeting process.”).
431. Arguably, czars can both help a president to “advance ambitious policy
agendas” and play a role in ensuring regulatory coherence and helping to coordinate “the work of agencies on . . . key [presidential] policy priorities.” Watts,
supra note 282, at 704–05 (discussing Obama’s appointment of “regulatory
czars” to White House policy positions). “Obama’s czars seem to serve as a structural solution to the compartmentalization of the President’s cabinet organization, helping to provide interagency coordination and coherency in areas that
require expertise across areas.” Id. at 705.
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placed in the White House itself432—a practice with deep historical roots433—has recently been used to facilitate the coordination of agencies that traditionally work at cross-purposes.434 Alternatively, the President could attempt to restructure
coordinating agencies herself, for instance, by regrouping administrative competencies435 in order to modify ineffective statutebased coordination or coordination that is overly burdensome for
a particular agency. In addition, the President could shape the
orientation and improve the quality of interagency relationships
by holding agencies themselves responsible for justifying their
coordination, for instance, via cost/benefit analysis436 and other
forms of reporting to the White House and/or the public.

432. See generally Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and
the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2011) (discussing
Obama’s approach to czar appointments); see also id. at 2583 (arguing that
Obama’s “proliferation of high-profile czars is his particular instantiation of a
policy, common to all modern Presidents, of seeking to magnify his control over
agency action”).
433. Graham Allison, An Executive Cabinet, SOC’Y, July-Aug. 1980, at 41.
434. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 461, 489 (2010) (concluding that the President need only
control the czars to coordinate bureaucracy). Examples of czars focusing on coordination include the “drug czar” and Obama’s “urban affairs czars.” See 21
U.S.C. § 1702(a) (2012) (establishing “in the Executive Office of the President
an Office of National Drug Control Policy, which shall . . . coordinate and oversee the implementation of the national drug control policy”); id. § 1704 (establishing duties of line agencies to provide ONDCP with information in order to
facilitate “coordination”); Examining the History and Legality of Executive
Branch Czars: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 96
(2009) (letter from Gregory Craig, White House Counsel, Obama Admin., to Sen.
Russel Feingold); Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy:
Hearings Before the Legis. and Nat’l Sec. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t
Operations, 103d Cong. 185 (1993) (statements of Peter Reuter & Jonathan
Caulkins) (“The impulse to create [the Office of National Drug Control Policy]
was primarily the friction among federal agencies involved in controlling illicit
drugs.”); John Carnevale & Patrick Murphy, Matching Rhetoric to Dollars:
Twenty-Five Years of Federal Drug Strategies and Drug Budgets, J. DRUG ISSUES, Spring 1999, at 299, 312 (“The Drug Czar . . . must attempt to exert topdown pressure and control in a process that is fragmented . . . .”); Adolfo Carrión, Jr., Foreword: A New Urban Vision for a New Urban Reality, 24 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2010) (Obama’s first “urban affairs czar”
justifying his office largely in terms of coordination); Michael D. Shear & Ceci
Connolly, Obama Assembles Powerful West Wing, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2009, at
A1.
435. Renan, supra note 40, at 248.
436. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Infor-
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More broadly, the President could use any of the aforementioned mechanisms to influence statute-based administrative coordination either through consensus, for instance, by identifying
an overlap in her interests and agency motivations,437 or by
brandishing authoritarian control over agencies.438 Identifying
and protecting administrative incentives could lead to coordination with fewer conflicts and greater fidelity to legislative intent.
However, gains in collaboration may also lead to losses in the
efficiency and unity of mission offered by a stronger hierarchy.439
Ultimately, the President could feasibly remove an agency head
exercising authority to coordinate in a manner with which she
disagrees,440 although taking this action would be controversial
and may signal that the President must resort to drastic
measures due to a considerable lack of actual control over her
branch.
3. Responsiveness to Interagency Conflict
This Article has already suggested that interagency discord
reduces agencies’ ability to wield control over one another on the
basis of coordination authority.441 This Section concludes the Article by positing that interagency conflict also impacts the extent
mation Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1391, 1394–95 (2010) (suggesting that cost/benefit and other agency analysis can “provide valuable mechanisms for the White
House or other high-level political officials to gain purchase on regulatory issues
and intervene more directly in ways that offset participatory imbalances arising
from information capture”).
437. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 755 (suggesting that a “directing agency
derives its voice not from law but from circumstance”).
438. See DONALD B. AYER ET AL., STATEMENT BY FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICIALS 2 (2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3007589/
Nationalsecurityletter.pdf. (“In our experience, a President must be willing to
listen to his advisers and department heads; must encourage consideration of
conflicting views; and must acknowledge errors and learn from them.”).
439. See Metzger, supra note 294, at 1836, 1842 (arguing for the inclusion of
“systemic administration [in] constitutional law,” particularly in “structural
and individual rights contexts”); Shah, Intra-Agency Separation, supra note
122, at 115 (suggesting that administrative efforts to help the poor might “be
better served by the accountability, efficiency, and expertise ascribed to a
stronger administrative hierarchy”).
440. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135, 176 (1926) (deriving an unlimited presidential removal power over certain subordinate executive officials from, among
other sources, the Article II Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause).
441. See supra Part I.C. The potential for interagency conflict may also motivate the passage of coordination legislation in some instances. See supra Part
II.B.4.
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to which coordinating agencies are, in fact, able to act with collective independence from the Executive. As an initial matter,
interagency conflict may reduce interagency control,442 which in
turn limits statute-based coordination’s interference with the
President’s command of each agency in the affected coordination
network.443 Further, while harmonious interagency relationships may progress under the President’s radar, conflict is likely
to draw her attention to interagency coordination that might
otherwise move forward autonomously. More specifically, interagency conflict can lead to infighting and indeterminacy that
garners the attention of the President, thus leading to greater
presidential influence on the coordination process.
On the one hand, a strict hierarchy whereby the lead agency
exercises strong control over others in the network, or conversely, agreeable interagency collaboration, may dilute the
President’s power to direct agency functions.444 For instance,
Jennifer Nou notes that coalition-building may provide some insulation from the President.445 In statute-based coordination,
substantively narrow aims,446 a specified set of coordinators,447
or a clear alignment among the incentives and goals of the agencies involved448 may also reduce the likelihood that coordination
442. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 316–19.
444. See Verkuil, supra note 132, at 265 (“Given the need for the President
to control policy as part of his constitutional duties pursuant to article II, independence and collegiality are being seen increasingly as qualities counterproductive to the rulemaking function.”); see also Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 181 (1986).
445. Nou, supra note 35, at 1798–99 (arguing that coalition-building increases the costs of reviewing agency activity, which reduces the likelihood of
presidential oversight).
446. See, e.g., infra notes 569–73 (discussing the delegation of broad authority to coordinate in order to reduce soil erosion), infra notes 523–27 (discussing
the delegation of broad authority to coordinate to protect marine mammals),
infra note 529 and accompanying text (discussing coordination to protect specific national parks).
447. See, e.g., infra note 588 and accompanying text (discussing coordination
between the Coast Guard and the Department of Health and Human Service to
provide emergency medical helicopter services to civilians).
448. See, e.g., infra notes 624–31 (discussing coordination between the Administration on Aging, which is part of the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the Department of Labor to improve employment and training
programs for the elderly), infra note 629 (discussing coordination between the
Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Labor to provide job
assistance for veterans), infra notes 633–40 (discussing coordination between
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will draw upper-level attention. For example, the Departments
of Energy and Transportation may be able to further the Electric
and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration
Project if they are equally committed to doing so,449 regardless of
the politics of any given presidential administration. In addition,
a lack of conflict means the President is less likely to become
involved as a mediator.450 In general, if coordination legislation
enables lead agencies to fashion coordination to suit their needs
and suppress discord, or like-minded agencies to cooperatively
increase their reach and attain their goals,451 those agency interactions are less likely to draw the attention of the President.
Alternatively, if there is friction between or among agencies
within the coordination process, then the process has the potential to attract executive intervention.452 As noted earlier, conflict
can result from subtle upward resistance in vertical coordination
arrangements or clashes within horizontal structures.453 Such
interagency discord provides justification for elevating the review of administrative activity to the White House454 and for delaying the administrative implementation of legislation.455 Indeed, the erosion of insulation resulting from interagency
conflict may be particularly acute for independent agencies.456

the State Department and Department of Commerce to implement international whaling regulations).
449. See infra notes 618–24 and accompanying text.
450. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 6, at 1411 (noting that, “[m]ost commonly, the White House steps in” to mediate or negotiate conflict at the agency
level); Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1175.
451. For a discussion of the coordination structures in which agencies are
less likely to engage in conflict than in others, see supra Part I.B.2.
452. See Strauss, supra note 8, at 744 (suggesting that interagency conflict
draws presidential oversight).
453. See supra Part I.C (discussing reduced interagency control resulting
from the interagency conflict occurring in horizontal and vertical coordination
structures).
454. Sunstein, supra note 279, at 1856–59 (noting several examples in which
review of agency activity was elevated to the White House due to disagreements
between agency actors).
455. See Watts, supra note 282, at 699–70 (noting how the President harnesses delay to wield broad control over the regulatory state).
456. Barkow, supra note 64, at 51 (suggesting that if an “executive agency
has the authority to veto or dictate the insulated agency’s policies,” an agency
that is insulated from public influence can no longer operate with the same level
of insulation, regardless of whether the agencies are more equally situated or if
their relationship is hierarchical); id. at 52–53 (noting that if an independent
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Agencies might even engage in conflict to draw the President’s
attention in order to slow down coordination. For example, the
Department of Energy, whose approach to conservation may be
characterized as conservative,457 could seek to disrupt meaningful coordination by involving a White House sympathetic to its
perspective in order to delay the development of vehicles using
alternative fuel or technology.458
In addition, indeterminacy459 could invite greater executive
oversight and scrutiny, ultimately limiting agencies’ ability to
act on their incentives and shape their own goals. As Strauss
suggests, “If Congress has given apparently conflicting statutory
instructions to differing agencies, it will not clearly have established where authority lies. [Thus,] the President as ‘the decider’—or at least as the preliminary, and often enough in practice, the final decider—is a readily understandable outcome.”460
Similarly, if agency infighting or a lack of clear jurisdiction in
coordination slows down or leads to an ineffective policymaking
process, this may alert the President’s attention and lead to a
firmer Executive grasp on agency activity. And indeed, this appears to have happened as a result of interagency conflicts resulting from a coordination statute governing several agencies’
efforts to coordinate to further policy on the Arctic.461 More specifically, in order to grab the reins,462 President Obama created
a steering committee463 to oversee and facilitate the implemen-

agency has veto power over another, the latter may suffer a reduction in mechanisms insulating it from partisan pressure, although those losses would be
greater if the vetoing agency were executive).
457. See Clinton & Lewis, supra note 129, at 6 fig.1 (illustrating mean
agency political preferences).
458. See, e.g., infra notes 547–53, 618–24 and accompanying text.
459. See Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1435, 1459–60 (2011) (noting that a problem for interagency decisionmaking is indeterminacy, which is often resolved through compromises that
are arbitrary and not based on sound technocratic reasoning).
460. Strauss, supra note 8, at 745 (noting that “[t]he same cannot be said of
disagreements between White House and agency, where a statute empowers
only the agency”).
461. See infra notes 496–500 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 352, 364 and accompanying text (discussing how the
coordination statute in this case may have otherwise insulated agency policymaking from the President).
463. See Andrew Hartsig et al., Next Steps to Reform the Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and Gas Planning and Leasing, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 16
(2016) (noting Obama’s creation of an Arctic Executive Steering Committee to
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tation of legislation governing the Arctic by these diverse agencies.464 In addition, as noted earlier, Congress has in one instance explicitly involved the President in a conflict-reduction
mechanism.465 This oversight provision also provides the President a concrete tool for curtailing these agencies’ exercises of discretion and interagency control.
Ironically, Congress may inadvertently create purchase for
presidential control by yoking together agencies with disparate
interests and aims,466 even if it actually sought agency conflict
for the express purpose of lessening executive control.467 Finally,
agencies might be able to reduce the likelihood that the president becomes involved in coordination in response to interagency
conflict by implementing their own dispute resolution mechanisms, as discussed earlier,468 but this is not a foolproof approach
to avoiding presidential intervention.
CONCLUSION
This Article is the first to establish the paradigm of statutebased coordination, by which Congress—as opposed to the President, as is otherwise understood—initiates interagency relationships in myriad areas of public law. By bringing coordination
legislation to light and contemplating its features, this Article
“provide guidance . . . and enhance coordination of Federal Arctic policies across
agencies and offices”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,689, 80 Fed. Reg. 4189–94
(Jan. 26, 2015) (announcing the Arctic Executive Steering Committee).
464. See infra notes 496–500 and accompanying text (describing the mandatory and non-mandatory agency coordination provisions of the Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Act).
465. See infra notes 591–95 and accompanying text; see also supra notes
136–38 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory provision for mediation
by the President should Department of Defense and NASA disagree as to how
best to coordinate to further the former’s military aims).
466. C.f. Marisam, Selection Powers, supra note 40, at 825 (“[W]hen Congress creates overlapping authority among several agencies, it enables presidents to select which of these agencies will act in the overlapping space.”).
467. See supra note 351 and accompanying text; see also EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 127, at 160 (“Congress does play agencies off against each
other more under divided government, despite the reductions in efficiency and
centralized control that this might entail.”); Barkow, supra note 64, at 52 (suggesting that Congress may pit conflicting agencies against one another because
this increases the costs of executive oversight in ways that “insulate certain
policy decisions from presidential control”).
468. See supra notes 422–24 and accompanying text (describing internal dispute resolution mechanisms, and the increased transaction costs resulting
when agencies implement their own).
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presents and parses an unexamined framework by which Congress interacts directly with agencies, and highlights its potential influence on interagency dynamics, presidential hierarchy,
and executive unification. More broadly, this Article suggests
that the debate regarding which political branch controls administrative agencies469 must account for the congressional administration470 of activity that occurs across agency boundaries, in
addition to its general focus on presidential administration.
The primarily mandatory and vertical interagency networks
established by coordination legislation empower agencies to
draw on one another’s competencies and even shape each other’s
use of discretion to better implement legislative mandates. In
this way, statutory authority to coordinate encourages agencies
to better abide by legislative intent while also maintaining some
of the efficiency in policymaking that might otherwise be lost in
more horizontal interagency relationships.471 This Article thus
illustrates, in contrast to other accounts,472 that the legislature
indeed creates beneficial forms of decentralization in the executive branch.473
However, by empowering agencies to interact of their own
volition, coordination statutes may interfere with the President’s
function as manager and overseer of her branch. Arguably, combined legislative-administrative efforts to further Congress’s priorities should accommodate the President’s leadership role in
the efficient and principled execution of the law. That having
been said, it is unclear which coordination format best balances
and preserves both the legislature’s and the President’s power to
direct the administrative state. For instance, while coordination
initiated unilaterally by a lead agency provides the President a
single entry-point to oversee the process, it also offers the lead
agency a mechanism for exercising control over other agencies
469. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text (introducing interagency
coordination as a framework for examining executive and legislative control of
the administrative state).
470. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing legislation orchestrating agency coordination).
471. See supra Part II (discussing reasons for legislative interagency coordination).
472. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (summarizing prior paradigms for legislative interagency coordination).
473. See CROLEY, supra note 19, at 153 (“[I]ndividual legislators who are motivated at least in part to advance general interests might not regret much
that agencies enjoy sufficient autonomy to do what Congress itself can do directly only at great political cost.”).
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outside of the Executive’s core purview.474 Conversely, while
more horizontal forms of coordination are less likely to undermine the traditional executive hierarchy, this structure also generates its own form of administrative independence and subsequent insulation from the President.475
Arguably, clear legislative delineation of a role for the President in statute-based coordination476 both enhances executive
accountability and reinforces a constitutional and functional distribution of the power to initiate and direct administrative relationships. Paradoxically, providing the President entrée ex ante
may allow the legislature both to limit overall executive involvement in agency coordination and to sidestep any latent obstacles
posed by this legislation to the proper separation of powers.477
Moreover, if the legislature fails to establish an explicit role for
the President, she may be motivated to pursue ex post strategies
that ultimately reduce beneficial agency autonomy in statutebased coordination and subsequent administrative responsiveness to the legislature’s priorities.478 Finally, the statutes and
legislative history this Article uncovers is ripe for future study,
including both fine-grained evaluations of statute-based coordination in particular regulatory areas or involving certain agencies, as well as broader consideration of the impact of agency design on the relationship among the political branches and the
administrative state.

474. See supra Part III.A (describing how coordination legislation disadvantages executive administration).
475. See supra Part III.B (describing how vertical coordination insulates
agencies and increases their independence from the executive).
476. For examples, see supra Part III.C.1.
477. See supra note 411 and accompanying text (giving examples of statutes
delegating specific coordination of other tasks to White House offices).
478. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing methods for overseeing legislative coordination that are endogenous to the executive).
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APPENDIX: COORDINATION LEGISLATION &
INTERAGENCY CONTROL
This Article presents and analyzes statutes that include a
section title referencing coordination, cooperation, and/or collaboration between or among federal agencies and/or departments,
as well as all the relevant legislative history, on which the preceding Article is based.479 Overall, the Appendix illustrates how
statutes sanctioning coordination support the contention that
Congress frequently legislates with specificity and intention, as
opposed to only in vague and ambiguous terms, as it is often accused of doing. In addition, the Appendix also discusses the features of each coordination paradigm that lend themselves to interagency control.480
As noted in the body of the Article, almost all of the coordination statutes authorize one named agency to control the implementation of legislation stipulating coordination between or
among the named agency and others. In the majority, the agency
is authorized to initiate coordination with several other agencies.
More specifically, the statutes analyzed throughout this Article
are more likely than not to authorize coordination that is “unilaterally-initiated,” by only one, leading, “named” agency, and
that is “expansive,” in that it spans several agencies.481 Alternatively, only eleven of the statutes analyzed for this project are
unilaterally-initiated and “limited,” in that they allow the authorized, lead agency to coordinate with only one or two named
agencies.482 This suggests that legislation authorizing coordination is predominantly hierarchical and rather, but not entirely,
expansive. Finally, a few statutes provide for “jointly initiated,”
or horizontal, forms of coordination in which there is no “named,”
lead, agency.483
In addition, the majority of statutes considered in this analysis are mandatory, in that they require coordination by use of
terms such as “shall” and “must.” Some others are “semi-obligatory,” in that they require coordination to the “maximum extent
possible” or the “maximum extent practicable,” thus rendering
the coordination requirement semi-obligatory. Only a handful of
479. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (describing the data collection methods that informed this statutory analysis).
480. See supra Part I for a discussion of the term interagency control.
481. See infra App., Part A.
482. See infra App., Part B.
483. See infra App., Part C.
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statutes are discretionary, in that they offer agencies the option
to coordinate determined only, and transparently, on the basis
of their own discretion, and all of these occur within coordination
frameworks that are as hierarchical and expansive as possible.
In other words, the “discretionary” subset of the unilaterally-initiated and limited category and the jointly-initiated category of
coordination legislation includes no statutes.
While the main body of the Article focuses on the trends suggested by this data, including that this legislation is primarily
unilaterally-initiated, expansive, and mandatory, the Appendix
substantiates all the categories of statute in the dataset, including those that are jointly-initiated or discretionary. The statutes
framing the coordination are listed in the order they are presented in Table 5 in the body of the Article, which can be found
in Part I.B. Table 5 lists the coordination statutes included in
the dataset, and describes the hierarchical relationship between
agencies directed by Congress to coordinate. The statutes appearing in Table 5 have been bolded in the Appendix, so that
readers may more quickly and easily reference the related coordination network.
The statutes framing the coordination are listed in the order
they are presented in Table 5 in the body of the Article, which
has been reprinted here. In this table, the relevant substantive
statute for which coordination has been authorized is listed first
and the agencies specified in the coordination legislation are
bolded. The empowered or named agency—in other words, the
agency at the head of the coordination hierarchy—is listed next
to the statute in (parenthesis). If the named agency has control
over an unnamed set of agencies, no other agency is listed in the
parenthesis. If the named agency has control over a named set
of agencies, the latter are listed in [brackets]. If the coordination
is jointly-initiated, both agencies are listed in the parenthesis.
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Mandatory

Most

Unilaterally
initiated by
lead agency
with
unspecified
(or
unnamed)
federal
agencies

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(DOJ/FBI), Market Reform Act
(Securities and Exchange
Commission), National Drug Control
Policy (White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy), Joint
Resolution Making Continuing
Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985,
and for Other Purposes (AG), Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation Act (Coast
Guard), An Act to Regulate Commerce
with Foreign Countries (International
Trade Commission), Small Business Act
(Small Business Administration),
Higher Education Act (Dept. of
Education), Healthcare Research and
Quality Act (HHS/Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality), Veterans' Benefits
Act (VA), Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (Dept. of Labor),
Older Americans Act
(HHS/Administration on Aging),
Indian Financing Act (Dept. of
Interior), Endangered Species Act
(Depts. of Interior and Commerce
with other unnamed agencies),
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(EPA), Marine Mammal Protection Act
(Marine Mammal Commission),
Energy Policy Act (Dept. of Interior),
Coast Guard Authorization Act (Coast
Guard), Coordination of Wildlife, Fish, and
Game Conservation and Rehabilitation in
Military Reservations (DOD), An Act
Authorizing the Construction, Repair, and
Preservation of Certain Public Works on
Rivers and Harbors for Navigation, Flood
Control, and for Other Purposes (Army),
Anti-Drug and Controlled Substances Act
(Forest Service), Wolf Trap Park Act
(Dept. of Interior)

Hierarchical
&
Expansive*
Authority to
Coordinate
National Aeronautics and Space Act
(DOD [with NASA]), Energy

Unilaterally Reorganization Act (EPA [with Energy
Research and Development
initiated by
Administration]), Water Bank Act
lead agency
(Depts. of Agricuture [with Dept. of
with specified Interior]), Rural Water Act (Dept. of
(or named)
the Interior [with Dept. of
agenc[ies]
Agriculture]), Housing and Community
Development Act (Dept. of Labor [with
EPA]),

Least

*meaning breadth of
topic and
number/flexibility of
agencies involved.

Semi-Obligatory

Discretionary

Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act (State
Dept.), Methane
Transportation Research,
Development, and
Demonstration Act (Dept. of
Energy), Marine Resources
and Engineering Development
Act (Dept. Commerce),
Conservation of Antarctic
Fauna and Flora (National
Science Foundation),
Consumer Product Safety Act
(Consumer Product Safety
Commission)

Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development
Act (Dept. of Housing
and Urban
Development), Housing
and Community
Development Act (Dept. of
Housing and Urban
Development), Reforestation
Act (Dept. of
Agriculture), An Act to
Provide for the Protection of
Land Resources Against Soil
Erosion (Dept. of
Agriculture), An Act to
Stop Injury to the Public
Grazing Lands (Dept. of
the Interior), An Act to
Promote Effectual Planning,
Development, Maintenance,
and Coordination of
Wildlife, Fish, and Game
Conservation and
Rehabilitation in Military
Reservations (DOD),
Colorado River Basin Project
(Army), Establishing the
Sawtooth National
Recreation Area (Dept. of
Interior/Forest Service),
An Act to Revise, Codify, and
Enact into Law, Title 23 of
the United States Code,
Entitled "Highways" (Dept.
of Transportation), Tuna
Conventions Act (Secretary
of State)

Southwest Forest Health and
Wildfire Prevention Act
(Depts. Of Agriculture [with
Dept. of Interior]), National
Fishing Enhancement Act
(National Science
Foundation [with Dept.
of State; Dept. of
Commerce, NSF, and
Dept. of State]), Act to
Amend the Commercial
Fisheries Research and
Development Act (Depts. of
Commerce [with Dept. of
Interior and other federal
agencies]), Electric and
Hybrid Vehicle Research,
Development, and
Demonstration Act (Dept. of
Energy [with Dept. of
Transportation])

Older Americans Act Amendments
(HHS/Administration on Aging and
Dept. of Labor); Vietnam Era Veterans'
Jointly
Readjustment Assistance Act (VA and
initiated** (by Dept. of Labor); National Flood
two named Insurance Act (Dept. of Homeland
agencies) Security/FEMA and White House
Office of Management and Budget),
Whaling Convention (Depts. of State
and Commerce)

**rarely is there
jointly initiated with
unnamed federal
agencies.

Most

[103:1961

Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act (Depts.
of Agriculture and
Commerce)

Congressional Control

Least
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The statutes listed in this table have been bolded in the
following text of the Appendix, so that readers may more quickly
and easily reference the related coordination framework.
A. UNILATERALLY INITIATED & EXPANSIVE
Most of the coordination statutes discussed in this project
empower one “named” agency to coordinate at will with a broad,
diverse and often unspecified, or “unnamed,” set of other agencies. Many of these statues make use of the word “shall” or otherwise require a set of agencies to respond to the empowered
agency if it chooses to initiate coordination.484 As noted earlier,
these examples are paradigmatic of interagency control, in that
they compel opportunities for individual, named agencies to
make use of the resources and discretion of other agencies to further their own implementation of legislation and related policy.485
In some, semi-obligatory statutes, phrases such as “the maximum extent practicable,”486 present an apparent mandate for
the named agency that nonetheless gives it some choice regarding whether to coordinate. In still fewer, the coordination may
be more transparently up to the discretion of the named agency.
But even within non-mandatory coordination frameworks, the
named agency may be able to draw from the resources and expertise of other agencies in order to increase its own enforcement
power.
1. Mandatory
Law enforcement and security is an area bolstered by mandatory coordination and that allows for interagency control by
law enforcement agencies and agency heads. For instance, under
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act,487 “[a]ny Federal financial regulatory agency shall cooperate with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies investigating fraud . . . with respect to . . . financial products.”488
Here, agencies are required to follow the FBI’s lead, should it
484. Cf. Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1158
(providing an example of “mandatory consultation”).
485. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
486. See supra Part I.B (describing coordination legislation, including mandatory coordination statutes).
487. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5234
(2012) (“Cooperation with the FBI”) (emphasis added).
488. Id. (“Cooperation with the FBI”) (emphasis added).
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initiate coordination.489 Likewise, the Market Reform Act compels agencies to coordinate with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to mitigate significant financial or operational risks
regarding any entity the Commission regulates.490 Legislation
governing the National Drug Control Policy requires all
agencies tasked with furthering the National Drug Control Program491 to share any drug-related data with the White House
Office of National Drug Control.492 Under Joint Resolution legislation,493 the Attorney General can demand coordination (and,
in some cases, staff and money) from any agency494 to empower
local law enforcement to help implement and increase the effectiveness of the Federal Witness Security Program.495 The text of
these statutory schemes allow the named agency to coordinate
with almost any other agency to amplify both its resources and
its reach for law enforcement purposes.
The information-sharing piece of the Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Act (which seeks to improve the
maritime domain of the Arctic) is phrased as an imperative
(“shall”).496 However, the sharing of tangible resources is not a

489. More specifically, the language is mandatory (“requires”) given that all
regulatory agencies have to cooperate with FBI and federal law enforcement in
the investigation of fraud; indeed, the Miller Amendment also specifies “with
any state consumer protection agencies.” H.R. REP. NO. 110-374(l) (2007). The
language is also broad, in that it uses umbrella term “cooperate” without specifying further.
490. Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, § 7, 104 Stat. 975–76
(1990) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831l) (authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission to coordinate).
491. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999).
492. Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 705, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 1704) (“Coordination with National Drug Control Program agencies in
demand reduction, supply reduction, and State and local affairs”).
493. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1208, 98 Stat. 1837, 2153–63
(1985).
494. 18 U.S.C. § 3526(a) (2012). In the chapter describing witness protection
provisions, § 3526 (“Cooperation of other Federal agencies and State governments; reimbursement of expenses”) provides that “[e]ach Federal agency shall
cooperate with the Attorney General in carrying out the provisions of this chapter and may provide, on a reimbursable basis, such personnel and services as
the Attorney General may request in carrying out those provisions.”
495. 130 CONG. REC. 31,742 (1984).
496. 14 U.S.C. § 154(a)–(b) (2012) (“Cooperation with Other Agencies”) (“The
Commandant shall improve maritime domain awareness in the Arctic—(1) by
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requirement497—and thus not a requirement the Coast Guard
may implement unilaterally. Nonetheless, coordination does offer the Coast Guard and several other agencies, named and unnamed,498 a significant opportunity to share resources and exercise discretion broadly in order to act on concerns related to the
Arctic.499 However, the variety of executive and independent
agencies authorized to coordinate may pose challenges. These
agencies include, for instance, the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security, as well as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Environmental Protection Agency.500
Thus, the interests (such as national security, the development
of scientific research, and environmental protection), political
perspectives, relative sizes, budgets, relationships with Congress, and involvement of the President of each of these agencies
are likely to come into conflict with one another and may result
in the constraint of any one agency’s influence. While the Coast
Guard may seek the final word on the implementation of policy,
it is unlikely to be able to fully control the consequences, or even
the quality of progress, resulting from binding this colorful group
of agencies. Similarly, An Act to Regulate Commerce with
Foreign Countries501 requires the International Trade Com-

promoting interagency cooperation and coordination; (2) by employing joint, interagency, and international capabilities; and (3) by facilitating the sharing of
information, intelligence, and data related to the Arctic maritime domain between the Coast Guard and departments and agencies listed in subsection (b)
[listed in the body of the paper].”).
497. Howard Coble Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2014,
Pub. L. No. 113-281, § 502(a), 128 Stat. 3022, 3057–58 (2014).
498. These include the Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Defense, Department of Transportation, Department of State, Department of
the Interior, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, National
Science Foundation, Arctic Research Commission, and “[a]ny Federal agency or
commission or State the Commandant determines is appropriate.” Supra note
496 (italics denote independent agencies).
499. The coordination here is in service of improving the maritime domain
awareness of the Arctic, but legislators’ statements also mention national security and energy security. Id.; 160 CONG. REC. E1809 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2014)
(statement of Hon. Jim Jordan).
500. Supra note 498.
501. Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (“An Act To provide revenue,
to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the
United States, to protect American labor, and for other purposes”).
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mission to coordinate with the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, and any
other agency to further the goals of the statute as a whole.502
There are also examples from other substantive areas of regulation with a similarly unilateral and mandatory initiation of
coordination. Under the Small Business Act, the Small Business Administration is charged with and may require other
agencies to coordinate in order to further small business interests.503
The Higher Education Act504 requires the Department of
Education to work with other agencies to improve the quality of
STEM education.505 Under the Healthcare Research and
Quality Act,506 Congress has accorded the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, a subcomponent of the Department of Health and Human Services, the power to mold the
activities of any and all federal agencies that are involved with
health services research and quality assurance.507 Indeed, Congress made clear that it wishes for the named agency to have
502. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012) (“Cooperation with Other
Agencies”). This section is titled, “Cooperation with other agencies,” and it provides that “[t]he commission shall in appropriate matters act in conjunction and
cooperation with the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the
Federal Trade Commission, or any other departments . . . .”
503. 15 U.S.C. § 634 (2012).
504. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244,
§ 301(a)(5,7), 112 Stat. 1581, 1636 (1998) (transferring the STEM program from
the National Science Foundation to the Department of Education); Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 1002(d), 106 Stat. 448,
778–79 (1992); Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498,
§ 1002, 100 Stat. 1268, 1561 (1986); Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (strengthening the educational resources of colleges
and universities and providing financial assistance for students in postsecondary and higher education). The “Findings” and “Purpose” sections of the Act also
indicate coordination is to support technological and economic competitiveness,
educate Americans, and improve STEM programs.
505. 20 U.S.C. § 1067i (2012) (“Cross program and cross agency cooperation”)
(“The [Department of Education] Minority Science and Engineering Improvement Programs shall cooperate and consult with other programs within the Department and within Federal, State, and private agencies which carry out programs to improve the quality of science, mathematics, and engineering
education.”).
506. See Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-129,
113 Stat. 1653 (1999) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299–299c-7) (amending Title IX of the Public Health Service Act).
507. See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-6(a) (2012) (“Coordination of Federal Government
quality improvement efforts”) (mandating that “the Secretary, acting through
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expansive powers to influence other agencies to further
healthcare initiatives throughout the federal government.508
Legislation authorizing coordination under the Veterans’ Benefits Act has also effected an expansion of the Department of
Veteran’s Affairs power to assist homeless veterans.509 The implementation of other labor standards, including under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), is also reinforced by coordination offering the Department of Labor
interagency control.510
The Department of Health and Human Services, and in particular, the Administration on Aging, must initiate coordination
with other agencies—which are obligated to participate—as a result of a large-scale agency coordination arrangement involving
multiple pieces of legislation (such as the Older Americans Act

the Director, shall coordinate all research, evaluations, and demonstrations related to health services research, quality measurement and quality improvement activities undertaken and supported by the Federal Government”).
508. See S. REP. NO. 106-82, at 5 (1999) (stating that “through coordination
of various Federal quality initiatives, the Agency is to become the hub and driving force of Federal efforts to improve quality of health care in all practice environments”); H.R. REP. NO. 106-305, at 29 (1999) (noting that “this legislation
instructs the Agency to have an expanded role in the coordination of Federal
quality improvement efforts undertaken by the Federal government”).
509. Veterans’ Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 105-114, § 1774, 111 Stat. 2277,
2286 (1997) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 2034(a) (2001)) (“Coordination
with other agencies and organizations”) (“In assisting homeless veterans, the
Secretary [of Labor] shall coordinate with, and may provide services authorized
under this title in conjunction with, State and local governments, other appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and nongovernmental organizations.”); see also S. REP. NO. 105-123, at 17 (1997) (indicating
that the purpose of authorizing interagency coordination here was to “consolidate, clarify, and codify” authority for successful homeless assistance programs
that the VA had already established); H.R. REP. NO. 105-293, at 11 (1997)
(“[T]he reported bill does not seek to diminish VA efforts on behalf of the homeless . . . . To the contrary, the bill would effectively extend VA’s authority to administer [pilot] programs [begun in Public Law 102-590].”).
510. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-406, § 506, 88 Stat. 829, 894 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1136
(1996)) (“Coordination and responsibility of agencies enforcing this subchapter
and related Federal laws”) (implementing coordination between the Secretary
of Labor and “any such agency as he may find to be practicable and consistent
with law”); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No.
86-257, § 607, 73 Stat. 519, 540–41 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 527) (“Cooperation with other agencies and departments”) (implementing coordination between the Department of Labor and “any department, agency, or establishment
of the United States or of any State or political subdivision of a State”).
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and the Public Works and Economic Development Act) concerning programs for the elderly.511 The original grant of coordination authority512 was mandated to “build[] in requirements for
coordination with all other groups” having programs related to
the elderly, while also allowing the Administration on Aging to
retain its role as the leading component on elder issues.513 Another example of broad authority involves the Indian Financing Act,514 under which the Department of the Interior is authorized to coordinate extensively with other agencies515 to
improve the condition of Native reservations.516
511. See, e.g., Older Americans Act, Pub. L. No. 89-73, § 602, 79 Stat. 218,
226 (1965); 42 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (“Federal agency cooperation”)
(“The Assistant Secretary [on Aging], in carrying out the objectives and provisions of this chapter, shall coordinate, advise, consult with, and cooperate with
the head of each department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government proposing or administering programs or services substantially related to
the objectives of this chapter, with respect to such programs or services . . . . The
head of each department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government
proposing to establish programs and services substantially related to the objectives of this chapter shall consult with the Assistant Secretary prior to the establishment of such programs and services.”); Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-136, § 503, 79 Stat. 552, 565–66 (1965)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3132) (“Cooperation of Federal agencies”) (“In accordance with applicable laws and subject to the availability of appropriations, each
Federal agency shall exercise its powers, duties and functions, and shall cooperate with the Secretary [of Commerce], in such manner as will assist the Secretary in carrying out this subchapter.”). Congress provided for interagency cooperation here in order to improve employment and community service
opportunities for the elderly. See 42 U.S.C. § 3056c. This statute is closely related to 42 U.S.C. § 3013, infra note 626. The main difference between the two
statutes is that the coordination authorized here is focused on employment and
community service opportunities, whereas § 3013 encompasses coordination on
a much broader range of programs for the elderly.
512. Older Americans Comprehensive Services Amendments of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-29, 87 Stat. 30 (1973) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C and
42 U.S.C.).
513. H.R. REP. NO. 93-43, at 13 (1973) (noting that coordination should allow
the Administration on Aging to “maintain its own identity in order to serve as
a strong advocate for the needs of the older population”).
514. Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974).
515. 25 U.S.C. § 1542 (2012) (“Agency cooperation; private contracts for
management services and technical assistance”) (authorizing the Department
of Interior “to cooperate with the Small Business Administration and the Corporation for National and Community Service and other Federal agencies” to
further 25 U.S.C. § 1541).
516. This legislation is intended to require agencies to “provide capital on a
reimbursable basis to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical
and human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for

2019]

CONGRESS’S AGENCY COORDINATION

2069

One significant arena in which Congress has empowered
agencies to exercise control through coordination is environmental regulation, perhaps because of the cross-cutting, urgent and
protective nature of the enabling legislation. For instance, under
the Endangered Species Act,517 all agencies are required to
“utilize their authorities” to “carry[] out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species,”518 even
though only the Departments of the Interior and Commerce are
the named implementers of this mandate. Further, Congress
made clear that the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce
may even review other federal agencies’ programs and leverage
their authority to encourage agencies to use their resources in
service of these priorities.519 And under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,520 all federal agencies are required
to assist the Environmental Protection Agency in waste management.521 In addition, this coordination provision was intended to
“require[] cooperation of other Federal agencies with the EPA in

the utilization and management of their own resources and where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts.” 120 CONG. REC. 8383,
at 8388 (1974) (“The House . . . added a new title V which would direct the Secretary [of Interior] to work with the Small Business Administration and Action
to use their technical and managerial skills to develop a viable economic community on Indian reservations. This amendment is needed because the lack of
business, financial, and management skills has been a reason for this failure.”).
517. Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-707, § 109(g), 102 Stat. 4689, 4709 (1988); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Marine Fisheries Program Authorization Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-659, § 411(b)–(c), 100 Stat. 3706, 3741–42 (1986); Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, §§ 4(a), 8(b), 96
Stat. 1411, 1417, 1426 (1982); Endangered Species Act of 1973, appropriation
authorization, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1225, 1226–27 (1979); Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3751,
3752–60 (1978); Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87
Stat. 884, 892 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988)).
518. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2012) (“Interagency cooperation”).
519. See id.
520. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,
90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6987 (1984)).
521. 42 U.S.C. § 6963(a) (2012) (“Cooperation with Environmental Protection Agency”) (“All Federal agencies shall assist the Administrator [of the EPA]
in carrying out his functions under this chapter and shall promptly make available all requested information concerning past or present Agency waste management practices and past or present Agency owned, leased, or operated solid
or hazardous waste facilities. This information shall be provided in such format
as may be determined by the Administrator.”).
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achieving the purposes of th[e Resource Conservation and Recovery Act].”522
Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act523 the Marine
Mammal Commission “shall have access to all studies and data
compiled by Federal agencies regarding marine mammals” and
may even “utilize the facilities or services of any Federal agency”
with their consent (presumably, to carry out its mission).524 Similarly, under the Energy Policy Act,525 the Department of the
Interior “shall consult and coordinate with Federal, State, and
local agencies” to “ensure comprehensive collection of scientific
data . . . share resources, and fund projects” to “provide a better
522. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 8 (1976) (emphasis added). The purpose of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was to increase reclamation and
reuse of waste and to protect people from the harmful effects of hazardous waste
disposal. Id. at 2–3. The purpose of the original grant of cooperation authority,
42 U.S.C. § 6963(a), was to “require[ ] cooperation of other Federal agencies with
the EPA in achieving the purposes of th[e Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act].” Id. at 8. In amending the grant of cooperation authority to add subsection
(b) to the statute, Congress intended to assist the EPA in its execution of studies
on reuse of waste byproducts. 126 CONG. REC. 2733, 3361–62 (1980) (statement
of Hon. Tom Bevill) (discussing the importance of reusing waste byproducts in
regards to a related bill, H.R. 3994, and stating that EPA studies on byproduct
reuse “should not proceed in a vacuum,” but rather should be undertaken with
“the assistance and cooperation of those most expert in this field . . . includ[ing] . . . personnel from other agencies of Government [such as the Department of Energy, the Department of Interior, the Federal Highway Administration, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture] that are
aware of the role coal plays in our national energy policy, or of actual disposal
and utilization practices”). The congressional record was eventually incorporated into the Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96482, § 6003, 94 Stat. 2334, 2356 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
6963), in a slightly different form. Under subsection (a), all Federal agencies are
required to cooperate with the EPA in functions related to solid waste. See id.
The cooperation authority under subsection (b) also extends to all Federal agencies, although the congressional record suggests that the Department of Energy,
the Department of Interior, the Federal Highway Administration, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture are the agencies most
likely to cooperate with EPA under this subsection. See id.
523. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, § 205, 86
Stat. 1027, 1045 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1405).
524. 16 U.S.C. § 1405 (2012) (“Coordination with other Federal agencies”)
(“The Commission shall have access to all studies and data compiled by Federal
agencies regarding marine mammals. With the consent of the appropriate Secretary or Agency head, the Commission may also utilize the facilities or services
of any Federal agency and shall take every feasible step to avoid duplication of
research and to carry out the purposes of this chapter.”).
525. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 348, 119 Stat. 594, 708
(2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15906).

2019]

CONGRESS’S AGENCY COORDINATION

2071

understanding of the terrestrial, aquatic, and marine ecosystems of the North Slope of Alaska.”526 In addition, the Coast
Guard Authorization Act527 allows the Coast Guard to utilize
the resources of other agencies to respond to environmental concerns like oil spills and other debris clean-up. Indeed, the language of the coordination authority is expansive, in that it allows
the Coast Guard to unilaterally perform any activity for another
agency, or to avail itself of any other agency’s resource with the
permission of that agency head.528
In addition, in a number of instances, Congress has mandated coordination in order to protect individual national

526. See 42 U.S.C. § 15906 (2012) (“North Slope Science Initiative”).
527. This legislation is aimed at environmental protection and clean-up, and
the provision is part of a larger bill that discusses responses to oil spills, marine
debris clean-up, and related items. Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-324, § 405(a), 110 Stat. 3901, 3924 (1996) (codified as amended at 14
U.S.C. § 141).
528. 14 U.S.C. § 141 (2012) (“Cooperation with other agencies, States, territories, and political subdivisons”) (“The Coast Guard may, when so requested
by proper authority, utilize its personnel and facilities (including members of
the Auxiliary and facilities governed under chapter 23) to assist any Federal
agency, State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, to perform any activity for which such personnel and facilities
are especially qualified . . . . The Coast Guard, with the consent of the head of
the agency concerned, may avail itself of such officers and employees, advice,
information, and facilities of any Federal agency, State, Territory, possession,
or political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia as may be helpful in
the performance of its duties.”).
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parks.529 For instance, under the National Parks Act, the Department of the Interior530 is authorized to coordinate with other
agencies concerning a park/music facility called Wolf Trap located near an airport in Virginia.531 Indeed, mandating agencies
to coordinate may amplify administrative efforts in an arena in
which agencies might not otherwise concentrate ample resources. According to Congress, the purpose of cooperation was
“to assure adequate protection for Wolf Trap from undue noise
and air pollution in the future.”532 Because Wolf Trap Park is
operated by Interior and the anticipated source of noise and air
pollution was Dulles Airport, cooperation between Interior and
the Federal Aviation Authority in particular was contemplated
by the statute, although the text of the statute leaves open the
opportunity for Interior to coordinate with other agencies.533

529. See, e.g., Act of June 4, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-327, § 3, 82 Stat. 169 (1968)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 693d) (“Cooperation with public and private agencies;
contributions and gifts for Robert S. Kerr Center”) (“The Secretary of Agriculture is hereby authorized to cooperate with and receive the cooperation of public
and private agencies and organizations and individuals in the development, administration, and operation of the Robert S. Kerr Memorial Arboretum and Nature Center. The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to accept contributions
and gifts to be used to further the purposes of sections 693b to 693d of this title.”); Act of Sept. 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-207, § 4, 79 Stat. 843, 843–44 (1965)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460p-3) (“Outdoor recreation facilities development; cooperation with Federal and State agencies”) (encouraging the Department of
Agriculture to coordinate to develop recreation facilities in West Virginia); Robert S. Kerr Memorial Arboretum and Nature Center: Hearing on H.R. 15822 Before the Comm. on Agric., 90th Cong., 2–3 (1968) (statement of Orville L. Freeman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture) (reiterating the narrow subject
matter in arboretum-related coordination); Act of Mar. 25, 1948, Pub. L. No.
80-454, § 2, 62 Stat. 85 (1948) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 402) (“Acquisition of lands
and property; utilization of voluntary services; cooperation with other Federal,
State, and private agencies”) (granting authority to the Secretary of Interior to
contract with any agency, state or federal to secure a laboratory in North Dakota).
530. See 16 U.S.C. § 284g(a) (2012) (“Cooperation of government agencies”)
(“The Secretary [of Interior] shall cooperate with, and seek cooperation from,
other Federal, State, and local agencies (including the Federal Aviation Administration) to protect the park from undue noise intrusions, air pollution, and
visual degradation.”).
531. Act of Oct. 14, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-310, § 8(a), 96 Stat. 1455, 1457
(1982) (codified at 16 U.S.C § 284g(a)); Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-671,
80 Stat. 950 (1966).
532. H.R. REP. NO. 97-825, at 11 (1982).
533. Id. at 10; supra note 530.
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The named agency may even be the object, as opposed to the
subject, of the coordination effort. In an example that is reminiscent of the FBI’s remarkable power to utilize other agencies in
its fraud investigations,534 under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,535
the Forest Service (a division of the Department of Agriculture)
is compelled to cooperate with any federal agency that has related jurisdiction over a drug investigation536 and to “cooperate
with the Attorney General in carrying out the seizure and forfeiture provisions”537 of the Controlled Substances Act538 for any
violations of the Act.539 The Forest Service must even accept the
exercise of law enforcement from any other federal agency that
wishes “to exercise the powers and authorities of the Forest Service” when it is “economical and in the public interest” for general law enforcement purposes.540 In other words, the Forest Service is expected to coordinate with other, unnamed agencies at
their discretion. Beyond these exceptions, however, the named
agency is generally empowered to divert other agencies’ resources and attention, thus circumscribing those agencies’ discretion and altering their ability to pursue their preferred priorities.
Finally, in one case, more than one agency is tasked with
initiating coordination among an unspecified set of other agencies. More specifically, a Commission comprised of officials from
the Departments of State and Commerce is tasked with carrying
out duties and cooperating541 under the National Oceanic and
534. See infra notes 554–58 and accompanying text.
535. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 15004, 100 Stat.
3207, 3398–99 (1986) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 559d(1) (1988)).
536. Id. (“[T]he Forest Service shall cooperate with any other Federal law
enforcement agency having primary investigative jurisdiction over the offense
committed . . . .”).
537. 16 U.S.C. § 559d(3) (2012) (“Cooperation with other Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies”) (“[T]he Forest Service shall cooperate with the
Attorney General in carrying out the seizure and forfeiture provisions of section
511 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 881) for violations of the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.] relating to offenses committed
within the National Forest System, or which affect the administration of the
National Forest System . . . .”).
538. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012).
539. Id. §§ 801–904, 951–71.
540. 16 U.S.C. § 559d(4)–(5) (“Cooperation with other Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies”).
541. See id. § 5007(a)–(b) (“Cooperation with other agencies”) (“Any agency
of the Federal Government is authorized, upon request of the Commission, to
cooperate in the conduct of scientific and other programs, and to furnish, on a
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Atmospheric Administration Authorization Act.542 And,
under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs,543 an unspecified set of agencies are tasked
with coordinating to ensure the safety of mobile homes.544
2. Semi-Obligatory
Congress may also implement somewhat less obligatory
frameworks of coordination by mandating agencies to interact
“to the maximum extent possible” or, seeming more discretionarily, “to the maximum extent practicable.” In general, while the
statutory language in these examples is not as binding as “shall”
or “must,” it nonetheless, apparently, leaves less room for opting
out than the clear delegation of pure discretionary authority to
coordinate, as discussed later in this subsection. Furthermore,
the hierarchy established by these coordination statutes may offer the named agency in each case some power to persuade other
agencies to support its interests.
For instance, under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act,545 “other Federal agencies” are required to cooperate “to the maximum extent possible with the
reimbursable basis, facilities and personnel for the purpose of assisting the
Commission in carrying out its duties under the Convention.”).
542. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Authorization
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-567, § 808, 106 Stat. 4270, 4312 (1992) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 5007 (2000)); Oceans Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-587,
§ 8008, 106 Stat. 5039, 5101 (1992); Pribilof Islands Transition Act, Pub. L. No.
106-562, § 304(a), 114 Stat. 2794, 2806 (2000) (amending the Oceans Act of
1992). In particular, the commission has expansive authority to implement the
North Pacific Anadromous Stocks Convention, as well as “minimiz[e] current
bureaucratic red tape,” streamline procedures, and strengthen enforcement under the statute. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Authorization Act of 1992, § 802, 138 CONG. REC. 32,467, 32,474 (1992).
543. See Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (1971).
544. 42 U.S.C. § 4634 (2012) (“Agency coordination”) (authorizing interagency coordination to set and determine compliance with mobile home and
manufactured home standards). The purpose of the overall legislative scheme
is to “ensure safer and better constructed mobile homes” possibly at the behest
of those with a stake in mobile homes. Housing and Community Development
Legislation—1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 93d Cong. 2186 (1973) (indicating a legislative interest
in coordination regarding this matter: “In all, what seems to be evolving is a
new cooperation between Federal, State and local governments in establishing
and fulfilling the housing policies of the Nation.”).
545. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub.
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Secretary of State” to maintain the security of all U.S. diplomatic
missions.546 Similarly, under the Methane Transportation
Research, Development, and Demonstration Act,547 the
Department of Energy is authorized to work with any federal
entity, and agencies may exercise discretion to further aims of
the statute548 “to the maximum extent possible.”549 However, the
particular coordination language in this instance limits the responsibility and power of the Secretary of Energy by not specifying to what extent other agency activities must incorporate the
goals of methane vehicle development and by leaving to those
agencies’ discretion whether they will provide resources to the
Department of Energy in service of this goal.550
Under the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act,551 the Secretary of Commerce is expected to coor-

L. No. 99-399, § 106, 100 Stat. 853, 857–58 (1986) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 4805).
546. 22 U.S.C. § 4805 (2012) (“Cooperation of other Federal agencies”) (authorizing coordination to accomplish 22 U.S.C. § 4802(a), which provides for the
protection of all U.S. security and diplomatic missions).
547. See Methane Transportation Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-512, § 5, 94 Stat. 2827, 2830 (1980) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 3804); see also S. REP. NO. 96-1006 (1980) (supporting the Methane
Transportation, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1980).
548. The overarching goal of the statute is to “provide for advanced and accelerated research into, and development of, methane vehicle design.” 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3801(b)(1), 3804 (2012) (“Coordination with other Federal departments and
agencies”).
549. Id. § 3804(a)–(b) (“Coordination with other Federal departments and
agencies”) (“In carrying out the programs established under sections 3803 [management of methane vehicle research, development, and demonstration] and
3806 [assessing current state of methane vehicle technologies] of this title, the
Secretary shall assure, to the maximum extent practicable, that the functions
of this program are coordinated with related regulatory activities and other responsibilities of the Department of Energy and any other Federal departments
of agencies.”); see also S. REP. NO. 96-1006, at 5 (1980) (explaining that the statute directs the Secretary to maximize cooperation between Federal agencies).
550. See 15 U.S.C. § 3804(a).
551. See Oceans Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-587, § 2205(b)(13), 106 Stat.
5039, 5051 (1992) (amending the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6208, 104 Stat.
1388, 1695 (1990) (amending the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 504,
92 Stat. 629, 693 (1978) (amending the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972);
Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, § 6, 90
Stat. 1013 (1976); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583,
86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a) (1992)) (amend-
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dinate with other agencies “to the maximum extent practicable”552 in order to improve and strengthen coastal zone management in the United States and to coordinate and further the objectives of national energy policy.553
Another statute, the Act to Implement the Agreed
Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and
Flora554 dictates that the National Science Foundation cooperate with other federal agencies “to the maximum extent practicable”555 for the named purpose of the statute. In another example, the Consumer Product Safety Act556 provides the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, an independent agency,
the opportunity to interact with any other federal agency, “to the
maximum extent practicable,”557 both in a general capacity558 as
ing the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966 in an attempt to “establish a national policy and develop a national program for the
management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the land and water
resources of the Nation’s coastal zones”); Marine Resources and Engineering
Development Act, Pub. L. No. 89-454, 80 Stat. 203 (1966) (seeking “to provide
for a comprehensive, long-range, and coordinated national program in marine
science, to establish a National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development, and a Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources”).
552. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a) (2012) (“Coordination and cooperation”) (“In carrying out his functions and responsibilities under this chapter, the Secretary shall
consult with, cooperate with, and, to the maximum extent practicable, coordinate his activities with other interested Federal agencies.”).
553. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1298, at 23 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
554. Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-541, § 12, 92 Stat.
2048, 2056 (1978).
555. Antarctic Conservation, ch. 44, 16 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (2012) (“Federal
agency cooperation”) (“Each Federal department or agency whose activities affect Antarctica shall utilize, to the maximum extent practicable, its authorities
in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter, and shall cooperate with the Director in carrying out the purposes of this chapter.”).
556. 15 U.S.C.A § 2078 (2012); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, Tit. II, §§ 207, 235(c)(7), 122 Stat. 3016,
3044–3046, 3075 (2008) (Cooperation with States and other Federal agencies
(ch. 47, Consumer Product Safety)); Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 15, 90 Stat. 503, 510 (1976); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, Tit. V,
§ 5115(c), 102 Stat. 1107, 1433 (1988); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L.
No. 92-573, § 29, 86 Stat. 1207, 1230–1231 (1972).
557. H.R. REP. NO. 110-501 (2007).
558. Consumer Product Safety, ch. 47, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2078(c) (“Cooperation
with States and other Federal agencies”) (“The Commission and the heads of
other departments and agencies engaged in administering programs related to
product safety shall, to the maximum extent practicable, cooperate and consult
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well as more specifically for the collection of data in order to
carry out any of its functions.559 And a general set of “Federal
agencies” are expected to coordinate with any other “Federal departments and agencies” on this basis for the purposes of metropolitan development under the Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act.560 Other examples in which
the language mandating coordination is somewhat tempered include interagency efforts to foster volunteer programs under the
Domestic Volunteer Service Act561 and aeronautics activities
under the America COMPETES Act.562
3. Discretionary
Finally, in some cases, the named agency has the discretion
to choose whether to coordinate with other agencies. Those unnamed agencies must, however, be responsive to the named
agency, should it decide to initiate coordination. In these examples, the named agency wields power independent of Congress.
In other words, unlike those instances in which unilaterally-initiated coordination is mandatory, Congress has not required that
in order to insure fully coordinated efforts.”); see supra note 556 and accompanying text.
559. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2078(c) (“The Commission may obtain from any Federal
department or agency such statistics, data, program reports, and other materials as it may deem necessary to carry out its functions under this chapter.”).
560. See infra notes 553–66 and accompanying text. The relevant statutory
language states that “all Federal agencies which are engaged in administering
programs related to metropolitan development, or which otherwise perform
functions relating thereto, shall, to the maximum extent practicable, consult
with and seek advice from all other significantly affected Federal departments
and agencies in an effort to assure fully coordinated programs.”
561. Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-113, 87 Stat.
394 (1973); Domestic Volunteer Services, ch. 66, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5050 (1973) (“Coordination with other programs”) (“The Director [of the Corporation for National
and Community Service] shall take necessary steps to coordinate volunteer programs authorized under this chapter with one another, with community action
programs, and with other related Federal, State, and local programs.”); S. REP.
NO. 93-311, at 107 (1973) (deriving the section from various sources and noting
that it “continues the emphasis from [the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964] on
the importance of including volunteer programs under this Act within . . . community action programs being carried out under this Act”).
562. Aeronautics, ch. 401, 51 U.S.C.A. § 40103 (2012) (“Cooperation with
other agencies on aeronautics activities”) (“The Administrator [of NASA] shall
coordinate, as appropriate, the Administration’s aeronautics activities with relevant programs in the Department of Transportation, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Homeland Security . . . .”); America COMPETES Act, Pub. L. No. 110-69, 121 Stat. 572 (2007).
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the lead agency utilize the resources of other agencies for policymaking purposes. As a result, while an agency’s ability to influence another agency’s actions may be fairly strong, that the
agency will pursue the exercise of interagency control in the first
place is not a given. Therefore, these statutes do not provide a
reliable way for the legislature to exercise influence over the
structure of administrative relationships.
Most statute-based coordination in this category concerns
the development and management of land. For instance, under
the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development
Act,563 the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development has
expansive authority to collect data from other agencies for the
general purpose of “areawide development.”564 The Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development also has authority under the
Housing and Community Development Act565 to coordinate
in order to plan and develop the safety and construction of manufactured homes.566 And under the Reforestation Act,567 the
Department of Agriculture may insert itself into the work done
by any institution on any land—public or private—near a national park, as long as “the public interest justifies” it; further,

563. Economic Development Administration and Appalachian Regional Development Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-393, 112 Stat. 3596 (1998)
(providing for interagency coordination); Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-754, 80 Stat. 1255 (1966) (original
statute).
564. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Program, ch. 41,
42 U.S.C.A. § 3332 (2012) (“Cooperation between Federal agencies”) (“In order
to insure that all Federal programs related to areawide development are carried
out in a coordinated manner . . . the Secretary is authorized to call upon other
Federal agencies to supply such statistical data, program reports, and other materials as he deems necessary to discharge his responsibilities for areawide development, and to assist the President in coordinating the areawide development efforts of all Federal agencies . . . .”).
565. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
88 Stat. 633 (1974).
566. Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards, ch. 70, 42
U.S.C.A. § 5408 (1974) (“Cooperation by Secretary with public and private agencies”).
567. An Act to Facilitate and Simplify the Work of the Forest Service, and
for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-478, 64 Stat. 83 (1950); An Act to Facilitate
and Simplify the Work of the Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture, and to Promote Reforestation, Pub. L. No. 68-575, 43 Stat. 1132
(1925).
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the institution is required to pay for Agriculture’s involvement.568 And to combat soil erosion under the Act To provide
for the protection of land resources against soil erosion,569 the Department of Agriculture may “secure the cooperation of any governmental agency.”570 Under An Act To stop
injury to the public grazing lands . . . ,571 the Department of
the Interior is authorized to coordinate to improve range management.572 Under the Sawtooth National Recreation Area
Act,573 the Department of the Interior’s Forest Service division
sought and was granted the authority to coordinate with any
other agency in regards to “technical planning and assistance,

568. Forests; Forest Service; Reforestation; Management, ch. 3, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 572 (2012) (“Cooperation between Secretary of Agriculture and public or private agencies in working land under State or private ownership”) (“The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized, where the public interest justifies, to cooperate
with or assist public and private agencies, organizations, institutions, and persons in performing work on land in State, county, municipal, or private ownership, situated within or near a national forest, for which the administering
agency, owner, or other interested party deposits in one or more payments a
sufficient sum to cover the total estimated cost of the work to be done . . . .”).
569. An Act to Amend Reorganization Plan Numbered 2 of 1973, and for
Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 102, 88 Stat. 50 (1974); An Act to Provide
for the Protection of Land Resources Against Soil Erosion, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 74-46, 49 Stat. 164 (1935), 63 Stat. 972 (1949).
570. Cooperation of Governmental Agencies; Officers and Employees, Appointment and Compensation; Expenditures for Personal Services and Supplies, 16 U.S.C.A. § 590 d (1935) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary
of Agriculture may–(1) Secure the cooperation of any governmental
agency. . . .”).
571. An Act to Stop Injury to the Public Grazing Lands by Preventing Overgrazing and Soil Deterioration, to Provide for Their Orderly Use, Improvement,
and Development, to Stabilize the Livestock Industry Dependent Upon the Public Range, and for Other Purposes., Pub. L. No. 73–482, 48 Stat. 1269 (1987).
572. Grazing Lands, ch. 8A, 43 U.S.C.A. § 315k (2012) (“Cooperation with
governmental departments; coordination of range administration”) (authorizing
the Secretary of the Interior to cooperate with “any department of the Government” to carry out the Act’s purposes and coordinate range administration).
573. An Act to Establish the Sawtooth National Recreation Area in the State
of Idaho, and to Temporarily Withdraw Certain National Forest Land in the
State of Idaho from the Operation of U.S. Mining Laws, and for Other Purposes,
Pub. L. No. 92-400, 86 Stat. 612 (1972).
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advice, and [even simply] encouragement”574 concerning the protection of land in Idaho.575 Congress has even authorized the Department of State to initiate international coordination around
tuna fishing under the Tuna Conventions Act of 1950.576
In some cases, Congress has established a structure of interagency control to enhance the power of the armed services. These
are paradigm instances in which the named agency has discretion to implement coordination at will, but the unnamed agencies must be responsive if the former chooses to coordinate. For
instance, the Act To promote effectual planning, development, maintenance, and coordination of wildlife, fish,
and game conservation and rehabilitation in military reservations allows the Secretary of Defense to enter into agreements with just about any entity to maintain or improve national resources in order to benefit its own military efforts.577
574. Sawtooth National Recreation Area: Hearing on H.R. 6957 Before the
Subcomm. on Nat’l Parks and Recreation of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong. 62 (1971) (statement of John R. McGuire, Deputy Chief
of the Forest Service).
575. “The Secretary may cooperate with other Federal agencies, with State
and local public agencies, and with private individuals and agencies in the development and operation of facilities and services in the area in furtherance of
the purposes of this subchapter, including, but not limited to, the restoration
and maintenance of the historic setting and background of the frontier ranchtype town of Stanley.” National Parks, Military Parks, Monuments, and Seashores, ch. 1, 16 U.S.C.A. § 460aa-5 (1972) (“Cooperation with other agencies in
development and operation of facilities and services; Stanley, restoration”) (located in An Act to Establish the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area in the
States of Oregon and Idaho, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 94-199, 89 Stat.
1117 (1975)).
576. S. REP. NO. 2094, at 2, 6 (1950) (noting that interagency cooperation
was authorized in this case to further the international coordination of tuna
research); Tuna Conventions Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-764, 64 Stat. 777
(1950); Tuna Conventions, ch. 16, 16 U.S.C.A. § 958 (2012) (“Cooperation with
other agencies”).
577. Conservation Programs on Government Lands, ch. 5C, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 670c-1 (“Cooperative and interagency agreements for land management on installations”) (“The Secretary of a military department may enter into cooperative agreements with States, local governments, Indian tribes, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals, and into interagency agreements with the
heads of other Federal departments and agencies, to provide for the . . . maintenance and improvement of natural resources . . . if the purpose of the cooperative agreement or interagency agreement is to relieve or eliminate current or
anticipated challenges that could restrict, impede, or otherwise interfere with,
whether directly or indirectly, current or anticipated military activities.”); An
Act to Promote Effectual Planning, Development, Maintenance, and Coordination of Wildlife, Fish, and Game Conservation and Rehabilitation in Military
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Here, Congress prescribed coordination to ensure an emphasis
on military interests vis-à-vis wildlife conservation.578 And,
within the auspices of a seemingly narrowly-focused statute, the
Act Authorizing the construction, repair, and preservation of certain public works on rivers and harbors for
navigation & flood control579 the Secretary of the Army is empowered to engage with other agencies to further the large project of “preparing the general plan for the development of the
water resources of the western United States . . . .”580 Indeed,
this coordination was intended to authorize the Secretary to
“participate to the fullest extent in development of water resources in the Western United States . . . .”581 Put another way,
Congress wished to give the Secretary of the Army a free hand
to participate in the development of a water plan for the Western
United States, so the Secretary’s authority to cooperate with
other agencies in this policy area was intended to be quite
broad.582
Finally, in at least a few instances, the named agency is the
object, as opposed to the subject, of the coordination effort, as
may be the case within mandatory coordination frameworks.583
In these situations, it is the unnamed set of agencies that are
empowered by coordination legislation to wield control over the
named agency. For instance, the Department of Transportation
has permission to maintain and improve highways for other
agencies, as well as states and foreign countries,584 and to pro-

Reservations, Pub. L. No. 86-797, 74 Stat. 1052 (1960).
578. S. REP. NO. 97-413 (1982).
579. An Act Authorizing the Construction, Repair, and Preservation of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors for Navigation, Flood Control, and for
Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 91-611, 84 Stat. 1818 (1970).
580. Colorado River Basin Project, ch. 32, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1511a (2012) (“Cooperation and participation by Secretary of the Army with Federal, State, and
local agencies”).
581. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1665, at 66 (1970); see also S. REP. NO. 91-1422, at
107–08 (1970) (noting that the “[present] authority . . . available to the Department of the Army [was] not sufficient for participation in a study of this magnitude,” meaning, a study to develop a “general plan for the future water needs of
Western United States”).
582. See id.
583. See supra notes 535–43 and accompanying text.
584. See 23 U.S.C. § 308 (2012); An Act to Revise, Codify, and Enact into
Law, title 23 of the United States Code, Entitled “Highways,” Pub. L. No.
85-767; Cooperation with Federal and State Agencies and Foreign Countries
(Chapter 3. Highways, General Provisions).
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vide “services” to these entities for people and businesses displaced by highway projects under the Act To revise, codify,
and enact into law, title 23 of the United States Code, entitled “Highways”.585 In another example under the Moving
Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, the Coast
Guard is required to cooperate with and expend resources to assist several agencies that have an interest in international or
foreign matters586 and have jurisdiction over ports of entry with
which the Coast Guard may interact.587 The Coast Guard also
“may assist” the Department of Health and Human Services and
other agencies in the provision of “medical emergency helicopter
transportation services to civilians” if the assistance occurs
within the Coast Guard’s jurisdiction under An Act To amend
titles and to improve the Code.588
B. UNILATERALLY INITIATED & LIMITED
Authority to coordinate may also empower a named agency
to initiate coordination at its discretion with a specified second
585. See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No.
112-141, 126 Stat. 405, 126 Stat. 577, 577–79 (2012); see also ROBERT S. KIRK,
RES., SCI., & INDUS. DIV., R42445 SURFACE TRANSPORTATION REAUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS: MAP-21, H.R. 7, AND H.R.
4348 – MAJOR PROVISIONS 42–43 (2012) (amending an earlier version of Pub. L.
No. 85-767 to include “activities under section 214 of the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970” as “services” that
the Secretary may perform “for other Federal agencies, cooperating foreign
countries, and State cooperating agencies”).
586. These agencies include U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Postal Service,
the Public Health Service, and the now-defunct Immigration and Naturalization Service, and ostensibly the immigration subcomponents of the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice. See An Act to Provide for the Establishment, Operation, and Maintenance of Foreign-trade Zones in Ports of Entry
of the United States, to Expedite and Encourage Foreign Commerce, and for
Other Purposes, Pub. L. 106-36, Tit. I, § 1001(b)(3), 48 Stat. 998; An Act to Make
Miscellaneous and Technical Changes to Various Trade Laws, and for Other
Purposes, Pub. L. No. 106-36, Tit. I, § 1001(b)(3), 113 Stat. 127, 131 (1934).
587. Foreign Trade Zones, ch. 1A, 19 U.S.C.A. § 81i (2012) (“Cooperation of
Board with other agencies”) (“The Board shall cooperate with . . . the United
States Customs Service, the United States Postal Service, the Public Health
Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and such other Federal
agencies as have jurisdiction in ports of entry described in section 81b of this
title.”).
588. Cooperation with Other Agencies, ch. 7, 14 U.S.C.A. § 147a (1982) (“Department of Health and Human Services”); An Act to Amend Titles 10, 14, 37,
and 38, United States Code, to Codify Recent Law and to Improve the Code,
Pub. L. No. 97-295, 96 Stat. 1287 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 97-388, at 48 (1982).
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agency, as opposed to with a set of unnamed agencies. These examples often indicate intent by Congress to grant one agency dominion over another in regards to a particular directive, particularly when the coordination is mandatory. The interagency
control exercised in these examples is more limited, primarily
because the statute-based coordination in each example involves
only one compelled agency, and also if the subject matter is often
narrower or more focused in scope.
1. Mandatory
Agencies may be mandated to consult with one other, named
agency. Overall, coordination legislation involving named executive agencies may lay the groundwork for legislative and interagency control, albeit in a manner characterized less explicitly
as such by Congress, perhaps because the legislature has to be
careful in the way it circumscribes the discretion of agencies beholden to the President.
In a regime under the National Aeronautics and Space
Act,589 Congress granted the Department of Defense significant
control over NASA to ensure the former’s military goals are bolstered by the latter.590 Congress also added a unique dispute resolution mechanism granting the President the final authority to
determine the outcome of any conflicts between the two independent agencies,591 because “the procedure . . . in this highly

589. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72
Stat. 426 (1958).
590. National Aeronautics and Space Program, ch. 201, 51 U.S.C.A. § 20114
(2012) (“Administration and Department of Defense coordination”); H.R. REP.
NO. 85-1770, at 7 (1958) (noting that NASA was “directed, and not merely authorized, to cooperate with the Department of Defense” to achieve two purposes:
“[(1)] cooperation between civilian and military organizations on all matters extending beyond purely peaceful applications or readily identifiable military requirements; and [(2)] freedom for the military departments to conduct such
basic and applied research and development as may be necessary and appropriate to their military missions.”).
591. National Aeronautics and Space Program, ch. 201, 51 U.S.C.A. § 20114
(“The Administration and the Department of Defense, through the President,
shall advise and consult with each other on all matters within their respective
jurisdictions related to aeronautical and space activities and shall keep each
other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities . . . . If the
Secretary of Defense concludes that any request, action, proposed action, or failure to act on the part of the Administrator [of NASA] is adverse to the responsibilities of the Department of Defense, or the Administrator concludes that any
request, action, proposed action, or failure to act on the part of the Department
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important subsection constitutes the machinery through which
the more difficult problems of civilian and military relationships
in the fields of aeronautics and astronautics will be worked
out.”592 Given the presumed alliance between the President, who
is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, with the Department of Defense, which is also a cabinet agency (unlike NASA),
this dispute resolution mechanism may also boost the Department of Defense’s reach and ability to shape NASA’s actions and
priorities.
Some examples of seemingly joint initiation of collaboration
in fact involve the legislature arming one independent agency
with the power to shape the activities of another, perhaps because a sitting Congress seeks to alter the mandate of the latter
agency to conform to its own political and ideological priorities.
In the 1970s, under the Energy Reorganization Act, Congress
authorized coordination593 in order to ensure the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has control over all environmental protection initiatives, in particular those of the Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA). Indeed, a statement
by the senators responsible for the language of this section
speaks to this point: “It is not enough for EPA to maintain an
ability to ‘assess’ pollution control developments [vis-à-vis the
ERDA]; the Agency must be able to stimulate such developments
and to participate actively in that process in order to understand
the problem with particular technologies.”594 This was due, perhaps, both to an interest in environmental initiatives as well as
in anticipation of these agencies’ dissimilar incentives and goals.
of Defense is adverse to the responsibilities of the Administration, and the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense are unable to reach an agreement with
respect to the matter, either the Administrator or the Secretary of Defense may
refer the matter to the President for a decision (which shall be final).”).
592. H.R. REP. NO. 1770, at 16 (1958).
593. Development of Energy Sources, ch. 73, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5820 (2012) (“Coordination with environmental efforts”) (“The Administrator [of the Energy Research and Development Administration] is authorized to establish programs
to utilize research and development performed by other Federal agencies to
minimize the adverse environmental effects of energy projects. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as other affected agencies
and departments, shall cooperate fully with the Administrator in establishing
and maintaining such programs, and in establishing appropriate interagency
agreements to develop cooperative programs and to avoid unnecessary duplication.”); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233
(1974).
594. S. REP. NO. 93-980, at 51 (1974) (statement by Sens. Jacob K. Javits &
Edmund S. Muskie).
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In fact, while developing this coordination, the drafting senators
declared, “We do not question the importance of the proposed
agency [meaning, the ERDA] having a strong environmental
component but it should not replace or duplicate EPA’s activities. Instead of removing this function from EPA, full coordination between EPA and ERDA should be required to assure that
EPA’s research capability is utilized.”595 Furthermore, this is not
the only time Congress has authorized coordination to expand
the EPA’s purview in relation to other agencies.596
Under the Water Bank Act, the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior have similar authority to coordinate per
the text of the statute.597 Legislative history bears this out by
emphasizing how important the Secretary of the Interior is to
maintaining the wetlands program, which is of interest in this
provision.598 However, it is the Secretary of Agriculture that is
empowered, in the operative language of the statute, to affirmatively coordinate in order to ensure the program’s success,599 perhaps because Congress did not wish to sublimate Agriculture to
this effort if it has other important priorities.

595. Id.
596. See supra notes 504–23 and accompanying text.
597. Water Bank Program for Wetlands Preservation, ch. 29, 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1309, 2504 (2012) (“Consultation with Secretary of the Interior; conformity
of program with wetlands programs administered by Secretary of the Interior;
consultation with and utilization of technical services of appropriate local,
State, Federal, and private conservation agencies; coordination of programs”)
(“The Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of the Interior and take appropriate measures to insure that the program carried out pursuant to this chapter
is in harmony with wetlands programs administered by the Secretary of the
Interior.”) (emphasis added).
598. More specifically, the House Committee on Merchant and Marine Fisheries deemed the coordination provision “most important,” stating further that
cooperation is necessary to the success of the migratory waterfowl conservation
program established by the statute because the Secretary of the Interior is “[t]he
nation’s principal wildlife conservation officer,” responsible for acquiring “valuable migratory waterfowl habitat throughout the United States” and that without land for waterfowl habitats, the program would flounder. H.R. REP. NO.
91-1307, at 12 (1970).
599. See supra note 575.
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The Rural Water Act600 requires the Department of the Interior to coordinate with the Department of Agriculture to improve governmental rural water programs.601 And per the Housing and Community Development Act,602 the Department of
Labor is required to coordinate with the Environmental Protection Agency to control the dangers of lead paint.603 Finally, the
Whale Conservation and Protection Study Act604 requires
the Department of State and other agencies to work with the Department of Commerce605 to ensure international cooperation to
promote whale conservation.606
2. Semi-Obligatory
Unilaterally-initiated, named-agency coordination may also
be structured so that an agency is tasked with a responsibility
in consultation with another agency.607 In these examples, the
hierarchy is clear but permeable, or “soft,”608 in keeping with
documented legislative preferences. For example, under the
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conservation Act,
“the Director of the National Science Foundation, in consultation
with the Secretary of State and the heads of other appropriate
departments and agencies of the United States, shall continue to
600. See, e.g., Rural Water Supply Act, ch. 42, Pub. L. No. 109-451, 120 Stat.
3345 (2006). Coordination was authorized here to standardize eligibility criteria
for the federal government’s rural water programs.
601. Rural Water Supply Act, ch. 42, 43 U.S.C.A. § 2428 (2006) (“Interagency
coordination and cooperation”) (requiring coordination between the Department
of the Interior and the USDA for financial appraisal functions and loan guarantee administration under the Rural Water Supply Act).
602. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992).
603. Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act, ch. 63A, 42
U.S.C.A. § 4853a (1992) (“Coordination between Environmental Protection
Agency and Department of Labor”).
604. Whale Conservation and Protection Study Act, Pub. L. No. 94-532, 90
Stat. 2491 (1976).
605. Whale Conservation and Protection and Study Act, ch. 14A, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 917b (1976) (“Cooperation of other Federal agencies”) (“All Federal agencies
shall cooperate, to the fullest extent possible, with the Secretary of Commerce
in preparing the study and recommendations required . . . .”).
606. 122 CONG. REC. 32,928 (1976).
607. Cf. Freeman & Rossi, Agency Coordination, supra note 9, at 1157 (discussing and providing one example of “discretionary consultation”).
608. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 6, at 1389 (defining a “soft” hierarchy among agencies as one in which “a substantive power relationship still exists, but the dominant actor’s control has limits”).

2019]

CONGRESS’S AGENCY COORDINATION

2087

support basic research investigations of the Antarctic marine
ecosystem as a part of the United States Antarctic Program”;609
and “the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the National Science Foundation, the Secretary of State
and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall design and conduct the program of directed scientific research . . .
supplemental to and coordinated with the United States Antarctic Program.”610
In these examples, the first named agencies are in charge of
their respective duties, but must make overtures towards including the input of other agencies. Further, the named agency may
not be able to implement the policy without input from the secondary agenc[ies]. And while the secondary, consultative agencies are not in full control of the process at hand, they do have
the opportunity to participate—and very likely, to determine
their own level of participation, thereby impacting the scope of
the lead agencies’ efforts and the outcome of the coordination. In
these arrangements, the first agency may obligate the consulting
agency to expend resources or share information, while the consulting agency shapes the named agency’s path to statutory implementation.
In a twist on this type of authority, some statutes authorizing coordination require that agencies consult with one another
to establish coordination with yet a third set of agencies. For instance, the legislature passed the Fisheries Amendments
Act611 because it was concerned by the unequal distribution of
federal resources across fishing jurisdictions.612 Therefore, it authorized the Departments of Commerce and Interior to involve
additional institutions, including federal agencies, in the management of commercial fishing regulations.613 And, under the
609. Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conservation Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-623, § 312, 98 Stat. 3394 (1984); see also Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-241, § 902(h)(2), 120 Stat. 516
(1984) (changing Department of Transportation to Department of Homeland Security in the afore mentioned Act).
610. Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention, ch. 44A, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 2441 (2012) (“Federal agency cooperation”).
611. Fisheries Amendments Act of 1982, Pub L. No. 97-389, 96 Stat. 1949
(1982).
612. H.R. REP. NO. 97-295, 3–4 (1981).
613. North Atlantic Salmon Fishing Act, ch. 56, 16 U.S.C.A. § 3605 (“Cooperation with other agencies and institutions”) (stating that to promote interjurisdictional management of resources that inherently transcend jurisdictional
boundaries as well as research and development, “the Secretary of Commerce,
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Southwest Forest Health and Wildfire Prevention Act,614
the Secretary of Agriculture is tasked, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Interior, to “facilitate the transfer of interdisciplinary knowledge”615 and to otherwise encourage agencies to coordinate and cooperate for ecological restoration and wildlife
management purposes.616 In these examples, agencies are effectively jointly empowered to shape the priorities of a third set of
agencies. As a result, on the one hand, pressure from two agencies may more easily persuade a third set of agencies to respond
to requests for coordination. On the other hand, the fact that
compliance or responsiveness by the third set of agencies has not
been made mandatory by statute in these examples means that
agencies’ ability to exercise interagency control is not certain.
Finally, a statute may also direct two specific agencies to
engage in jointly-initiated coordination “to the maximum extent
practicable.”617 For example, under the Electric and Hybrid
Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration
Act,618 the Department of Energy is directed to coordinate with
the Department of Transportation “to the maximum extent practicable” to further the Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Project.619 While the Department
of Transportation may have some leverage that equalizes the
two agency heads’ roles, given that Congress delegated analysis
of relevant data to the Secretary of Transportation,620 legislative

in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, may arrange for the cooperation of agencies of the United States and the States, and of private institutions
and organizations”).
614. Southwest Forest Health and Wildfire Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-317, 118 Stat. 1204 (2004).
615. H.R. REP. NO. 108-397, § 3 (2003); see also S. REP. NO. 108-252 (2004).
616. Southwest Forest Health and Wildfire Prevention, ch. 86, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 6705 (“Cooperation between Institutes and Federal agencies”).
617. See Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-413, 90 Stat. 1260 (1976).
618. Id.
619. Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act, ch. 52, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2504(a) (2012) (“Coordination between Secretary
of Energy and other agencies”) (“[T]he Secretary of Energy shall, to the maximum extent practicable, consult and coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation with respect to any functions of the Secretary of Energy under this chapter which relate to regulatory activities or other responsibilities of the Secretary
of Transportation . . . .”).
620. S. REP. NO. 94-1048, at 19 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
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history suggests that Congress authorized the Secretary of Energy to coordinate at will with Department of Transportation.621
Nonetheless, the similar ideological and programmatic interests
of these two agencies might mean they in fact seek to advance
the project together.
3. Discretionary
The set of statutes considered in this project do not include
any purely discretionary regimes that involve unilaterally-initiated/hierarchical coordination between named agencies.
C. JOINTLY INITIATED
Thus far, the analysis has focused on unilaterally-initiated
coordination, in part because this constitutes the majority of
statute-based coordination. However, the authority to coordinate
may also be fashioned by Congress into a form of administrative
partnership or collaboration,622 either between two named agencies or among a group of agencies. In some of these statutes, the
coordination is limited, in that it occurs between two named
agencies and is substantively narrow; in others, it is broad, in
that it involves several, unspecified agencies. As a whole, the relative lack of hierarchy in these statutes do not grant agencies as
much opportunity to exercise interagency control as in the
frameworks examined thus far, although the impact of joint initiation of coordination on interagency dynamics may be complex.
Finally, this type of coordination appears to be primarily mandatory, perhaps because discretionary, jointly-initiated coordination might be toothless.
621. More specifically, Congress authorized coordination to allow the Secretary of Energy to delegate certain parts of the electric car project to other agencies when those parts are within the expertise of other agencies and suggested
that the Secretary may do so by entering into “such arrangements and agreements with various Federal offices and agencies as he may deem necessary or
appropriate.” S. REP. NO. 94-830, at 46 (1976) (emphasis added).
622. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 6, at 1427 (“For symmetrical arrangements, the powers within the federal bureaucracy are more equivalent
than in advising and monitoring adversarial relationships.”); KAISER, supra
note 240, at 6 (“[C]ollaboration . . . recognizes a degree of voluntarism among
the participants; even though required to become members of a collaborative
arrangement, their actual participation could vary, based on their own determinations and not on directives from a lead authority. This situation reflects parity . . . producing a horizontal cooperative arrangement among peers.”); STANTON, supra note 130, at 7 (noting that in collaboration, “multiple agencies may
perceive mutual benefit in working together”).
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1. Mandatory
Congress may mandate coordination with a clearly collaborative flavor. The set of intentional, mandated jointly-initiated
coordination schemas brought to light here tend to involve agencies with similar views on the importance and intent of the overarching legislative mandate, meaning that agencies involved in
these frameworks are inherently motivated to work together.
Furthermore, in these instances, the interplay between the lack
of hierarchy and the likelihood of conflict623 resulting from overlapping jurisdiction means that the potential for interagency
control is reduced, but not eliminated, because agencies are still
required to coordinate.
For instance, the Older Americans Act and other legislation concerning the Administration on Aging624 include coordination between two named agencies. More specifically, the Administration on Aging must work with its parent agency, the
Department of Health and Human Services,625 and with the Department of Labor626 to improve “employment and training programs”627 and further “support services” for the elderly involving
health, education and training, among others.628 The provision
of job assistance for veterans also includes mandatory joint coordination arrangements between the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Labor under the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act.629 And, a joint
623. See supra Part II.B.1.
624. See supra notes 511–16 and accompanying text (describing coordination
within the Older Americans Act).
625. Programs for Older Americans Act, ch. 35, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3056c (2012)
(“Interagency cooperation”).
626. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3013 (requiring the Commissioner on Aging (now the Assistant Secretary on Aging) to “advise, consult, and cooperate with the Secretary
of Labor” in order to increase employment opportunities for the elderly); Older
Americans Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-375, 106 Stat. 1195 (1992);
H.R. REP. NO. 102-199, at 76–78 (1991) (determining that “the Secretary of Labor and the Commissioner on Aging [should] work together”).
627. H.R. REP. NO. 102-199, at 76–78 (1991).
628. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 3030(d).
629. Job Counseling, Training, and Placement Service for Veterans Act, ch.
41, 38 U.S.C.A. § 4105 (2012) (“Cooperation of Federal agencies”) (mandating
that the Department of Labor to coordinate with the Department of Veterans
Affairs, the Department of Defense and “[a]ll federal agencies” under the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act to provide career counseling
and job placement services to veterans); S. REP. NO. 100-128, at 29–30 (1987);
Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
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approach to coordination630 is mandated by the Public Works
and Economic Development Act631 in order to promote domestic economic development.632 In all of these instances, agencies must both wield and willingly submit to use of one another’s
resources in order to further a shared goal. And in a rather idiosyncratic example under the Whaling Convention Act,633
agencies must concur with—that is, consent to—the Secretary of
State’s efforts to coordinate634 in order to uphold national policy
92-540 (1972); see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 4108 (1972) (“Cooperation and coordination”) (allowing periodic coordination between the Department of Labor and the
Department of Veterans Affairs under the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act); see also supra note 509 and accompanying text (describing interagency coordination in assisting homeless veterans).
630. Economic Development Partnerships Cooperation and Coordination
Act, ch. 38, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3133 (“Coordination”) (“The Secretary [of Commerce]
shall coordinate activities relating to the preparation and implementation of
comprehensive economic development strategies under this chapter with Federal agencies carrying out other Federal programs, States, economic development districts, Indian tribes, and other appropriate planning and development
organizations.”). Whereas 42 U.S.C.A. § 3132 (2012) required other federal
agencies to cooperate with the Secretary of Commerce, this section places a duty
on the Secretary of Commerce to coordinate the activities of state and federal
agencies/programs related to the Act. The grant of power is broad, as it appears
to encompass all federal agencies. Even prior to the addition of § 3132, the Economic Development Administration (within the Department of Commerce) was
coordinating with a wide range of agencies to execute its duties under the
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act; these included the
Department of Energy, Department of Labor, and Department of Defense,
among others. See Economic Development Partnership Act: Hearing on S. 1647
Before the S. Subcomm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, Comm. on Env’t and
Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 30, 42 (1998).
631. Economic Development Administration and Appalachian Regional Development Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-393, 112 Stat. 3596 (1998)
(providing for coordination); Public Works and Economic Development Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-136, 79 Stat. 552 (1965) (original statute).
632. S. REP. NO. 105-332, at 5 (1998) (suggesting that Congress provided for
interagency cooperation in 42 U.S.C.A. § 3133 because it found that “better coordination of Federal activities [was] needed” to achieve the Public Works and
Economic Development Act’s purpose of providing economic development assistance to less developed parts of the United States).
633. Whaling Convention Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-676, 64 Stat. 421
(1950).
634. Whaling Convention Act, ch. 14, 16 U.S.C.A. § 916h(a) (2012) (“Cooperation between Federal and State and private agencies and organizations in scientific and other programs”) (“In order to avoid duplication in scientific and
other programs, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the agency, institution, or organization concerned, may direct the United States Commissioner to arrange for the cooperation of agencies . . . .”).
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concerning the regulation of whaling,635 even though the State
Department’s authority in this instance stems in part from the
international nature of whaling636 and allows it to reach out to
just about any institution.637 Here, although coordination is
mandated, agencies that affirmatively concur/consent may be
more likely to volunteer resources that benefit the State Department’s agenda on whaling regulation.
In one notable case, under the National Flood Insurance
Act,638 Congress mandated coordination between an executive
agency—the Department of Homeland Security and its subcomponent, the Federal Emergency Management Agency—and the
White House, in order to prevent hazards that might lead to
flood disasters.639 Finally, a few examples in this category are
responsive to the need for coordination created by overlapping
jurisdiction. For instance, shared informal ownership of fishing
regions and the related nuances of transboundary fish migration
under the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention640 motivated the issuance of coordination between the Department of
Commerce and other “Federal agencies, the States, the New
England and Mid-Atlantic [Fishery Management] Councils, and
private institutions and organizations”641 under the Fisheries
635. H.R. REP. NO. 2514, at 5 (1950).
636. Id. at 7.
637. See supra note 634.
638. National Flood Insurance Act, ch. 50, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4122 (1968) (“Studies of other natural disasters; cooperation and consultation with other departments and agencies”); National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448,
82 Stat. 572 (1968).
639. National Flood Insurance Act, ch. 50, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4101c(a)(1) (“Coordination”) (mandating that the “Secretary of Homeland Security, the Administrator [of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is a component of
Homeland Security], the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and
the heads of each Federal department or agency . . . shall work together to ensure that flood risk determination data and geospatial data are shared among
Federal agencies in order to coordinate the efforts of the Nation to reduce its
vulnerability to flooding hazards”); id. § 4101c(a)(2) (“Coordination”) (requiring
the “Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United States Geological Survey,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Corps of Engineers,
and other Federal agencies [to] submit to the appropriate authorizing and appropriating committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives an interagency budget crosscut and coordination report”).
640. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention Act, ch. 76, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 5604 (1995) (“Interagency cooperation”).
641. S. REP. NO. 104-91, 15 (1995).
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Act.642 The various statutes on coordination to provide programming for the elderly also feature overlap.643
2. Semi-Obligatory
The examples examined in this project do not include any
regimes that involve jointly-initiated coordination between
named agencies “to the maximum extent possible” or “to the
maximum extent practicable.”
3. Discretionary
Finally, the only instances of jointly-initiated, discretionary
coordination in the examined dataset is the oldest statute in this
dataset, the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, under
which the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce are “authorized” to coordinate with federal and state agencies to “increase
the supply of game and fur-bearing animals, as well as to study
the effects of domestic sewage, trade wastes, and other polluting
substances on wildlife.”644 The neutral, non-mandatory language
in this statute may be due to its function as prototype of the more
forceful language Congress now uses to mandate interagency coordination.

642. Fisheries Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-43, 109 Stat. 366, (1995).
643. See supra notes 499–504 (discussing interagency coordination to provide programing for elderly Americans).
644. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.

